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Abstract
This thesis is primarily an investigation of Piaget * s claim that
preschool children are egocentric, in the particular sense of being
unable to calculate what another person can see (Piaget and Inhelder,
1956).
Chapter 1 outlines the general theoretical background to this
investigation. It is argued that there is a conflict between Piaget's
claim that young children are egocentric, or unable to take another
person's point of view, and the idea, stemming from Dewey and Mead,
that young children are from an early age involved in communication
situations which require them to take another person's point of view.
A historical review is presented of each of these two positions, and
- Bome specific areas of conflict are outlined.
Chapter 2 focuses on the specific ability of calculating what
another person can see, and suggests that the preschool child's early
interactions contain sequences in which this ability may be required.
„ Tm jaain kinds of sequence are considered: those involving reference,
or the joint focusing of visual attention on features of the immediate
environment, and those involving clearance, or the use of visual attention
in initiating interactions. The evidence for the occurrence of these
sequences is discussed.
Chapter 3 considers various experimental studies of the child's
ability to calculate what another person can see in terms of the dist¬
inction between -projective abilities (which involve merely calculating
what another person is looking at) and perspective abilities (whioh
involve calculating how it looks to the other person). Virtually all
these studies support the findings of Piaget and Inhelder's mountain
(iv)
task and suggest that children below 8 years do not have complex per¬
spective abilities. Moreover, Piaget and Inhelder argue that their
findings imply that preschool children cannot have simple projective
and perspective abilities. It is suggested that Piaget and Inhelder's
arguments are inadequate, and that a fuller investigation of preschool
children's competences in this area is required.
Chapter 4 reports eight experiments which investigate these
competences. In general these experiments demonstrate that even children
as young as 3 years have considerable abilities in both the projective
and perspective areas. In the projective area, the results of Experi¬
ment 1 show that 3- and 4-year old children can construct the line of
sight between two dolls, and are aware that blocking this line of sight
means that one doll can no longer see the other. Moreover the results
of Experiments 7 and 8 show that children as young as 3 years perform
well on tasks requiring them to coordinate 2 or 3 lines of sight. In
the perspective area the results of Experiments 4» 5 and 6 show that
3- and 4—year old children can construct another person's view of a
group of 3 dolls, and that they do this by using a two stage inferential
strategy. However they will only use this strategy in certain specified
COltditions. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that many 4-year
olds can calculate another person's view of a cup when this involves
transformations in the front/back dimension.
Chapter 5 summarises these findings and draws some general con¬
clusions. Primarily, these experiments show that children as young as
3 years can calculate what another person can see, and in this respect
preschool children are by no means as egocentric as Piaget has claimed.
(v)
Moreover these findings have implications for the more general area of
cognitive development, in tezms of how cognitive tasks are presented to
children; the strategies children may use in solving such tasks; the
kinds of inferences preschool children can make; and the importance
of considering cognitive abilities in social situations.
«
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Chapter 1. Introduction and General Theoretical Background
1. Introduction
This thesis is primarily an investigation of Piaget's claim
that young children are egocentric or unable to take another
person's point of view (e.g. Piaget 1926, 1928; Piaget and
Inhelder 1956). It is particularly concerned with one aspect of
egocentrism: the question of whether or not young children are
able to calculate what another person can see.
In Piaget's theory it is claimed that children below 7 or 8
years are unable to calculate what another person can see. The
main evidence for this comes from the well known "mountain task"
(Piaget and Inhelder 1956). In this task the child is seated
before a model of three mountains and a doll is placed at various
positions around the model. In a typical version of the task the
child is then shown several pictures of the mountains, taken from
different viewpoints, and he is asked to select first the picture
showing his own view and then the picture showing the doll's view.
Piaget and Inhelder found that most children below 8 years could
correctly select their own view, but few could select the doll's
view. A typical response found with the younger children (below
6 years) was that when asked to select the doll's view they simply
selected their own view again.
This result is generally held to be a classic example of
egocentrism. Children below 8 years at least are, quite literally,
unable to take another person's point of view. Moreover, children
below 6 years do not even seem to be aware that the other person
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has a point of view distinct from their own. They seem to believe
that the other person sees exactly what they themselves see.
Piagetian theory, then, holds that young children are unable
to calculate what another person can see. However, a different
approach to this question suggests a rather different answer.
Observations of young children in their naturally occurring social
interactions suggest that situations frequently occur which may
require them to be able to calculate what another person can see.
We will briefly outline two main kinds of situation here; these
will be considered in more detail in Chapter 2.
First, it seems that very young children (below 3 years) may
actively engage in directing or following another person's direction
of gaze in order to achieve a common focusing of visual attention
on some particular object or event in the immediate environment.
This common focus may be achieved for its own sake, or for naming
or requesting the name of an object, or as a prelude to talking
about the object. This process will be considered under the general
heading of reference.
The second kind of situation occurs when interactions are
initiated. It seems that slightly older children (3 to 5 years)
frequently engage in quite complex sequences of behaviour when
initiating interactions, and these sequences often involve
attracting the other person's visual attention before proceeding
with the interaction. This process, which is called clearance
by Goffman (1963), occurs even when the topic of the interaction or
conversation lies outside the immediate environment.
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Both of these processes seem to require the young child to be
able to calculate what another person can see. Clearly there is a
conflict here between this alternative approach and Piaget's theory.
This thesis is essentially an attempt to resolve the conflict
between these two positions.
This particular conflict is part of a much wider theoretical
conflict between Piaget's theory of egocentrism and the idea
that young children are from an early age involved in situations
which require them to take another person's point of view. For
the rest of this chapter we will be concerned with this more
general conflict. We will first give a historical review of
Piaget's concept of egocentrism, and then consider some aspects
of the alternative theoretical position. Finally we will outline
some areas of conflict between the two positions and suggest
possible ways in which particular issues may be resolved.
2. Piaget's concept of egocentrism
Piaget introduced the concept of egocentrism in his first
two books (Piaget 1926, 1928). The main theme of both these books
is that young children below 7 or 8 years are predominantly egocentric,
or unable to take another person's point of view. This is illustrated
by three studies in particular: those of egocentric speech, com¬
munication skills, and relational terms.
Piaget's investigation of egocentric speech was primarily an
attempt to obtain an objective measure of the egocentrism of thought.
He recorded the spontaneous speech of children in a free situation
and divided it into two major categories, egocentric speech and
socialised speech. Egocentric speech occurs either when the child is
f
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alone or when "he does not attempt to place himself at the point
of view of his hearer" (Piaget, 1926, p.9.). Socialised speech
occurs when the child does adopt the point of view of his hearer.
Piaget found that for his small group of subjects the coefficient
of egccentri3m (the proportion of egocentric speech to total
speech) was around 40-50% between 3 and 6 years, and decreased
rapidly around 7 or 8 years.
One major problem with this account of egocentric speech
is that it is not clear exactly what is meant by "not attempting
to place himself at the point of view of his hearer". Piaget offers
several different explanations of egocentric speech and socialised
speech, but they are all expressed in mentalistic terms with few
behavioural criteria. For example, during egocentric speech the
child
"... seems on this occasion to want to make himself
understood; but on closer examination it will be
seen that he cares very little who is listening to
him ... and furthermore, that he does not care
whether the person he addresses has really heard
him or not. He believes someone is listening to
him; that is all he wants."
(Piaget, 1926, p.8.).
and
"... He talks either for himself or for the
pleasure of associating anyone who happens to be




"He is not speaking to anyone. He talks aloud
to himself in front of others."
(ibid, p.18.).
and
"The child talks about himself, except in those
cases where he does so during collaboration with
his hearer ... and except in cases of dialogue.
Dialogue, in our view, occurs when the child who
has been spoken to in a proposition answers by
talking about something that was treated of in
this proposition."
(ibid. p.21.).
On the other hand, during socialised speech,
"
... the child talks not at random, but to
specified persons and with the object of









... the child actually makes his hearer listen and
contrives to influence him, i.e. to tell him some¬
thing."
(ibid. p.19.).
Not surprisingly, a variety of different interpretations of the
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of egocentric speech were made by Piaget's readers (see, for
example, McCarthy 1954). Piaget later claimed (e.g. Piaget
1959, p.257; Piaget and Inhelder 1969, p.61) that these readers
had simply misunderstood what was quite clear. The selection
which we have just given from Piaget's original account shows
that Piaget himself must take a fair share of the blame for the
subsequent misunderstandings.
Piaget also devised communication tasks where children
were first told a story, or given an explanation of a mechanism
such as a tap or a syringe, and were then asked to repeat the
story or explanation to another child. Piaget found that
children below 7 or 8 years showed considerable inadequacy in
communicating. One common form of this inadequacy was a lack
of clarity of reference. The younger children frequently used
personal pronouns or demonstratives without indicating what
they referred to, and they often completely omitted to name
characters in the stories or parts of the mechanisms. Piaget
claimed that this was due directly to egocentrism. The young
child is unable to differentiate his own view from the other's,
and so he believes that the other child already knows what he
is talking about. Consequently he does not take the trouble to
make himself clear.
"If children fail to understand one another, it is
because they think they do understand one another.
The explainer believes from the start that the
reproducer will grasp everything, will almost know
beforehand all that should be known, and will
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interpret every subtlety ... it is obviously owing
to this mentality that children do not take the
trouble to talk convinced as they are that the
other person knows as much or more than they do,
and that he will immediately understand what is
the matter. This mentality does not contradict the
egocentric mentality. Both arise from the same
belief of the child, the belief that he is the
centre of the universe."
(ibid, p.101.).
This explanation seems a poor attempt to explain the results
of the communication tasks. Indeed, if what Piaget says here is
true, then why do children "take the trouble to talk" at all?.
The children do not fail the tasks because they don't talk. They
do talk, but they make characteristic errors, particularly of
reference. Piaget's explanation is incapable of explaining why
they talk at all, or why they make these particular errors.
As part of his investigation of the child's ability to handle
relational concepts, Piaget (1928) directly tested the child's
comprehension of the terms "brother" and "sister". A typical
finding was that a boy below 7 or 8 years would know that he had
a brother, but would not know that he himself was his brother's
brother. Piaget argued that the child's egocentrism prevented him
from seeing himself from his brother's point of view, and thus
realising the reciprocal nature of the relationship.
Piaget reported similar results for the terms "left" and
"right". Below 7 or 8 years the child can identify his own left
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and right hands, but cannot correctly identify the right and
left hands of a person sitting opposite him. This, Piaget claims,
involves taking the point of view of the other person, and so is
impossible for the egocentric child.
These three studies, of egocentric speech, communication
skills, and relational terms, are for Piaget the paradigm cases
of egocentrism. They are the clearest examples he gives of the
young child's inability to take another person's point of view.
All the same, he tries to relate all the other studies in these
two volumes to egocentrism. The argument he uses is that the
egocentric child is unable to take another person's point of view,
and so feels no need either to justify his thinking to others or
to compare his thought with theirs. The egocentric child is
unable to see his thought as itself an object of thought and so
he cannot see the subjective and self-contradictory elements in
his own thinking. As a consequence his thought is illogical,
dominated by personal schemes and visual analogies. These properties
are described by such terms as syncretism, juxtaposition,
precausality and intellectual realism, and are illustrated by the
other studies in the two volumes"''.
A final example of egocentrism from Piaget's early works is
given by his study of children's conceptions of the rules of
marbles (Piaget 1932). Piaget found that children below about
7 years knew at most only a small part of the rules, and this
often differed from the parts that the other participants knew.
Nevertheless all would play together at their own variation of
the game, each believing he was playing to the same rules as
the others. There was little conception of winning and losing.
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Piaget claimed that to play to the rules involves subjecting one's
own interpretation of the game to the more objective point of view
outlined by the rules. The child below 7 or 8 years, being
egocentric, is unable to do this.
There have been three major developments in Piaget's concept
of egocentrism since these early formulations. First, Piaget
developed other concepts to describe the major changes which occur
in the child's thinking around 7 or 8 years (e.g. the groupings.
concrete operations, reversibility), and egocentrism became
closely related to these other concepts. Secondly egocentrism,
in connection with the notion of decentering, became a higher order
concept and was applied throughout development. Thirdly Piaget
attempted around I960 to "clarify" his position on egocentric speech
but in so doing contradicted his earlier account. These three
developments will be considered in turn.
In the late 1930s and 19U0s Piaget started to express the
properties of the young child's thought in terms that were more
logical and mathematical, replacing the informal descriptive terms
he had previously used, such as syncretism and juxtaposition. The
logical, organised thinking which emerges around 7 or 8 years
became known as concrete operational thought, and the child below
7 or 8 years was referred to as preoperational. The concrete
operations are internalised general actions performed on specific
elements in the real world (hence concrete) which are coordinated
into organised systems, the logico-mathematical structure of which
is expressed by the groupings. The operations are essentially
reversible, in that each operation necessarily implies the reverse
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operation. (For more details see Piaget 1950, Inhelder and
Piaget 1964, Piaget and Inhelder 1969).
Concrete operational thought is also connected with the
concept of decentering. This has two main senses here. First,
Piaget often states that concrete operational thought is decentered
in the general sense of being objective rather than subjective
(e.g. Piaget 1950 p.73, Piaget and Inhelder 1969 pp.94-5). This
objectivity is ensured by its not being confined to one particular
point of view; it involves the coordination of several points of
view. Here decentered thought is being directly contrasted with
egocentrism. What is decentered is the whole cognitive system,
and what it is decentered from is the personal viewpoint or ego.
In another sense, the decentering of concrete operational
thought is connected with specific acts of attention and perception.
Here it is directly contrasted with the notion of centering.
The preoperational child tends to center or focus on only one
aspect of an object or an event, and ignores other relevant
features of the situation. A child who can decenter, on the other
hand, can take account of, and is able to coordinate the results
of, several centerings. Piaget often uses the concept of decentering
in this second sense to explain performance on class inclusion
tasks and conservation tasks (Piaget 1950 pp.130-3).
2
Piaget relates each of these concepts in turn to egocentrism.
The groupings, he argues, are essentially a system which coordinate
viewpoints and so are incompatible with egocentrism (Piaget 1950
p.164). Similarly, egocentrism is incompatible with reversibility,
for the simultaneous awareness of both an action and its reverse
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action requires the ability to be aware of and coordinate more
than one viewpoint (Piaget 1959 p.28o). Finally, egocentrism
is most closely related to decentering (Piaget 1950 p.ll+2).
Egocentric thought cannot be decentered, as it is tied to a
single viewpoint, and an egocentric child cannot decenter, as
he is tied to his own perception. The linking together of all
these concepts is well illustrated by the following:
"Now from the fact that a grouping gives us that form
of equilibrium achieved by the coordination of actions
at the time of their becoming completely decentered,
it follows that we can measure intellectual egocentrism
by the irreversibility of thought, and therefore by the
absence of any groupings, and we can also determine the
exact progress of reversibility by the gradual building
up of such groupings ..."
(Piaget 1959 p.28l).
The linking up of these concepts has a very import effect
on the concept of egocentrism. It ties egocentrism up much more
closely with the formal structures of Piaget's theory, and in
particular, via the notion of decentering, to the standard tests
of preoperational thought such as class inclusion and conservation.
At the same time it draws the emphasis away from the manifestations
of egocentrism in the social and linguistic areas which were a
crucial part of Piaget's early formulations of the concept. Thus,
following on directly from the passage just quoted, Piaget continues:
"... That is why, in our opinion, research which is
based on evidence as fragile as egocentrism should be
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replaced by an analysis of the actual operational
mechanism of action and thought i.e. of the inner
source of intellectual development." (Piaget 1959 p.281)
Similar sentiments are expressed in the following passage:
"The phenomenon itself (i.e. egocentrism) whose
relative frequency at different development levels
we had wanted to test, as well as its decline with
age, has never been disputed because it has seldom
been understood. When viewed in terms of a
distorting centering on one's own action, and of
subsequent decentering, this phenomenon proved
much more significant in the study of actions
themselves and of their interiorisation in the
form of mental operations than in the field of
language." (Piaget 1962 p.7).
This still seems to be the current Piagetian position, as
Inhelder (pers. comm.) has recently confirmed. She again emphasises
that the egocentrism of the preoperational child must be seen
primarily in terms of the subsequent decentering leading to the
grouping of operations. This, as we shall see later, is well
illustrated by Piaget and Inhelder's explanation of the young
child's performance on the mountain task.
The second major development in the concept of egocentrism
was that, in conjunction with the concept of decentering, it became
a higher order concept within Piaget's theory. This development
was at first implicit in Piaget's extension of the concept to
infancy and adolescence, and was later made explicit when he
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used the concept to compare intellectual development with
expansions in epistemology.
The egocentrism of infancy is illustrated by the neonate's
complete inability to distinguish himself from the rest of the
world (Piaget 1950 pp.113-4). A gradual decentering occurs
over the first 18 months of life so that at the end of this
period the infant can recognise himself as an object in a world
made up of permanent objects, and containing some degree of
causality (see Piaget 1952, 1954 for more details). The egocentrism
of adolescence is connected with the appearance of formal operational
thought. The principal feature of this level of thinking is its
ability to organise logically not only statements about the real
world (as in concrete operational thinking) but also hypothetical
statements about other possible states of the world. The
egocentrism of adolescence comes from an inability to differentiate
these imagined possibilities from more realistic expectations of
the world. It manifests itself in the form of an adolescent
idealism, more or less unadapted to reality (see Inhelder and
Piaget 1958, especially pp.345-6).
The extension of the concepts of egocentrism and decentering
to the whole of intellectual development, and finally to epistemology,
is illustrated by the following:
"In the field of thinking, the whole history of
science from geocentrism to the Copernican
revolution, from the false absolutes of Aristotle's
physics to the relativity of Galileo's principle of
1<+.
inertia, and to Einstein's theory of relativity,
shows that it has taken centuries to liberate us
from the systematic errors, from the illusions
caused by the immediate point of view as opposed
to ' decentered' scientific thinking. And this
liberation is far from complete.
"I coined the term 'cognitive egocentrism'
(no doubt a bad choice) to express the idea
that the progress of knowledge never proceeds
by a mere addition of items or of new levels,
as if richer knowledge were only a complement
of the earlier meagre one: it requires also a
perpetual reformulation of previous points of
view by a process which moves backwards as well
as forward, continually correcting both the
initial systematic errors and those arising
along the way. This corrective process seems
to obey a well defined developmental law, the
law of decentering ('decentration'). For
science to shift from a geocentric to a
helicentric perspective required a gigantic
feat of decentering. But the same kind of
process can be seen in the small child: my
description notably favoured by Vygotsky, of
the development of the notion 'brother' shows
what an effort is required of a child who has
a brother to understand that his brother also
15.
has a brother, that this concept refers to a
reciprocal relationship and not to an absolute
property ...
"I have used the term egocentrism to
designate the initial inability to decenter,
to shift the given cognitive perspective ('manque
de decentration'). It might have been better to
say simply 'centrism', but since the initial
centering of perspective is always relative to
one's own position and action I said 'egocentrism'
and pointed out that the unconscious egocentrism
of thought to which I referred was quite unrelated
to the common meaning of the term, hypertrophy of
the consciousness of the self."
(Piaget, 1962, p.3-*+).
The main implication of this extension of the concept of
egocentrism is that there is no longer any particular stage of
development at which the child can be said to be egocentric.
Instead, he is egocentric, in some way or another at every
developmental stage. Indeed, egocentrism occurs even in adulthood
whenever "there are periods of mental inertia" (Piaget 1959 p.271),
while on the epistemic level Piaget seems to be implying that, as
long as man's knowledge of the universe is incomplete, there will
3
always be egocentrism . The appropriate question to ask now is
not "is the child egocentric at this stage?" but "what form does
his egocentrism take at this stage?". This second major development
clearly ties up with the first; the egocentrism of the preoperational
15.
child lies primarily in his lack of groupings.
However Fiaget has not by any means abandoned his concept of
egocentric speech, despite his attempts to draw attention away from
it. The third major development in the concept of egocentrism is
that Piaget recently cried to "clarify" his position on egocentric
speech (Piaget 1959, 1952). The clarified position, though, is
substantially different from the original account. For a start
Piaget retracted the claim made in 1926 that the coefficient of
egocentrism (the proportion of egocentric speech to total speech)
is a valid measure of the egocentrism of thought. Instead he
acknowledged the evidence (e.g. from Katz and Katz 1927, Buhler
1931, Isaacs 1933) that there is considerable variation in this
coefficient. However, Piaget claimed that these variations can
be explained by situational factors, such as the number of others
present and their relationships to the child, the kind of activity
going on, and whether the setting is home or school. Whether these
factors alone can explain all the variations found in the coefficient
of egocentrism is doubtful. Even after discounting those studies
which have grossly misunderstood Piaget's concept of egocentrism,
such as Fisher (1934) who simply recorded the number of sentences
with "I" as the subject, it is certain that there are still sufficient
differences in the subjective interpretations of Piaget's criteria
for egocentric speech to make comparison between studies of little
use (see McCarthy 1954).
Having retracted his claim about the coefficient of egocentrism,
Piaget then proceeded to reformulate his position on egocentric speech.
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"There is no reason to believe that cognitive
egocentrism, marked by unconscious preferential
focusing or by a lack of differentiation of
viewpoints, has no application to the field of
interpersonal relations, in particular those which
are expressed in language. To take an example from
adult life, every beginning instructor discovers
sooner or later that his first lectures were
incomprehensible because he was talking to himself,
so to say, mindful only of his own point of view. He
realises only gradually and with difficulty that it
is not easy to place oneself in the shoes of students
who do not yet know what he knows about the subject
matter of the course." (ibid, p.5.)
Clearly this example of the lecturer is closer to Piaget's
original study of communication between two children than to his
observations on spontaneous speech, and indeed he goes on to say
that the communication situation was originally the more important
for him. (This is certainly not the impression one gets from the
original account.) The communication situation, illustrated by
the example of the lecturer, now becomes the model for egocentric
speech. In this revised position, then, speech is egocentric when
a child is trying to communicate with another person but failing to
take into account their particular knowledge, attitudes, opinions,
etc. which are relevant to the situation.
"As far as I know, I have never spoken of speech
'not meant for others'; this would have been
18.
misleading, for I have always recognized that the
child thinks he is talking to others and is making
himself understood. My view is simply that in
egocentric speech the child talks for himself (in
the sense in which a lecturer may speak 'for
himself' alone, even though he naturally intends
his words for the audience.)"
(ibid, p.8.)
This later account of egocentric speech differs considerably from
Piaget's original account. The emphasis here is on the child trying
to cummunicate and failing, through not taking account of the other's
point of view. This contradicts earlier statements such as
"He feels no desire to influence his hearer nor tell
him anything ..."
(Piaget, 1926, p.9.)
Moreover Piaget's original account included under egocentric speech
the category of monologue, or speech uttered when the child is alone.
Again this is incompatible with the later position, where the emphasis
is on the child's attempting to communicate to another person.
Monologues cannot be considered as egocentric speech in the revised
position.
There are then clear contradictions between Piaget's two accounts
of egocentric speech. Furthermore it is not clear which version is
favoured in current Piagetian theory. The most recent account of
egocentric speech (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, pp. 20-122) includes
both versions simultaneously, without taking account of their differences.
19.
One of the main conclusions that we want to draw from this
review of Piaget's concept of egocentrism is that it is not easy to
specify precisely what Piaget means when he claims that young
children are egocentric or unable to take another person's point of
view. This lack of precision occurs in several different places in
his account of egocentrism. First, we have seen that Piaget's early
account of egocentric speech was confusing and that his explanation
of the results of the communication tasks in terms of egocentrism
was inadequate. Secondly, we have pointed out that one of the main
effects of linking up egocentrism with the other concepts of
preoperational thought is that all standard tests of preoperational
thought, such as class inclusion or conservation tasks, automatically
become tests of egocentrism. Finally we have shown that there are
contradictions between Piaget's original account of egocentric speech
presented in 1926 and his revised account presented in 1959 and 1962.
3. Taking the other person's point of view in communication
We will now consider the theoretical position which appears at
first sight to be in direct opposition to Piaget's theory of egocentrism.
The essence of this opposing theoretical position is the idea that
communication is fundamentally an interpersonal process for which the
ability to 'take another person's point of view" is a basic prerequisite.
The direct implication of this basic idea is that, since young children
do have a certain number of communication skills, then they must, to
some extent at least, be able to "take another person's point of view".
Although this basic idea that communication involves taking another
person's point of view has been put forward by several theorists, it
has usually been expressed in a variety of different forms and has
20.
never been worked out very extensively. As a consequence, there
is no single comprehensive elaboration of this basic idea, but
instead there is a variety of isolated accounts. We will now
review some of the more important of these accounts.
The idea that communication involves taking another person's
point of view is by no means new. It was stressed in particular
by both Dewey and Mead. The following passage from Dewey (1925)
is a good account of the basic ideas involved. Here Dewey not
only deals with taking the other person's point of view, but
connects this with the important distinction between "conventional"
and "non-conventional" communication, and finally ends with a
model account of what has since become known as "intersubjectivity".
"A requests B to bring him something, to which A
points, say a flower, There is an original
mechanism by which B may react to A's movement
in pointing. But natively such a reaction is
to the movement, not to the pointing, not to
the object pointed out. But B learns that the
movement is a pointing; he responds to it not
in itself, but as an index of something else.
His response is transferred from A's direct
movement to the object to which A points. Thus
he does not merely execute the natural acts of
looking or grasping which the movement might
instigate on its own account. The motion of A
attracts his gaze to the thing pointed to; then,
21.
instead of just transferring his response from
A's movements to the native reaction he might
make to the thing as a stimulus, he responds in
a way which is a. function of A's relationship,
actual and potential, to the thing. The
characteristic thing about B's understanding
of A's movements is that he responds to the
thing from the standpoint of A. He perceives
the thing as it may function in A's experience,
instead of just egocentrically. Similarly, A
in making the request conceives the thing not
only in its direct relationship to himself, but
as a thing capable to being grasped and handled
by B. He sees the thing as it may function in
B's experience. Such is the essence and import
of communication, signs and meaning. Something
is literally made common in at least two
different centres of behaviour. To understand
is to anticipate together, it is to make a
cross-reference which when acted upon, brings about
a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking."
(Dewey, 1925, pp.178-9, emphasis added in places)
Mead (1934, 1947) also emphasised the process of taking another's
point of view. In his theory, meaningful human communication
"involves not only communication in the sense in
which birds and animals communicate with each other,
but also an arousal in the individual himself of
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the response which he in calling out in the ether
individual, a taking of the role of the other, a
tendency to act as the other person acts." (Mead,
1947, p.193, emphasis added)
Despite their apparent similarities there are considerable
differences between the positions of Dewey and Mead. Dewey seems
to be suggesting that all conventional communication implicitly
involves taking the other's point of view, and so this ability
must be present in the young infant as soon as he speaks his
first word or engages in his first conventional act of non-verbal
communication. On Dewey's theory, then, infants of less than 12
months may be able to take another person's point of view. Mead,
on the other hand, claims that only a certain type of communication
involving what he calls significant symbols. This type of communication
takes place only when the child has acquired the ability to internalise
a variety of other points of view, a process which Mead calls the
acquisition of the generalised other. Mead does not specify the age
at which the generalised other is acquired, but he does say that before
it can be acquired the child must pass through the "play stage" in
which he externalises several roles at once in his dramatic play.
This seems to put the age of acquisition of the generalised other
at around 5 or 6 years, slightly before the age Piaget gives for the
waning of preoperational egocentrism.
The kind of interpersonal approach to language typified by
Dewey and Mead has been very much out of fashion lately. Since
Chomsky (1.957, 1965), the emphasis has been mainly on regarding
language as an impersonal system of rules which an individual somehow
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learns or acquires. Much attention has been paid to determining
developmental levels of competence within the system, particularly
by looking at the age at which certsin structures (usually syntactic)
are acquired. Little attention has been paid to the situational, and
in particular to the interpersonal contexts in which such structures
are used, although there are signs that more recent accounts (e.g.
Bloom 1970) are beginning to take some of these factors into account.
Similarly, the various abilities and mechanisms which have been
proposed to account for the young child's acquisition of language have
also been very much detached from the actual interpersonal situations
in which language is acquired and used. For instance in the early
post-Chomsky period there was much discussion of a "Language Acquisition
Device" (e.g. Chomsky 1965, McNeill 1970). This crude device was
supposed to operate on the corpus of utterances that a young child
heard and extract the underlying regularities in the corpus, thus
providing the child with his "grammatical competence". However,
there has been some realisation recently that grammatical competence
is not enough. Campbell and Wales (1970) argue for the notion of
"communicative competence" or "the ability to produce or understand
utterances which are not so much grammatical but, more important,
appropriate to the context in which they are made." (p.247) This
point has beer, taken up by Ryan (1974):
"The neglect of what has come to be known as
'communicative competence' is not only serious
in itself, but has also led. to a distorted viev;
of the child's grammatical abilities. This
distortion is seen most clearly in McNeill's (1966)
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exaggerated claims as regards the child's 'achievements'
in acquiring syntax with such alleged speed. If the
acquisition of syntex was seen in a broader develop¬
mental perspective as based on the child's pre-existing
social, communicative, and verbal skills, it would not
seem quite the 'mystery' that McNeill (1970) supposes it
to be."
(Ryan, 197U, p.185)
There have been a few attempts by psychologists recently to provide
interpersonal models of communication (e.g. Flavell et al 1968, Argyle
1969, Marshall 1971). These three models, though, amount to little
more than restatements of the fact that communication is_ an interpersonal
process involving some kind of interpersonal skills ("role taking skills"
in Flavell's terminology, and "social skills" in Argyle's). Indeed
most of the more interesting recent accounts of the interpersonal
aspects of language have come not from linguists, nor from psychologists,
but from philosophers interested in ordinary language (e.g. Austin 1962a,
Grice 1957, 1968, Searle 1969, Strawson 196^). Austin, for example,
distinguished between the formal meaning of an utterance and its
illocutionary force, or what the speaker is trying to bring about
conventionally by his utterance. Thus the utterance "will you shut
the door?", although formally an enquiry about what the hearer might
do in the future, is in fact a request for immediate action. According
to Austin, then, understanding an utterance involves not just knowing
the meaning of the words, but also understanding what the speaker is
trying to do with the utterance.
Also relevant here is Grice's theory of meaning. He proposed
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(Grice 1957) that utterer's meaning, or what a speaker means by
a given utterance on a specific occasion, is more basic than
sentence meaning, or what the sentence conventionally means.
He analyses the former as follows: a speaker means something by
an utterance if the speaker intends to produce a certain effect
in his audience by means of the audience's recognising his intention.
This was later refined and extended by Strawson (1964) and Grice
(1968) to include more levels of intention and recognition of
intention. Thus a more complete analysis involves:
(1) the speaker's intention to produce a certain response in the
audience;
(2) the speaker's intention that the audience should recognise the
speaker's intention (1);
(3) the speaker's intention that this recognition of the speaker's
intention (2) be the reason, or part of it, for the audience's
response;
(4) the speaker's intention that the audience should recognise the
speaker's intention (2).
These insights of Austin and Grice may have considerable
relevance for the understanding of certain kinds of communication
situation. Although all communication situations can be regarded as
implicitly involving the recognition of another's intentions or the
determination of what the other is trying to do with the utterance,
there are some important kinds of situation which explicitly involve
this kind of ability. Examples of these include occasions where the
meaning of a word is being learnt or extended, or where there appears
to be difficulty or failure in communication. These are all features
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of the early language-learning situation where, as Bloom (1Q70)
and Bruner- (1973) among others have pointed out, both sides are
continually trying to interpret each other's utterances and
intentions against the background of the whole ongoing situational
context. We will look at early language acquisition again shortly.
For the time being we will merely point out that the theories of
Grice and Austin may well be useful for specifying what is involved
in "taking another person's point of view" in these situations.
Also relevant here, but in a much more general way, is Strawson's
account of our concept of a person (Strawson 1359). Strawson's
argument is essentially a critique of solipsism, the philosophical
position that holds that one can deny that other people have conscious
experience similar to one's own. Strawson argues that such a
position is logically incoherent, because it is a necessary condition
of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself that one should be
prepared to ascribe them to other persons. Our concept of a person
is of a type of entity to which both predicates ascribing states of
consciousness and predicates ascribing physical characteristics are
equally applicable, and this concept of a person is logically prior
to that of an individual consciousness. Thus it is logically
incoherent to claim that oneself is capable of consciousness while
other persons are merely physical objects.
This brief summary does not do justice to what is a very
complex argument. Moreover it should be pointed out that Strawson
is arguing for the logical primacy of our concept of a person, and
not for the developmental primacy. Nevertheless Strawson's argument
is relevant here because it suggests that young children must be able
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to identify, in some rudimentary form at least, other "centres
of consciousness" before they can meaningfully identify their own
states of consciousness. This basic recognition that other people
have points of view is an essential precondition of being able to
calculate what these other points of view are.
The few isolated theoretical insights reviewed in this section
unfortunately do not add up to an adequate overall theory. Clearly
there is a great need for a detailed interpersonal theory of
communication which would incorporate these insights into a
comprehensive overall account. Such a theory would, hopefully,
provide an adequate account of the extent to which any communication
situation involves taking another person's point of view. More
importantly, it would break down this global term "taking another
person's point of view" and specify instead precisely which of
each person's perceptions, thoughts, feelings, desires, knowledge
and intentions are relevant to the communication situation, and
what specific abilities, in the form of recognising or calculating
these perceptions, etc., are required for successful participation
in the communication situation. It would be an even better theory
if it could give an account of how an individual's level of
competence in performing these recognitions and calculations actually
imposes constraints on his performance in such situations. Clearly
this is a vast, but necessary, undertaking.
U. Specific areas of conflict
In the last two sections we have reviewed two theoretical
positions which appeared at first sight to be in direct opposition
to each other: first, Piaget's theory that young children are
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egocentric and unable to take another person's point of view and
secondly, the position that communication is an interpersonal
process for which the ability to take another person's point of
view is a basic prerequisite. We pointed out that there was on
the one hand a lack of precision in Piaget's theory of egocentrism,
and on the other hand a lack of an adequate detailed account of
the alternative theoretical position. The main conclusion to be
drawn from these two reviews is that it is at present virtually
impossible to specify which abilities in young children are being
denied by Piaget's theory yet upheld by the opposing position.
This does not mean that the conflict between the two positions
has evaporated. Instead it merely means that the two opposing
positions have not yet joined battle. Moreover they will not do
so until specific areas of conflict are outlined, each position
making a precise statement of the specific skills and abilities
claimed to be present or absent. Unless this is done, claims and
counter-claims that young children are able or unable to take
another person's point of view are of little avail. This section
briefly outlines a few areas of possible conflict between the two
opposing positions.
(a) Early language acquisition
This is currently becoming a very popular area of research,
particularly among psychologists interested in the skills and
abilities which infants bring to early language-learning situations
(e.g. Bruner 1973, 1974 and Trevarthen 1974, in press). This
research is beginning to focus on the interpersonal skills and
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processes involved in early language acquisition but, hampered by
the lack of an adequate theory, it has not yet made much progress
towards specifying the precise skills and abilities required in
these processes.
The lack of theoretical clarity in this area is well illustrated
by the many different accounts of "intersubjectivity" being circulated
at present. For example, Habermas (1970) regards intersubjectivity
as being to do with whether speakers are talking about the same
things, and is particularly concerned with the linguistic devices
by which this is brought about. For Bruner (1973) intersubjectivity
seems to cover not only the processes by which mother and child try
to interpret each other's speech and intentions (which is the concept
also put forward by Ryan, 1974), but also the vaguer notions of
"shared experience" and the establishment of a strong "link" between
mother and child. Bruner also claims that the child has the "innate
capacity to construct interpersonal schemata". Innateness is also
important for Trevarthen's idea of intersubjectivity (1974, in press).
From his films of mothers and infants interacting, he concludes that
there is a 'highly specialised form of psychological action concerned
with the transmission of intentions and attentions", and this is
present at birth. He also believes that this transmission of intention
is usually successful. (In contrast to this, Ryan emphasizes the
difficulties mothers have in trying to understand the child's early
utterances). Clearly one of the first things needed in this area
is an adequate interpersonal account of early language acquisition
perhaps based, as we have already suggested, on the insights of
Dewey and Grice.
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The recent research in this area has paid little attention to
Piaget's theory of language acquisition (Piaget 1951). In Piagetian
theory, language is very much regarded as merely another form of
representing the external world, and Piaget pays very .little attention
to the interpersonal situations in which early language is acquired.
Although imitation is an important process in Piaget's theory of
language acquisition, there is no real discussion of how much this
involves taking another person's point of view, and how far it relates
to his concept of egocentrism. This does seem to be a large defect
in Piaget's theory, and it seems more than likely that future research
in language acquisition will show that infants have a far wider range
of interpersonal skills than Piagetian theory at present allows for.
(b) Deixis in personal pronouns
A more specific example of the kind of interpersonal skill we
have in mind is that of learning the deictic constraints on the use
of personal pronouns. This example has been used more than once by
Bruner, who connects this skill with both the Piagetian concept of
decentration and his own account of intersubjectivity.
"Indeed it is a further differentiation of inter-
subjectivity that finally produce decentration or
linguistic deixis - knowing that 'I' refers to
self when self-generated but to another when
generated by them, what Jakobsen (1972) calls
'shifters'..." (Bruner, 1973, p.24)
Bruner has hypothesised that this skill arises out of the transfer
of roles occurring during play between mother and child. Having analysed
a section of film in which such a transfer occurs, he continues,
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"The child, initially Recipient of Action, now
calls on mother to act as Recipient. He ends
with himself as Agent and mother as Recipient.
We take this as the prototype of deixis,
illustrated by such conventional 'shifters' as
'I' and 'me'..." (Bruner, 1974, p.8.)
This example raises several points. First there is not yet a clear
developmental picture of how this skill is arrived at. For example
Sully (1895) noted that the first use of 'I' and 'you' between 2 and
3 years is often incorrect. "The child proceeds imititatively to use
'I', 'me', 'mine', for 'you' and 'your' (p.178). On the other hand
Huxley (1970), who recorded the acquisition of pronouns in two young
children, reported that neither of these children confused 'I' and
'you'. However both children often referred to themselves in the
third person (i.e. by their own name) before settling on the correct
use of 'I'.
Secondly there is the interesting phenomenon that a very common
syndrome found in autistic children is precisely this inability to
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use 'I' and 'you' correctly . A psychoanalytic interpretation of
this has been made by Bosch (1970), but the general opinion of those
working on autism is that there is simply a lack of the necessary
interpersonal skill in these children (Kanner 1943, Hermelin and
O'Connor 1970). At the same time some autistic children are able,
in their own fashion, to transfer roles in play (e.g. Park 1972),
which suggests that Bruner's hypothesis of role transfer being the
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prototype of deixis needs to be amended, or at least clarified .
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Finally there is the problem of relating the acquisition of
this skill to egocentrism. Bruner refers to the acquisition as
"decentering", yet it certainly does not seem to require the
possession of concrete operational thought. Can Piagetian theory
allow such partial decenterings between stages?. And how does
this skill relate logically to Piaget's (1928) study of relational
terms such as 'brother' and 'sister'?. There seems to be a very
close connection between knowing that I am 'you' to you and knowing
that I am 'brother' to my brother.
(c) Egocentric speech
Despite the vast amount of attention devoted to this topic
over the last 50 years (see the reviews by McCarthy 1954 and Kohlberg
et al 1968), it has never been satisfactorily resolved. We will
not here go over the same ground yet again, but rather suggest
alternative approaches which may turn out to be more fruitful. We
will consider the spontaneous speech situation and the communication
tasks separately.
(1) Spontaneous speech
Traditionally, Piaget's position on the egocentrism of the child's
spontaneous speech is contrasted with that of Vygotsky (1962) and Mead
(1934), and indeed what evidence there is seems to favour these two
theorists rather than Piaget (Kohlberg et al 1968). Here, however,
we will suggest an approach which is an alternative to all three of
these positions.
The major problem in analysing young children's spontaneous
speech is that it is often impossible to say for whom it is intended.
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Often a given remark may not be clearly intended either for the
child himself or for any other person present. Piaget's solution
to this problem was to say that this kind of speech is intended
for others but that the child cannot differentiate their viewpoint
from his own. Vygotsky and Mead, on the other hand, said that
this kind of speech is intended for the child himself, but both
had to add the proviso that the child is unable to differentiate
some aspects of himself from some aspects of the others.
VJhat is common to all these theorists is that they felt
obliged to answer the question: for whom is the child's speech
intended?. This may not be the most fruitful question to ask of
a lot of the child's spontaneous speech. A suggested alternative
is to regard the child's speech as an activity performed in social
settings, and to look for the extent to which it influences, and
is influenced by, the other verbal and non-verbal activity in the
situation. The emphasis here is on looking for the rules and
structure of sequences of social activities, rather than attempting
to discover the intentions of the participants. A good example of
this approach is given in a study by Garvey and Hogan (1973), who
found that many utterances which Piaget would have classified as
egocentric are in fact part of a larger complex sequence of
regulated social activity. This suggests that young children, in
maintaining such sequences, are showing a higher level of inter¬
personal competence than Piagetian theory would allow.
(ii) Communication tasks
The communication tasks designed by Piaget in 1926 have since
become the paradigm for a large number of studies of communication
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skills (e.g. Flavell et al 1968, Glucksberg and Krauss 1967,
Peterson 1972). This basic paradigm is often compared either
with Piaget's example of the lecturer failing to appreciate his
audience's lack of knowledge of the subject matter of his lecture,
or with the example given by Brown (1965) of the local inhabitant
giving traffic directions to a stranger in terms of local landmarks
which the stranger cannot be expected to know. The main points we
will make here are first, that these analogies with the lecturer
and the local are misleading, and secondly, that these communication
tasks, in their present form, may tell us very little about the
child's ability to take another person's point of view.
For a start, one difference between the young child in a
communication task and the lecturer or local is that we cannot be
sure that the child understands the nature of the situation and
what he is expected to do, whereas the lecturer and local are
both clearly intending to convey some information and presumably
understand the nature of the communication situation they are in.
More importantly, if a child or adult fails to communicate
adequately in any of these situations, there could be several
explanations:
(1) he may be incapable, due to the structural level of cognitive
development, of realising that his audience has a different view¬
point ;
(2) he may be capable of this, but fails to realise it in the
actual situation;
(3) He may realise the difference of viewpoints, but lack both
the linguistic skills (such as possession of required structures,
t
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adequate lexicon, etc) and the perceptual and memory skills
which are needed to express his knowledge;
(1+) he may realise the difference, and possess the skills, hut fail
for one reason or another (lack of attention, tiredness, etc) to
monitor his output and so produce an inadequate message.
It seems unlikely that explanation (l) is relevant for either the
lecturer or the local. Yet this is precisely the explanation Piaget
gives for the young child who fails the communication tasks. Indeed
he believes that explanation (3) is identical with explanation (l)
"... Each child has his own world of hypotheses and
solutions which he has never communicated to anyone,
either because of his egocentrism, or for lack of
the means of expression - which comes to the same
thing if (as we hope to show in this chapter)
language is moulded on habits of thought."
(Piaget, 1926, p.79t introduction to the chapter
on communication skills, emphasis added)
Clearly a detailed examination of each communication situation
is needed to discover which of the above explanations is relevant.
To do this one would have to examine separately the speaker's
knowledge of the relevant aspects of the listener's point of view,
and test for the speaker's relevant linguistic, perceptual and
memory skills. Furthermore each message the speaker produced would
have to be discussed with him, and the truth or falsity of the
presuppositions of the message pointed out to the speaker, to see
if this kind of awareness would help him to change his message.
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(For example, the local would be told that the strangers had
not heard of the features he used in his directions.) So far
none of the recent studies of children's communication skills
have used a design subtle enough to do this, although Fry (1966, 1969),
Glucksberg and Krauss (1967) and Peterson (1972) found that older
children get some benefit from a knowledge of the effects of their
message. Informal investigation by the author suggests that a
procedure like the one outlined above, though difficult, is
possible even with children as young as ^ years old. What we
are saying here, then, is that these studies of communication skills
must be refined considerably before they can tell us much about the
young child's ability to take another person's point of view.
5. Conclusion
In the previous section we have considered a few areas of possible
conflict between Piaget's theory that young children are egocentric
and unable to take another person's point of view, and the position
that communication is an interpersonal process for which the ability
to take another person's point of view is a basic prerequisite. In
each case it is clear that there is a great lack of precision in
specifying what processes are involved and what abilities are
required, and overall there is a general fuzziness surrounding the
concept of taking another person's point of view. What is needed
most is for each of the specific areas mentioned to be subjected
to a precise and detailed study in order to determine, in each
situation, in exactly what ways young children are able ©r unable
to take another person's point of view.
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Accordingly, the rest of this thesis will focus on one
particular issue: the extent to which young children can calculate
what another person can see. In the next chapter we will consider
some aspects of the social interactions of the young child which
suggest that he may be able to calculate what another person can
see, while in Chapter 3 we will look at the relevant experimental
studies of this ability.
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Chapter 2. Visual Attention in the Social
Interactions of the Young Child
1. Introduction
In this chapter we will consider some aspects of the social
interactions of the young child which suggest that he may be able
to calculate what another person can see. Before we do this, though,
a number of qualifications need to be made.
First, the analysis given here is mainly speculative. As we
pointed out in chapter one, there is little adequate theory in this
area, and this chapter is primarily an attempt to provide some ideas
for future work. As yet there is virtually no systematic data on
any of the topics discussed here, and consequently much of the
evidence is based solely on casual observation.
Secondly, we are using the term "the young child" to cover the
whole age range from 0 to 5 years. Obviously the interactions and
abilities of neonates are totally different from those of a 5 year
old child. We use the blanket term "the young child" not because
we want to ignore these differences, but simply because we are not
in a position to speculate as to the precise age at which these
abilities appear.
Thirdly, "being able to calculate what another person can see"
covers a wide range of skills and abilities. The most we can conclude
from this chapter is that the young child may be able to calculate
what another person is looking at, but he may not be able to calculate
how it looks to the other person. We will discuss this distinction
in more detail in chapter three.
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Fourthly, we will not speculate as to what cues the child is
using in order to calculate what the other person can see. He may
use the other person's eye position or eye movements, or the
orientation of the head or body, or perhaps something harder to
define, such as the focus of the other person's movements. It is
probably impossible to tell, without careful experimentation,
exactly what cues are used in practice. Similarly it may be
impossible to tell from observation alone how accurately the child
can calculate what another person can see. The child may, for
example, only be capable of determining the general area the other
person is looking at, from which he then selects the most salient
feature. This may in practice give him a high degree of success.
Again, observation needs to be combined with careful experimental
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study of the abilities involved.
Two main areas will be considered here, coming loosely under
the headings of reference and clearance. The first is concerned
with the interpersonal processes which lead to a common focus of
visual attention, while the second is concerned with the role of
visual attention in initiating more complex interactions.
2. Reference
The topic of reference is, for philosophers, particularly
perplexing (e.g. Strawson 1950, 195M-; Geach 1962, Quine 1960,
1968). For example there are problems as to how to express
logically the fact that words are used to refer to entities that
are ephemeral, non-existent, or simply dead. The present
approach hopes to avoid these problems by concentrating on
some basic interpersonal processes involved in referring.
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A convenient starting point is supplied by Quine:
"There are two parts to knowing a word. One part
is being familiar with the sound of it and being
able to reproduce it. This part, the phonetic
part, is achieved by observing and imitating
other people's behaviour, and there are no
important illusions about the process. The
other part, the semantic part, is knowing how
to use the word. This part, even in the
paradigm case, is more complex than the phonetic
part. The word refers, in the paradigm case,
to some visible object. The learner has now
not only to learn the word phonetically, by
hearing it from another speaker, he also has
to see the object: and in addition to this, in
order to capture the relevance of the object
to the word, he has to see that the speaker also
sees the object."
(Quine 1968, p.186, emphasis added)
The fundamental point here is that, in order for one person to learn
the name of an object from another person, then not only must the
object be named, but it also must become the common focus of attention.
This is the heart of the problem of referring, and it is of
particular importance for early language acquisition. By the age of
3 years the child has a vocabulary of around 1000 words, and a
considerable proportion of these are the names of simple objects,
persons, events, and features in his immediate environment. Thus
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it is an important question to ask how these objects become
common foci of attention between the young child and his language
teachers. Does the process involve paradigms like Quins's, which
require the young child to be able to calculate what the other
person can see?.
There are clearly a variety of methods by which this common
focusing can occur, apart from the one outlined by Quine. One
extreme example is the purely tactile method used by the teacher
of Helen Keller, who was blind, deaf and dumb. Another example,
equally extreme, would be a hypothetical semi-Pavlovian situation
where the child was invariably told the name of an object whenever
the object fully occupied his attention. Presumably, on this kind
of schedule, a child could acquire a large vocabulary without ever
looking anywhere near his teacher's face.
When we restrict ourselves to considering more normal language-
learning situations, then it soon becomes apparent that a common
focus of visual attention is often reached in a quite unremarkable
manner. The following episode, for instance, may be typical of
many situations where a name is learnt without any specific
interpersonal skills being needed by the child.
(1) Mother (to Father) "Pass the teapot":,
(2) Father passes teapot:
(3) Child watches teapot passing in front of him.
Alternatively the common focus of attention may be reached by a
general orientation response by all persons involved.
(1) Telephone rings;
(2) Mother, Father and child all orient to the telephone;
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(3) Mother (to Father) 'Telephone again".
Clearly a common focus of attention may be reached without any
interpersonal processes involvxng the child. Moreover, mundane
examples like these suggest that the philosophical problem which
Quine (1968) calls "the inscrutability of reference" (i.e. that
one can never be sure that what is being pointed out is an object,
or the location of an object, etc.) may in practice be solved by
the presence of common psychological mechanisms of orientation and
attention.
Nevertheless adults and young children do seem to use various
interpersonal methods for obtaining a common focus of attention.
Of course this is not always accompanied by naming, and often occurs
as part of the ordinary activities of mother and infant such as
bathing and feeding, demanding and fetching things, and playing
games. We are not concerned here with a full description of all
these activities. Instead we will just describe a few simple
paradigms for reaching a common focus of visual attention, and see
which ones might require the child to actually calculate where his
mother is looking. We will consider an extremely simplified
situation of mother (M), child (C) and object (0).
The first distinction to be made is whether one person simply
follows another's attention to the object, or whether the first
person actually directs the other's attention to the object. This
gives us four basic paradigms.
Paradigm A (1) M attends to 0:
(2) C attends to M;
(3) C follows M's attention to 0.
1+3.
Paradigm B (1) C attends to 0;
(2) M attends to C;
(3) M follows C's attention to 0.
Paradigm C (1) M attends to 0, C not attending
(2) M attends to C;
(3) M attracts C's attention to M;
00 M directs C's attention to 0.
Paradigm D (1) C attends to 0, M not attending
(2) C attends to M;
(3) c attracts M's attention to C;
(M c directs M's attention to 0.
These paradigms assume efficient and successful functioning.
No doubt, though, there will be many occasions when, for instance,
one person fails to direct the other's attention, or fails to
locate what the other is attending to, or tries to direct the other
attention to what the other is already attending to. We will not
consider these here.
We will look first at paradigms A and B, which involve one
person following another's attention. The main cues showing where
a person is attending are head and body orientation and direction
of gaze, and in order to follow their attention the other person
must be able to use these cues to locate the source of attention.
This paradigm, moreover, covers a variety of case3. The mother
may be attending to an ob.iect as part of a fairly static performanc
(such as reading a book) or else she may make a sudden orientation
reaction involving sharp changes in head and body orientation and
direction of gaze, (for instance, when another person enters the
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room unexpectedly). One would expect that following the mother's
attention in these two situations would involve quite different
processes. It would also be quite difficult, in the second
example for instance, to determine if the child was accurately
following the mother's attention or merely picking up from her
the general direction in which to start looking himself.
Nevertheless paradigm A could well cover several situations
where the young child is actually calculating where his mother
is looking. In paradigm B, on the other hand, it is the mother
who needs to calculate where the child is looking, and this is
of relatively little interest to us here.
Paradigms C and D involve more interesting interpersonal
processes. There are a variety of ways one person can direct
another person's attention to an object, such as turning one's
head and body towards it, looking at it, holding it in front of
the other, pointing at it, saying "Look at that", or even, as
John Churcher has kindly pointed out, forcing the other person's
head round until they are looking at the object. With older
children one can just tell them to "Come and see what I can see".
And of course various combinations of these are possible.
Although it may at first sight seem arbitrary as to which
of these methods are used, a closer look at the processes involved
reveals some constraints. Consider first paradigm C. The mother
wants to direct the child's attention to an object, which she is
probably either holding or looking at. First she must check that
the child is not already looking at it. Then she must divert his
attention away from what he is looking at, and direct it first to
herself, and then to the object. Throughout this she must monitor
the child's attention to see that she is actually achieving her
purpose.
All of this means that simply to turn and look at the object,
as in paradigm A, will not usually even divert the child's attention
from his ongoing activity. The simplest way to draw the child's
attention to an object is just to put the object in the child's own
line of sight. For distant or immovable objects the mother may
lift him up and carry him to the object. Presumably these are the
methods generally used with young infants. With slightly older
children the mother may call (either the child's own name, or "look"),
which will usually result in the child attending to her. She can then
either hold up the object, or point to it, perhaps repeating "look".
It is interesting that at this point she is unlikely to redirect the
child's attention by simply turning and looking. The child would no
doubt be able to follow this, but the mother, having taken her eyes
off the child, wouldn't know if he had. However if she were instead
to point to the object, this would probably be accompanied by a
quick shift of her gaze from the child to the object and back again,
perhaps turning her head as well.
Thus in paradigm C it is most unlikely that the child will be
following the mother's direction of gaze, as for the most part she
will be looking at him, in order to monitor his direction of gaze.
So paradigm C, it turns out, will not elicit many examples of the
child's ability to calculate where his mother is looking.
Instead many more examples of this skill will emerge from
paradigm D. This is probably the most important paradigm for our
purposes. Here the roles are reversed, and the child is directing
the mother's attention. Just as the mother did in the previous
paradigm, he must, in theory at least, first check that she is not
attending to the object, then divert her attention, either first
to himself and then to the object, or directly to the object.
Throughout this this he must, again in theory at least, monitor
her attention to make sure he is accomplishing his purpose.
However, in practice it is not clear how often the pure
paradigm occurs. For instance, as Bruner (1974) points out, one
of the earliest ways infants call attention to objects is by
simply "fretting" and gesturing at the mother, who then has to
work out what object she must attend to, and what she must do
with it. Although this is probably the earliest kind of paradigm D
occurrence it is unlikely that the child is doing anything like
monitoring his mother's attention in these situations.
In a similar way, even when an infant has developed a rudimentary
method for drawing attention to an object, such as crying out and
reaching towards the object, he will mainly use this method when he
wants some action performed on the object (for example, if he wants
it to be given to him). Thus the child's attempt to direct his
mother's attention to the object may take no account of whether his
mother is already attending to it. All that is important is that
the child does not have the object. Again the child's monitoring of
the mother's gaze may be non-existent. He may simply look at her
until she performs the desired action, irrespective of whether she
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actually looks at him, or the object. Here again we must be
careful not to read too much into such an episode.
It seems likely that there will be some more clear cut cases
of this paradigm when the child reaches the holophrastic stage
(single word utterances). Several investigators of early child
language have noted that one of the earliest functions of some
g
words in this stage, particularly "look", "see", "that", "there" ,
etc., is to draw another person's attention to an object or event,
and these utterances are often accompanied by pointing (e.g. Sully
1895; Lewis 1937; Leopold 1949). This literature is discussed by
Atkinson (1974) who goes on to suggest that many "content holophases"
(such as the names of people or objects) are uttered in order to
draw another person's attention to the person or object concerned,
and are not necessarily cases of "naming" as is often claimed. On
several occasions, when the child has got the other person's attention,
he then goes on to say something about the person or object named.
This may occur whether the referent is present or absent, as the
following two examples show:
"Sitting in front of the fire Daniel holds up a toy
car and says 'car'. No response is forthcoming
from me and so he repeats 'car'. Again the word is
repeated several times until finally I look up and
say 'car' to which he immediately responds 'broken'
which is true." (Atkinson 1974, p.13)
"The child's mother has been out for several minutes
and the child approaches the father and says 'Mummy'
with no signs of distress or question intonation.
48.
The question then is what is the child doing with
this utterance. He is certainly not naming anything,
nor wanting anything, nor asking anything. What
happened next is interesting because the father,
obviously picking up the fact that the utterance
is none of the things already enumerated, responds
with 'Mummy?' using a question intonation, to which
the child immediately responds with 'gone', (ibid, p.7a)
If Atkinson's interpretation is correct then these episodes can
be the source of some interesting theoretical speculation. For example
they could be the earliest form of the topic-comment distinction which
Gruber (1967) has claimed to be the fundamental structure of child
language. Similarly they could be taken as examples of the deictic
function that Lyons (1973) has proposed as one of the fundamentals
of his "quasi-English", an ultra-simple language that he considers
may be the basis of child language. Lyons goes on to suggest that
this deictic function is the prototype of more general referring
functions, such as the definite article and personal pronouns.
It is not clear, however, whether Atkinson's interpretation is
correct. For example the child may be using the words "car" and
"Mummy" as a clearance request, to get the adult to attend to him,
rather than to the object or person. This can only be determined
by detailed examination of such episodes to see who is attending to
what and when. For instance we would want to know whether the
adult responds by looking at the child, or the car, or both. Which
of these responses does the child himself respond to?. Does he in
fact monitor the adult's attention to see where he is looking (at
himself or at the car*) and could he in any case tell the difference?.
These questions, moreover, are precisely the ones we want to ask in
order to find out if these episodes constitute genuine paradigm D
situations in which the child is actually calculating what the
adult can see. Yet again we must be careful not to read too much
into such episodes without more detailed investigation.
There is a similar danger of drawing too hasty a conclusion
when slightly older children are at the "naming" stage. It has
often been proposed (e.g. McCarthy 1954) that the dramatic increase
in the child's vocabulary between the ages of 2 and 3 years comes
when he learns to ask "what's that?" of anything in sight. This
seems to be a clear case of paradigm D. The child is attending to
the object, and wants to know its name. Thus he has to combine
asking "what's that?" with some method of directing his mother's
attention to the object, and this, at least in theory, requires
him to monitor her attention in order to know that she is in fact
attending to the object.
However a casual observation of such episodes shows that in a
high proportion of cases the child is not explicitly monitoring his
mother's attention. Often the episode is conducted successfully
without the child ever looking at his mother, and she herself may
only give a brief glance in the required direction. Quite a common
phenomenon is for the child to ask "what's that?" of something when
his mother is out of sight in another room. This has been discussed
both by Flavell et al (1968), who claim that it shows that the child
does not know that his mother cannot see what he sees, and by
Atkinson and Griffiths (1973), who suggest that it shows that the
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child has not yet learnt the appropriacy conditions for using
the word "that" to refer to something. Neither conclusion
seems justified until we have ruled out a third possibility,
namely that the child knows his mother cannot see what he sees
and knows how to use "that", but is simply using "what's that?"
to get his mother to actually come into the room and attend either
to him or to the object of his attention. Certainly older children
and adults use this strategy, usually with great success.
So far this account has been mainly speculative. This is
because there is virtually no discussion of anything like these
issues in previous work on infant development. Investigators of
early human development have in the past been more interested in
questions like whether eye contact elicits smiling in babies
(e.g. Spitz and Wolf 19*+6). There is surprisingly nothing of
relevance in Piaget's work on infancy, although he does report
in one place that between the ages of 9 months and 12 months
all his own children responded to his opening and closing his
eyes by opening and closing their hands or mouths I (Piaget 1951 p.^).
Presumably he did not test their responses to shifting his gaze
because it is impossible for the person doing this (even if he is
Piaget) to see the exact response he is getting.
However, work is currently in progress on this topic at
Strathclyde, under Shaffer, at Edinburgh, under Trevarthen, and
at Oxford, under Bruner.
Shaffer (197*0 has observed mothers and infants in a free
situation with a number of novel and conspicuous toys present,
and reports that mothers follow the direction of gaze of their
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infants from an early aye, but that right up to tha end of their
first year it is rare to see infants following their mothers'
direction of gaze. On the other hand, some preliminary work
done at Oxford by Scaife (1974) suggests that infants as young
as 4 months can respond to other people's direction of gaze.
Scaife found that 30% of his babies between 2 and 4 months responded
positively when an unknown experimenter first engaged the child
o
in eye-to-eve contact and then turned his head through 90 away
from the child. By the age of 11 to 14 months all the infants were
responding positively to this. Moreover, if the "looking away"
was accompanied by pointing and saying "look" then the response
was even higher. Scaife argues that the discrepancy between his
findings and Shaffer's is due to the fact that his situation was
less distracting for the child.
Scaife's findings with pointing are surprising in view of
another study by Anderson (1972), who made an ethological observation
of mothers and young children in a London park. Anderson found
that children below two years did not respond to their mother's
pointing, but merely stared at the mother's face or hand. "Though
the mother may emphasize the gesture and shout, the infant continues
to stare blankly at her face" (ibid, p.209).
It has indeed often been reported that young children (and dogs
too) respond to pointing by looking at the hand instead of at the
object pointed to. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Dewey
referred to this as "an original mechanism ...to the movement, not to
the pointing", and mentioned that one learns "that the movement a
pointing". John Churcher, of the Oxford group referred to earlier,
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is about to do extensive work on this problem. He makes the
important distinction between conventional and non-conventional
meaning, and has argued that to respond to another's pointing
involves understanding the convention of pointing. He is particularly
interested in how this evolves from non-conventional actions such as
reaching, holding out an object to another person, etc.
It is relevant both to the above discussion of pointing and to
our earlier discussion of paradigm D that Ellv, the autistic daughter
of Park (1972) did not point.
"Elly is eight years old now. I have still never
seen her point. She has a vocabulary of hundreds
of words. But although it includes 'rectangle',
'square', and 'hexagon', it does not include 'what's
that?'." (ibid, p.12)
In general, then, it seems likely that there will be many episodes
in the child's early development where he is either following another
person's attention, or trying to direct their attention to something,
and these episodes may well require the child to be able to calculate
what the other person can see. At the same time it must be emphasized
yet again that the existence of these episodes does not automatically
ensure the presence of this ability, and much more work is needed
before such a claim can be substantiated.
3. Clearance
So far we have considered some fairly straightforward ways in
which mothers and infants may reach a common focus of visual
attention. As the child gets older his interactions will become
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more complex, form more discrete units, and will focus more and
more on topics which are not in the immediate visual environment.
They may well occur without a shared visual environment at all
(e.g. telephone conversations). It may seem at first sight that
the role of visual attention in such situations is limited.
Nevertheless, the following analysis shows that it is still
important.
We start with Goffman's description of how unfocused
interactions develop into focused interactions. This distinction
comes from Goffman (1961): an unfocused interaction is the result
solely of people being in one another's presence, while a focused
interaction occurs when people "effectively agree to sustain for
a time a single focus of cognitive or visual attention".
Goffman describes the initiation of focused interactions as
follows:
"An encounter is initiated by someone making an
opening move, typically by means of a special
expression of the eyes but sometimes by a
statement or a special tone of voice at the
beginning of a statement. The engagement
proper begins when this overture is acknowledged
by the other, who signals back with his eyes,
voice or stance that he has placed himself at
the disposal of the other for purposes of a
mutual eye-to-eye contact, even if only to ask
the initiator to postpone his request for an
audience." (Goffman 1963 pp.91-2)
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Goffman calls this process "clearance". Thus the simplest form
for the initiation of an interaction is
(1) A requests clearance;
(2) B grants clearance;
(3) A proceeds with interaction.
The concept of clearance has already been used by Kendon and
Ferber (1974) in their detailed observational study of adults
greeting each other at an outdoor party. Kendon and Ferber unearthed
some subtle variations on the main theme. For example they found
that the initiator often gives only tentative clearance requests
such as disguising a "look" at the other person as part of the general
scan of the scene, or simply by synchronising his body movements with
the other person's. They suggest that if these subtle requests are
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not granted then no major loss of face occurs, such as might happen
if a more clear cut request was made and rejected.
Goffman himself gives some examples of one party refusing to
grant clearance by avoiding looking at the other person.
"A waitress, for example, may prevent a waiting
customer from 'catching her eye' to prevent his
initiating an order. Similarly, if a person
wants to ensure a particular allocation of the
street relative to a fellow pedestrian, or if a
motorist wants to ensure priority of his line of
proposed action over that of a fellow motorist
or a pedestrian, one strategy is to avoid
meeting the other's eyes and thus avoid
co-operative claims." (Goffman 1963 p.93)
55.
And of course merely to look at another person often does not
constitute granting clearance. A waitress may look at her customer
and meet his gaze without "having her eye caught", and it is possible
to look at someone whom one suspects one knows, and meet their gaze,
10
without "recognising" them. This should be distinguished from
"looking through" someone, which is an interesting phenomenon in
11
itself.
Clearance is a useful concept in describing young children's
interactions, particularly in a nursery setting. Here young
children are for the most part in an unfocused interaction, yet
periodically form and dissolve short focused interactions both with
each other and with the nursery staff. A large number of informal
observations by the author suggest that almost all these focused
interactions are initiated by sequences involving clearance. Much
of the time this is done by one child looking at another child and
either calling their name or saying something to get their attention,
and clearance is granted by the other child's looking back. These
informal observations are being confirmed by a much more systematic
study by Maureen Child (see Child 197*0. She points out that
clearance is often requested by the child putting himself directly
in the other child's line of regard, or by touching an object the
other child is looking at while himself looking directly at the
other child. Sequences like these closely resemble the episodes
discussed in the previous section under paradigm D, and our interest
in them here is precisely because they may well require the child
to calculate where the other person is looking.
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One common form of clearance request used by preschool
children is to combine looking at the other person with some
variation of "do you know what?" (e.g. "do you know what I watch
on T.V.?", or "do you know what I've just done?"). The
conventional reply is "No" and the child, clearance granted,
will continue with his story. It is interesting that to reply
"Yes" may confuse the child but rarely stops him continuing.
This is further evidence that the initial question was not a
factual enquiry but simply a clearance request. Adults often
use this form on young children, and sometimes find it rebounds
when they do want to ask the child a factual question, e.g.:
(1) Adult: Do you know what that's called?
(2) Child: What's it called?
(3) Adult: No, I'm asking you.... etc..
Garvey and Hogan (1973) have also noticed that the "do you
know what?" sequence is an example of clearance request in preschool
children. They report a sequence when one child uses the power
of the routine to play a joke on the other:
(1) A: Do you know what?
(2) B: What?
(Pause; B turns to A and moves toward him)
(3) B: What?
(Repetition is louder with broader rising-falling
intonation)
(A grins, then laughs before speaking)
(4) A: You're a nut.
(Garvey and Hogan 1973, p.566)
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The following episode, observed by the author, also illustrates
the power of clearance in eliciting the next stage in the interaction,
even if it is not appropriate to do so.
(1) Child approaches nurse, from over 30 feet away,
looking at her.
(2) When child is about 25 feet away, nurse looks at him.
(3) Child immediately starts to speak. However he is too
far away for the nurse to hear him properly.
(4) Child continues approaching, nurse looks away.
(5) As child gets to within 2 feet of the nurse, she
looks at him again.
(6) Child repeats what he said earlier.
This suggests that what determines when a child starts to speak in
such a situation is not so much the distance between him and his
listener but whether or not he has just received clearance. We
see also that the nurse looks away again at step (4) so that she can
give him clearance again at a more convenient moment. This of
course is a well known source of embarrassment to adults, the
problem of premature salutation (or what to do when you're
granted clearance but you're too far away to talk.) Kendon
and Ferber (1974) found that this often occurred in their study
of adults greeting out of doors. Almost invariably both adults
would look away while approaching each other between the
"distance salutation" and the "close salutation" and only look at
each other again when they were a few feet apart.
The power of clearance in eliciting an utterance from young
children is also demonstrated when they learn how to respond when
12
a teacher asks a question in a classroom . There are apparently
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two stages here. First the child must learn not just to call out
the answer if he knows it, but to make the "conventional"
clearance request of raising his hand. Five year old children
learn this quite quickly. The second stage, however, is harder.
Here the child has to learn that the teacher will often scan the
class, looking in turn at each child with raised hand, before
selecting one child either by pointing, by naming him, or by
giving a "look" combined with a characteristic nod of the head.
Apparently 5 year old children find it hard to inhibit their
response when the teacher looks at them as part of her "scanning"
the calss. The "look", the usual way of granting clearance,
continues to elicit their response.
We are proposing, then, that the social interactions of young
children are initiated by sequences involving a complex interplay
of speech with the attention of both parties, and that these
sequences can be organized around the concept of clearance.
However, apart from the sources already mentioned, there is little
hard data on this topic.
However, two further studies deserve mention. Castell (1970)
observed individual children playing freely in a room with an
adult -who either read a book or looked continuously at the child.
It was found that children looked more at the adult and moved
physically closer to him in the second condition. This not only
goes against Argyle's "intimacy" theory of eye contact (see
Argyle and Dean 1965) which would have predicted the opposite,
but suggests instead that looking encourages interaction. In our
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terms, clearance is being continually granted.
The second study again involves autistic children. Hutt
and Ounsted (1966) made films of autistic children interacting,
and concentrated on their characteristic tendency to avoid
13
another's gaze . The children in this study did not simply
look away continually from other children. Instead they
monitored each other's gaze and specifically averted their own
gaze just at the last moment before eye contact was made. In
other words, these children seem to be calculating where the
other is looking, but doing so in order to avoid contact rather
then make contact. Clearly, some very interesting questions
are posed by this study and by the other features of autistic
children we have already discussed.
Concluding remarks
In the previous two sections we have proposed that the child's
early interactions contain sequences in which he may be required
to calculate what another person can see or, at least, what another
person is looking at. We focused on two main areas: first, the
interpersonal processes which lead to a common focus of visual
attention; and second, the role of visual attention in initiating
more complex interactions. In the first area we were mainly
concerned with children in the first 2 or 3 years of life, while
in the second area the emphasis was on older children between 3
and 5 years old.
There are obviously many more areas we could have considered,
such as the role of visual attention throughout the interactions of
older children. Alternatively we could have concentrated on specific
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lexical items, such as "here", "there", "this", "that", "in front of",
"behind", "left" and "right", whose use involves to some degree the
awareness of where others are looking or what they can see. These
issues were simply too large to have been encompassed here.
It seems that the general area of the role of visual attention
in the young child's speech and interactions is being converged on
from many sides, e.g. by linguists such as Atkinson (197!+), by
psychologists such as Bruner (1974) and Trevarthen (1974) and by
child ethologists such as Leach (1972) and Child (1974). With the
advent of more sophisticated recording techniques (such as twin
video cameras with split screen mixing) it seems likely that there
will soon be a large body of data relevant to the claims made here.
It has already been mentioned that the present author made a
large number of informal observations of the kinds on interactions
discussed here. However it was decided not to do empirical work
in this area for three main reasons. First, there was not readily
available the kind of sophisticated equipment mentioned above.
Secondly, even if such equipment had been available, there did not
seem an easy solution to the problem of working out precisely where
people are looking in natural interactions. These difficulties are
present not only for the other people in the interaction, but also
for the experimenter trying to analyse the interaction, and they
present a severe methodological problem (see Vine 1971). Finally,
as has been emphasised several times in this chapter, observation and
recording of natural interactions would in any case have to be
accompanied by careful experimentation in order to unearth the
precise skills and abilities involved. Consequently it was decided
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to focus entirely on experimental studies of the young child'3
ability to calculate what another person can see. In the next
chapter we will review existing studies of this ability.
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Chapter 3. A Review of Relevant Experimental Studies
The most important experimental study of the young child's
ability to calculate what another person can see is, of course,
the mountain task of Piaget and Inhelder (1956). In a typical
version of this task the child is seated before a model of three
mountains, and a doll is placed at various positions around the
model. The child is then shown several pictures of the mountains,
taken from different viewpoints, and asked to select first the
picture showing his own view, and then the picture showing the
doll's view. Piaget and Inhelder found that most children below
7 or 8 years can correctly select their own view, but few can
select the doll's view. After 8 years children are partially
successful in selecting the doll's view, but it is not until
9 or 10 years that they are completely successful on the task.
In another version of the task, one of the pictures is
selected first and the child has then to work out which position
of the doll corresponds to that picture, while in a third version
the child has to construct his own view and the doll's view using
three pieces of cardboard to represent the mountains. These two
versions of the task produced results similar to the first method.
Most of the subsequent replication studies give results
similar to those of Piaget and Inhelder, although on the whole
they suggest an even later age for completely successful
performance. The following studies all used three mountains
and procedures based on Piaget and Inhelder's. Dodwell (1963)
tested children aged between 5 and 11 years, and found that
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although performance improved with age only a very few of his
oldest subjects were completely successful. Neale (1966) found
J-4
that at 8 years performance was about 30% , rising only to 45%
at 11 years. Good performance was found by Aebli (1967), who
claimed that 43% of his 65 year olds and 68% of his 7§ year
olds showed a "significant tendency to solve the problem
correctly", although he gives no data to explain what he means
by this. Sullivan and Hunt (1967) investigated class differences
in performance. They found that at 7 years middle class boys
scored 35% and lower class boys 23%; at 9 years the respective
scores were 62% and 50%, and at 11 years they were 90% and 71%.
The overall class difference, incidentally, was significant, but
the variance was in fact totally accounted for by differences in
I.Q. Finally, Laurendeau and Pinard (1970) found that performance
was less than 50% below 10 years, rising only to around 70% by
12 years.
Other investigators have used procedures and materials
similar to the mountain task, but typically involving a group of
3 different objects instead of mountains. For example Youniss
and Robertson (1970) used a scene of a tower, a tree and a house.
They found that performance was around 45% at 9 years and 75% at
11 years. Shants and Watson (1971), in one of the few studies
to test younger children, used a scene of a school, a flag and
a sandbox. For their children, aged between 3 years 8 months
and 6 years 6 months, they found very low performance; most of
the children failed all trials or passed only one trial. Flavell
et al (1968) used a sequence of tests of increasing complexity,
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roost of which involved a group of 3 coloured cylinders. Flavell
found that overall performance gradually increased from around
20% at 7 years to around 70% at 3.5 years. Rubin (1973) used
Flavell's tests and found an increase from 22% at 5% years to
64% at 11% years. Finally, Huttenlocher and Pressor (1973)
used a line of 3 coloured blocks which could be rotated to
various positions. In the condition which most resembled
Fiaget and Inhelder's mountain task (Huttenlocher and Presson's
"visible perspective" condition) performance was around 50%
both at age 8 years and at age 10 years.
On the whole, then, these studies support Piaget and
Inhelder's main findings, and suggest that for the mountain task
and similar set-ups children younger than about 8 years are
unable to calculate what another person or doll can see. After
8 years performance gradually improves, although completely
successful performance may not be reached by even 11 or 12 years.
Clearly the calculations involved in the mountain task and
these replication studies are more complex than those required
in the simple interactions considered in the previous chapter.
The main difference between those interactions and the mountain
task is that in the former the child has only to calculate
what another person is looking at, while in the mountain task
he must not only do this but also calculate how it looks to the
other person. This is an important distinction which we will
expand.
The abilities involved in calculating what another person is
looking at we will call projective abilities, while the further
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abilities involved in calculating how it looks to the other person
will be called perspective abilities. In each case there are two
main components: first, a basic awareness of possible differences
in viewpoint, and second, the ability to perform the necessary
calculations.
Thus the projective abilities involved in calculating what
another person is looking at consist of
(1) a basic awareness that what the other person is looking
at may be different from what one is looking at oneself;
(2) the ability to calculate what the other person is
looking at. This involves
(a) using the relevant cues from the other person
(such as their eye position or eye movements, or
the orientation of their head or body etc.) in
order to calculate their direction of gaze;
(b) knowing that people see in straight lines
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(lines of sight, or visual lines) ;
(c) being able to project, or construct, a
straight line along their direction of gaze in
order to locate the object of their gaze;
(d) knowing that people see the nearest object
along their line of sight, and that objects
further along their line of sight will to some
extent be hidden or occluded by the nearest
object.
Having located what another person is looking at, then a further
set of perspective abilities are involved in calculating how it looks
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to the other person. These consist of
(1) a basic awareness that things look different to
another person in a different position to oneself;
(2) the ability to calculate how it looks to the other
person by performing various transformations on one's
own view. These transformations concern
(a) orientation: knowing that other people
will see the part of an object that is
turned towards them;
(b) front/back: knowing that other people
will see objects that are nearer to them in
front of objects that are further away;
(c) left/right: knowing that which objects
are seen on the left and which on the right
may be different for the other person, but
systematically related to one's own view
of the objects.
The essence of this distinction between projective and
perspective abilities is that with the former one is concerned
simply with whether a certain object is or is not in the other
person's visual field, while with the latter one is concerned
with the actual details of the other person's visual experience
of the object.
Having made this distinction between projective and perspective
abilities, it seems that there need not be any direct conflict
between our suggestions from chapter two and the experimental
results just discussed. All we are saying in chapter two is that
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by 5 years children may be able to calculate what another person
is looking at, which involves projective abilities. On the other
hand, the experiments just discussed are tests of relatively
complex perspective abilities, in particular the ability to perform
an integrated series of front/back and left/right transformations,
and these studies show that this level of performance is not
reached before 8 years at least. These results by themselves
do not rule out the possibility that children aged 5 years or
under may have some projective abilities, or that they may even be
able to construct simpler perspectives than those required in the
mountain task. Indeed, such a possibility seems a reasonable
implication from the experimental results just discussed.
Nevertheless, although this possibility is not imcompatible
with Piaget and Inhelder's results, it is in fact incompatible
with their interpretation of these results. Piaget and Inhelder's
theory clearly rules out the possibility that preschool children
may have simple projective or perspective abilities.
There are three distinct strands to their argument. These are:
(1) that children below 6 years are not aware that
things look different to another person in a different
position. This is our basic perspective awareness;
(2) that children below 8 years do not have simple
projective abilities, such as being able to construct
a straight line of sight;
(3) that children below 8 years cannot construct
simpler perspectives than those required in the
mountain task, such as being able to calculate how
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a single object looks to another person.
We will examine each of these strands in detail.
First we will look at Piaget and Inhelder's claim that children
below 6 years are unaware that things look different to another person
in a different position. This claim is based on their division of
performance on the mountain task into four main stages:
Stage IIA (roughly 4-6 years): the child tends to
select his own view instead of the doll's view.
This is generally known as the egocentric response.
Stage IIB (roughly 6-7 years): the child is still
unable to calculate the doll's view and makes
various kinds of errors, such as always selecting
the same view for different positions, or turning
a picture of his own view towards the doll's
position, etc..
Stage IIIA (roughly 7-8 years): the child is
partially successful in calculating the doll's
view. For example he will select pictures showing
some aspects of the doll's view, but is unlikely
to be completely correct.
Stage IIIB (roughly 9-10 years): the child is
completely successful in calculating the doll's
view.
We will focus here on the distinction between Stage IIA and
Stage IIB. Piaget and Inhelder argue that because the child gives
the egocentric response at Stage IIA this indicates that
".... the child fails to realise that different
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observers will enjoy different perspectives and
seems to regard his own point of view as the
only one possible,"
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1956, p.213)
and again
".... the children . .. all ideally imagine that
the doll's perspective is the same as their own,
they all think the little man sees the mountains
in the way they appear from where they themselves
sit." (ibid, p.220)
On the other hand the fact that children make different kinds
of errors at Stage IIB suggests that
"Compared with Substage IIA, the present level is
a definite step towards true relativity, to the
extent that there is some awareness that things
will look different to an observer stationed
elsewhere. But this idea is not yet by any means
sufficiently developed to warrant an understanding
of perspectives or their fundamental relativity."
(ibid, p.233)
Piaget and Inhelder's argument, then, is that egocentric responses
indicate a lack of awareness that others see things differently, while
the non-egocentric errors typical of Stage IIB indicate that the child
is aware of the difference. The argument, however, is not necessarily
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valid . We cannot rule out, a priori, the possibility that a child
may be aware that the doll has a different view from him, but because
he is unable to calculate the doll's view he may all the same give an
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egocentric response. In a similar way, a child may be unaware
of the difference between the doll's view and his own, and yet
still give a non-egocentric error response.
Moreover, Piaget and In'nelder themselves seem to admit that
the presence or absence of this basic perspective awareness cannot
necessarily be deduced from the type of error the child makes.
In another study described in the same volume (the "perspectives
task") children were asked to construct various views of a single
object. Piaget and Inhelder found that children at Stage IIA in
this study did not usually make egocentric reponses, but in fact
their errors were more like the Stage IIB (i.e. non-egocentric)
errors of the mountain task. Nevertheless Piaget and Inhelder
conclude that there Is "no real contradiction" between these two
tasks, for the results show in each case that the child is "quite
unaware that he possesses a viewpoint distinct from those of
other observers", (p.243). In other words, Piaget and Inhelder
are implicitly admitting that the kind of error produced does
not necessarily imply the presence or absence of a basic awareness
of differences in perspective.
Furthermore there is considerable empirical evidence against
this argument. Although, as we have seen, there have been many
replications of Piaget and Inhelder's main finding that children
aged 8 years and below do fail ox. the mountain task, there has
been virtually no confirmation of their claims as to how they fail.
For a start, both Dodwell (1963) and Flavell (1968), who explicitly
lookea for stages like Piaget's, had distinct trouble in even
identifying them, let alone confirming their sequence of appearance.
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The main source of trouble seems to have been the distinction
between Stage IIB and Stage IIA; egocentric responses (Stage IIA)
were easily identified.
Secondly, a number of studies have reported the curious finding
that the proportion of egocentric responses to other non-egocentric
errors actually increases with age (Houssidas 1965, Houssidas and
Brown 1967, Laurendeau and Pinard 1970, Fishbein et al 1972). This
of course directly contradicts Piaget and Inhelder's position. It
should be noted, though, that not all replications have found this
result. A few studies in fact agree with Piaget and Inhelder in
finding that the proportion of egocentric to non-egocentric errors
decreases with age. (Flavell et al 1968, Aebli 1967).
Finally, Aebli (1967) found that the proportion of egocentric
responses to non-egocentric errors varies according to how the task
is presented. If the child is asked to select his own view of the
mountain before the doll's view, then his errors are more likely to
be egocentric. Garner and Plant (1972) found a similar effect of order
of presentation on the actual number of egocentric errors given.
Taken together, these studies all show that whether or not a
child gives an egocentric response is in itself an interesting question,
and that the mere occurrence of an egocentric response does not by
itself necessarily imply the lack of a basic awareness of differences
in perspective. As this is the cornerstone of Piaget and Inhelder's
argument that children below 6 years do not have this basic awareness,
we conclude that their argument is not necessarily valid. We cannot,
a priori, rule out the possibility that children below 6 years do
have this basic awareness of differences in perspective.
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We will now look at Piaget and Inhelder's second argument, that
children below 8 years at least do not have simple projective
abilities such as being able to construct a straight line of sight.
In order to understand their argument here we must first describe
their projective line task (Piaget and Inhelder 1956, chapter 6).
In this task, children were given several matchsticks, each stuck
vertically into a plasticine base, and told they were telegraph
posts. Two of the posts were placed some distance apart on a table,
and the children were asked to put the others in a perfectly straight
line between these two.
Piaget and Inhelder found that children between 4 years and
6 years could make a straight line if it was parallel to the edge of
a straight table, (see figure 1), or across the diameter of a
round table, (see figure 2).
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At this age, however, they could not construct a straight line
across the corner of a table, but typically they would follow the






Figure 5 Figure 4
By seven years they could construct a straight line across
the corner (see figure 4). They would frequently do this by "taking
aim" or "sighting along the line", either spontaneously or after
prompting from the experimenter.
Piaget and Inhelder produce a detailed argument to explain this
result, and to connect this task with the mountain task. There are
three steps to the argument.
(1) The construction of a straight line in the crucial
situation across the corner of the table, requires the
child to adopt the method of "sighting", or to use even
more complex Euclidean relationships,
"In this case, imagining the line no longer
consists of merely imitating a past or present
perception, but entails creating new relationships
within an existing pattern distinct from those
sought after. Such an achievement requires
either a projective operation based on the action
of "taking aim", or else a Euclidean operation
based on changes of position". (ibid. p.163)
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(2) The method of taking aim involves the knowledge
that people see in straight lines.
"In other words the discovery of the
projective straight line is made when the
child grasps that two points X and Y can
be related to the observer 0 through the
agency of his line of regard OXY",
(ibid, p.169)
(3) The knowledge that people see in straight lines
requires the prior concept of "a point of view" which
can only arise when the mountain task has been solved.
"The discovery that he has a particular
viewpoint, even the child's becoming
aware that he occupies one momentarily,
is far more difficult to come by than
might at first be supposed. For such
a discovery or awareness really presupposes
the coordination of all possible viewpoints.
The operation of "sighting" is therefore
not just a simple action but the result of
discriminating between, and hence
coordinating, all the several points of
view that may be involved."
(ibid, p.165)
The conclusion from the above three steps is that the child
cannot construct a straight line until he has solved the mountain
task.
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"As we have just seen, the precondition for
forming a projective straight line is a
progressive discrimination and coordination
of different viewpoints, or in other words,
perspectives." (ibid, p.171)
and again:
"The main conclusion to be drawn from this
discussion is therefore, that global or
comprehensive coordination of viewpoints is
the basic pre-requisite in constructing
simple projective relations." (ibid, p.244)
In this form, the argument seems inconsistent with Piaget and
Inhelder's own data, which shows that children succeed on the
projective line task at 7 years (the beginnings of Stage IIIA) while
they are not completely successful on the mountain task until 9 or
10 years (Stage IIIB). Moreover Piaget and Inhelder themselves
point out that projective relations are acquired before perspective
relations.
"In short, once the projective straight line has
been discovered through the method of 'taking
aim' (Substage IIIA) the operations thereby
introduced are subsequently extended in the
course of Substage IIIB to cover perspective
in general." (ibid, p.190)
This objection, however, is not particularly serious, as we
can modify the final stage in Piaget and Inhelder's argument so that
it merely states that the appearance of projective abilities is
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closely connected with the appearance of perspective abilities, and
that neither are present before 7 or 8 years. This is still a strong
argument against the possibility that preschool children may have
any projective abilities.
However, like their previous argument, it is not necessarily
valid. It is possible that, contrary to step 1, a child could
construct a straight line of posts without taking aim. It is also
possible that, contrary to step 2, a child may know that people see
in straight lines without developing the schema of ''taking aim".
And finally it is also possible that, contrary to step 3, a child
may know that people see in straight lines without having any
perspective abilities at all.
Thus, although we cannot bring any convincing empirical
evidence against this second argument of Piaget and Inhelder's,
we have at least pointed out that it is not necessarily valid, and
that it does not, a priori, rule out the possibility that children
below 7 or 8 years may have some simple projective abilities.
Finally we will look at Piaget and Inhelder's third claim,
that children below 8 years at least cannot construct simpler
perspectives than those required in the mountain task. This third
argument resembles the second one, in that it arises out of Piaget
and Inhelder's attempts to connect the mountain task with another
task described earlier in the same volume, the perspectives task
(Piaget and Inhelder 1956, chapter 6). In this task, the child
sits at a table with a doll sitting in another position at 90° to
him. The child is shown various objects, such as a needle, a stick,
and a thin disc, and asked either to draw how this object looks to
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himself and to the doll, or to select his own view and the doll's
vie*? from a collection of pictures. Thus this task is essentially
a single object version of the mountain task, although it is reported,
and seems to have been conducted, in a much less systematic manner
than the mountain task.
Piaget and In'nelder distinguish four main stages in the child's
performance on this task.
Stage IIA (roughly h-6 years): the child tends to draw or select
the same picture irrespective of the orientation of the object, and
irrespective of which view is required.
Stage IIB (roughly 6-7 years): the child is partially successful
in selecting pictures showing the doll's view, but still fails on
the drawing.
Stage IIIA (roughly 7-8 years): the child's drawing and picture
selection correctly show the general shape of his own view and the
other's view, but are often inaccurate in detail.
Stage IIIB (roughly 9-10 years): the child is generally
completely successful and accurate on the details of both his own
view and the other's view.
There seem to be several inconsistencies between this account
of the perspectives task and Piaget and Inhelder's account of the
mountain task. We have already noted that the kind of errors which
Piaget and Inhelder class as Stage IIA in the perspectives task
(i.e. the child selecting one picture for all views) are classed as
Stage IIB in the mountain task. Similarly, in both ta3ks children
pass through a stage of at least partial success on picture selection,
but in the perspectives task this is classed as Stage IIB, while in
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the mountain task it is classed as Stage IIIA. On the whole, then,
it seems that the two tasks are not stage-for-stage equivalent, as
Piaget and Inhelder are trying to suggest, but rather the same level
of performance is reached about a stage earlier on the perspectives
task than on the mountain task.
However, we are more concerned here with Piaget and Inhelder's
argument that children below 7 or 8 years at least cannot construct
simple perspectives. There are three main steps to the argument.
(1) To construct any perspective, even if it is
simply to represent one's own view of a simple
object, or to calculate another person's view of
that object, requires one to be consciously aware
of one's own viewpoint.
"To see an object with a given perspective is to
view it from a particular viewpoint, but it is not
necessary to be consciously aware of this viewpoint
in order to perceive the object accurately. On the
other hand, to represent this object in perspective
by means of a mental image or a drawing necessitates
a conscious awareness of the percipient's viewpoint...."
(ibid, p.178)
(2) To be consciously aware of one's own point of
view involves being able to differentiate it from
others, and to coordinate it with them.
".... to discover one's own viewpoint is to relate
it to other viewpoints, to distinguish it from and
coordinate it with them." (ibid, p.193)
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(3) This can only be done when the mountain task
is solved, as this is the essential test for
coordination of viewpoints.
"Consequently, to the extent that the child can
coordinate his own viewpoint with others, he
succeeds both in constructing these alternative
viewpoints and in distinguishing his own from
them (Substage IIIA, and especially IIIB). In
so doing he masters simple perspective
relations and solves the problems of global
coordination (chapter 8) along with
perspectives of isolated objects (chapter 6)
" (ibid, p.243)
There are two main objections to this argument. The first
is concerned with the notion of being "consciously aware" of one's
own point of view. Piaget and Inhelder do not elaborate on what
they mean by this, although it is most likely connected with their
idea of the preoperational child being unable to reflect on his own
experience. However it seems likely that the minimal requirement for
conscious awareness of one's own point of view is simply the basic
awareness that other points of view may be different. Even Piaget
and Inhelder admit that this is present at least 3 years before the
child is able to solve the mountain task although, as we have
pointed out, their arguments for this are unsound. All the same,
this basic awareness is a long way from the complete ability to
solve the mountain task, and thus we cannot accept a priori Piaget
and Inhelder's argument that they are the same.
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More convincingly, there is firm empirical evidence against
Piaget and Inhelder's position from their own data for the
perspectives task. The objects used in this task were fairly
simple, although some of the views of these objects which the
children were asked to construct were in fact quite difficult
to represent (e.g. a rod seen end on, a thin disc seen edge on,
etc.). A close examination of the protocols for this task which
Piaget and Inhelder actually discuss shows that even in Stage IIA
(h-6 years) children were often able to calculate simple
perspectives, but were failing on the more difficult views, e.g.
"ZUM (5:2) draws the stick vertical when it is vertical for the
doll and horizontal when it is horizontal. But he also draws
the stick seen head-on as horizontal." (ibid, p.176). Similar
performances are given by UL (5:2) and GER (5:5).
Thus, far from supporting Piaget and Inhelder's claim that
children younger than 8 years at least cannot construct perspectives
simpler than those required on the mountain task, their own data
in fact shows the opposite. Thus Piaget and Inhelder's third
argument is unconvincing.
We have now considered three separate claims made by Piaget
and Inhelder. First they claim that children below 6 years are
not aware that things look different to another person in a
different position. Secondly they claim that children below
8 years at least cannot have simple projective abilities. Thirdly
they claim that children below 8 years at least cannot construct
simple perspectives. In each case we have demonstrated that there
are either logical or empirical objections to their arguments, and
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we have also pointed out some internal inconsistencies in their
own explanations. We conclude that their arguments do not, a
priori, rule out the possibility that preschool children may
have simple projective or perspective abilities.
It seems at first sight strange that Piaget and Inhelder
should have made these suggestions at all. We have already seen
that the possibility that preschool children might have these
abilities is not incompatible with the results of any of their
three relevant experiments (the mountain task, the projective
line task, and the perspectives task). Indeed it seems that
the most reasonable assumption to make from these results is
that younger children might be able to succeed on tasks which
are simpler than these three. Yet Piaget and Inhelder explicitly
argue that this is not possible. Why do they adopt this strange
position?.
It is perhaps easier to understand their position here when
we consider it in relation to their overall theory of egocentrism
and preoperational thought. We have already seen that although
the main sense of egocentrism is the inability to take another
point of view, it is closely connected to several other
preoperational concepts, such as the absence of groupings, the
inability of the child to reflect on his own experience, being
tied to his own perception, etc., and that these concepts form
a closely linked web. Piaget and Inhelder's position here is
a reflection in miniature of this overall interconnecting pattern.
Thus the young child who fails the mountain task does so not only
because he is egocentric and unable to take another point of view,
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but also because he has not yet acquired groupings and so cannot
perform the transformations needed to calculate the doll's view,
and because he cannot reflect on his own experience (or in other
words he is not "consciously aware" of his own viewpoint), and
because he is tied to his own perception of the situation and
cannot free himself from his own point of view. This beautiful
convergence of several different kinds of explanation is well
illustrated by the following quotation:
"... the purely preceptual point of view is always
completely egocentric. This means that it is
both unaware of itself and incomplete, distorting
reality to the extent that it remains so. As
against this, to discover one's own viewpoint is
to relate it to other viewpoints, to distinguish
it from and to coordinate it with them. Now
perception is quite unsuited to this task, for
to become conscious of one's own viewpoint is
really to liberate oneself from it. To do this
requires a system of true mental operations,
that is operations which are reversible and
capable of being linked together." (ibid, p.193)
Unfortunately it seems that such beauty is only achieved at
a price. There are, as we have seen, several inaccuracies and
inconsistencies in Piaget and Inhelder's position here, and because
of these we are unable to accept their a priori argument that
preschool children cannot have simple projective or perspective
abilities. Instead this possibility needs to be tested empirically.
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There is, however, very little relevant empirical evidence
available. We have already reviewed the evidence that children
below 8 years fail on the mountain task and on tasks of similar
complexity. Surprisingly enough, there has been only one attempt
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so far to see how preschool children perform on tasks which are
simpler than these. Although this study (by Flavell et al, 1968,
chapter 5) was only a series of pilot studies, it is still worth
considering.
Flavell gave a series of 6 tasks (in his terms, tasks IIIA-F)
to 40 children, 10 each at ages 3, 4, 5 and 6 years. Three of
these tasks (IIIA, C and F) were revised and given to ten 3-year
olds and ten 5-year olds. The most relevant tasks for our purposes
are tasks IIIA (revised), IIIC (revised), HID and IIIE.
Task IIIA (revised) is a very simple perspective test, in
which the child (C) is required to turn a picture so that the
experimenter (E) sees it in a certain way. To begin with, E and
C are at the same side of the table, and E shows C a simple picture
of a human figure. E says, "In this game I have just one card.
It is a picture of a child. He is standing up. Nov/ let's turn
the card around (that is, upside down). How does he look now?"
If C does not indicate that the picture is "upside down", "standing
on his head", or something equivalent, then E says, "He is standing
on his head, isn't he?" E then turns the picture the right way up.
"Now he is standing up again. Can you make him stand on his head?"
After the child does so E goes to the other side of the table and
places the picture crossways between him and the child. "Now you
take the picture and show it to me so I can see the man standing
on his head. Be sure to show it to me so that I see the man standing
on his head."
Flavell found that six out of ten 3-year olds placed the picture
correctly (i.e. right side up for the child), and so did nine out of
ten 5-year olds. Unfortunately, Flavell did not try other orientations
of the picture, or have E sitting in different positions, and so we
cannot be sure if the children knew exactly what they were meant to be
doing. It is a pity too that the "correct" resonse may also be the
child's most natural response - i.e. simply to turn the picture so
that he sees it right way up himself. Nevertheless, the results
suggest the presence of at least a basic perspective awareness in
preschool children.
The other three relevant tasks are all simple projective tasks,
in which the child is asked to identify what E sees. Task HID is
the simplest of these. E and C sit on opposite sides of a table.
"I have a card here that has two pictures on it. On this side
(demonstrates) is a little dog, or puppy, and on the other side,
(turns card over) is a picture of a birthday cake." E then holds
the card so that C sees the puppy and E sees the cake. "In this
game I am looking at a picture right now. See if you can tell me
what picture I am looking at." Flavell found that 7 out of 10 three
year olds, 9 out of 10 four year olds, 8 out of 10 five year olds
and 8 out of 10 six year olds were correct. These results strongly
suggest that most children in this age group at least have what we
call simple projective awareness, or the awareness that the other
person may be looking at something different from what the child
himself sees.
Task HIE was a wore complex version of this. This time
the card had the same three pictures on both sides: an aeroplane
at the top, a teddy bear in the middle and a clown at the bottom.
E shows both sides of the card to C, and then sits opposite C
with a card between them. First E takes a piece cf cardboard
hinged in the middle and covers two of the pictures on each side,
leaving only the cloxvn visible. E then asks C "Now, can you tell
me what picture I can see on my side?" (pretest). E then takes
another piece of cardboard, wider than the pictures, and covers
first the top picture, and then the top two pictures, on E's side
of the card only. Each time, E asks "Can you tell me what I see
on my side noxv?"
Most of the children passed the pretest, and most of the
children between *+ and 6 years passed the two main trials. However,
few 3 year olds succeeded on the main trials. Although a few
children gave egocentric responses (i.e. merely reported what
they themselves saw), for the most part their errors indicated
an awareness that what E saw was different from what they themselves
saw, together with an inability to work out exactly what E did see.
Finally, in task IIIC (revised), the materials were two
identical cubes (6" side) with a different picture on each vertical
face. First E shows one cube to C, asking him to name all four
pictures (a teddy bear, a bird, a chair and a doll in a cradle).
E then shows how the second cube is identical to the first and says
"I am going to turn my block around. Now can you turn your block
around so that you can see on your block the same picture that I
am looking at on my block." After the child has turned his block
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E asks two questions: "What picture are you looking at?" and "What
picture do you think I am looking at?"
The most common response of the 3-year olds (5 out of 10) was
to give incorrect responses both to the block turning and to the
verbal question about what E saw. (All children correctly answered
the verbal question about what they themselves saw.) The most
common response of the 5-year olds (6 out of 10) was to give all
correct responses. Most of the errors were egocentric: the children
turned their blocks so that they saw on their own block exactly what
they saw on E's block. However, it is hard to say how much their
difficulties lay in deciphering the rather complicated instructions,
and how much they were due to the children's inability to make the
necessary calculations.
Despite the few weaknesses in methodology that we have pointed
out, these studies do suggest that preschool children do have some
simple projective and perspective abilities. The first two tasks
discussed suggest that even 3-year olds are aware that other people
can see pictures which the child himself cannot (task HID) and
that other people can see the same picture in a different way (task
IIIA revised). The last two studies (IIIE and IIIC revised) suggest
that most 5-year olds can work out exactly what another person can
see in a more complex situation, but most 3-year olds cannot do
this.
These tentative results strongly suggest the need for a more
detailed and systematic investigation of the projective and perspective
abilities of preschool children. The experiments reported in the
next chapter are the beginning of such an investigation.
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Chapter U. Eight Experiments on Egocentrism
Experiment 1
Introduction
The first experiment is concerned with whether preschool
children have simple projective abilities. We have already seen
in the previous chapter that Piaget and Inhelder argue that they
do not. Their argument is based on the results of their projective
line task, in which children were asked to construct a straight line
of "telegraph posts" between two end posts placed in various positions.
Piaget and Inhelder found that children between 1+ and 6 years could
make a straight line if it was parallel to the edge of a straight
table or across the diameter of a round table. However, the crucial
condition was whether the children could construct a straight line
across the corner of a table. Piaget and Inhelder found that children
below 7 years were unable to do this, and claimed that this was
because it required the child to "take aim", or "sight along the line".
This, they argued, depends on the knowledge that people see in straight
lines, and this in turn depends on the child's being able to succeed
on the mountain task.
We saw earlier that Piaget and Inhelder's argument was not
necessarily valid, but we were unable to bring any direct empirical,
evidence against it. It should be noted here, though, that the few
attempts that have been made to replicate the projective line task
have produced conflicting results. For instance Lovell (1959) found
that for his youngest group (below H years) 93% could make a straight
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line (or a straight line with slight irregularities in it) parallel
to the edge of a square table, and U0% could make a straight line
across the corner of this table. The corresponding figures for his
oldest group (5 years 1 month to 5 years 8 months) were 100% and 56%.
Clearly these children are performing much better than Piaget and
Inhelder's subjects. On the other hand, Laurendeau and Pinard (1970)
found a lower level of performance than Piaget and Inhelder. In
their study children were not generally able to construct a straight
line parallel or perpendicular to the edge of a table until 7 years,
and were unable to construct a line across the corner of the table
until 8 years. There is some doubt, then, as to the reliability of
Piaget and Inhelder's original finding.
The following experiment compares two methods of constructing
a straight line in identical situations. First two small dolls are
placed, facing each other, on a table. One method, the projective
line task, is identical to that of Piaget and Inhelder. The child
is given a number of dolls and asked to put them in a straight line
between the two end dolls. The other method, the line of sight task,
is more direct. The child is given an object and asked to put it so
that one doll cannot see the other. The child can only do this
successfully by calculating the straight line of sight between the
two dolls.
Subjects
Twenty U-year old children (11 boys and 9 girls) and twenty
3-year old children (10 boys and 10 girls) were subjects. The ages
of the U-year old children ranged from U years 9 months to U years
2 months (mean age U years 6 months). The ages of the 3-year old
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children ranged from 3 years 11 months to 3 years 3 months (mean
age 3 years 8 months). They were all attending preschool playgroups
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and were of mixed social class.
Materials
For the projective line task the materials were six small
wooden dolls, 6 cm high, with round bases 3 cm in diameter.
For the line of sight task the materials were one of these dolls,
a wooden policeman 7 cm high with a round base 3 cm in diameter, and
a small wooden "wall", 7 cm high, k cm wide, g cm thick.
Procedure
The children were split into two groups, matched as far as possible
for age and sex. One condition performed the projective line task, the
other performed the line of sight task.
Projective Line Task
All six wooden dolls were placed in a group on a table in front of
the child. The experimenter (e) told the child that the dolls were a
group of boys and girls. e then placed two of the dolls about 30 cm




e said "put these boys and girls (pointing to the group) in a straight
line between that one (pointing to A) and that one (pointing to B)".
This was repeated with the two initial dolls either pointing
directly away from the child (see figure 6) or across the corner of
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Line of Slgni Task
The policeman, the single wooden doll, and the wall were placed
on the table. The child was told that the doll was a small boy.
E said "The policeman is looking for the boy. The boy wants
to hide from the policeman."
Then the policeman and the boy were placed facing each other on
the edge of the table, at A and B respectively (see figure 5).
E said "Put the wall so bhat the policeman cannot see the boy."
This was repeated with the policeman and boy at A and B
respectively, as shown in figures 6 and 7- As before, these three
situations were always presented in this order. The policeman and
the boy always faced each other, and the child could always see the
policeman's direction of gaze.
Scoring
It is difficult to give hard and fast criteria for when the child
has constructed a straight line in the projective line task. Straight
lines, and lines with slight irregularities were scored as correct.
Curved lines, discontinuous straight lines, and straight lines in the
direction AB but not between A and B were scored as incorrect.





wall wag placed on the line AB so that it obscured the policeman's
view of the "boy, it was scored as correct. All other placements
were incorrect.
Results
Table 1 shows the number of correct responses, (out of a
possible 10), for each situation.




Parallel to the edge 7 9
^ years Perpendicular to the edge 7 10
Across the corner 8 10
Parallel to the edge 1+ 9
3 years Perpendicular to the edge 2 10
Across the corner 1 10
Contrary no Piaget and Inhelder, there is no significant difference
between the three initial positions of the dolls (parallel to the edge,
perpendicular to the edge, and across the corner). These scores are
combined and expressed as percentages in Table 2.
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k years 13% 91%
3 years 23% 91%
The performance of the U-year olds on the projective line task
is lower than their performance on the line of sight task, but not
significantly so (U=3'+, p)0.1, Mann-Whitney U test, two-tailed). The
performance of the 3-year olds on the projective line task is both
significantly lower than that of the U-year olds on this task (U=17,
p\0.01, Mann-Whitney U test, one-tailed) and significantly lower than
that of the 3-year olds on the line of sight task (U=l, p(0.002, Mann-
Whitney U test, two-tailed).
Discussion
Virtually all the children, 3-year olds as well as It-year olds,
could construct lines of sight in every situation. Most of the U-year
olds could construct projective lines in all three situations, including
the crucial situation across the corner of the table. Few of the
3-year olds could do this.
There are three main implications of this result. First, the
present study supports the previous finding of Lovell (1959) that
the performance of preschool children on the projective line task
is better than Piaget and Inhelder claim. In particular the present
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study found that, contrary to Piaget and Inhelder, there was no
difference between constructing a line parallel to the edge,
perpendicular to the edge, or across the corner. This last finding
may be due solely to the small number of subjects used here, and
more data is needed, particularly from the younger group, in order
to clarify this. More definitely, we can reject the possibility
that the result occurred because all the subjects received the
"across the corner" condition last, since this was the order adopted
by Piaget and Inhelder themselves. For now, all we can suggest to
explain the higher level of performance is that in the present study
great care was taken to make the instructions as simple and precise
as possible. Unfortunately neither Lovell nor Piaget and Inhelder
give the precise wordings they used, and so we are unable to make a
direct comparison.
Secondly, the results show that preschool children are able to
construct a straight line of sight before they can pass the projective
line test. This needs some explanation, as the tasks are formally
identical. In each case the child has to calculate a straight line
between two points, and place objects on this line. Why, then, is
the line of sight task easier than the projective line task?.
Part of the answer is that the projective line task requires
the child to handle several dolls. This is superfluous to the
formal requirements of the task. In another informal study only
three dolls were used. Two of these were set up, as in the standard
task, and the child was asked to put the third "in a straight line"
between them. Young children performed better on this than on the
standard projective line task with six dolls. However, performance
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still was not as high as on the line of sight task. The number of
dolls used, then, only partly explains the difference between the
tasks.
It is possible that in the projective line task the child has
difficulties understanding the term "straight line". There is some
informal evidence for this. Children who fail the projective line
task typically produce a large variety of arrangements of the dolls.
In another informal study children who did this were asked by the
experimenter to "show me the straight line you've made." Many
children would trace out a line joining up the dolls, although this
line would be far from straight, typically giving comments like
"here's the straight line". Piaget and Inhelder (p.l6o) and Lovell
have also pointed out that 3-and U-year old children have difficulty
with the term "straight line", and this needs more systematic
investigation.
The third, and by far the most important, finding of this
experiment is that both 3- and U-year old children give virtually
errorless performances on the line of sight task. This shows that
by 3 years children already have considerable projective abilities.
In Chapter 3 we outlined the various component abilities involved
in calculating what another person can see. The present results
show that a 3-year old child has at least some competence in all
these component abilities. We will discuss each in turn.
First, a 3-year old child has the basic awareness that what
the other person is looking at is different from what he himself is
looking at. This follows directly from the fact that no child
attempted to put the wall between himself and the doll. Secondly,
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the child has at least a basic ability to calculate what the other
person is looking at. He is aware of the approximate direction in
which the policeman is looking, although it is not certain which cues
the child uses to calculate this, or whether he simply assumes from
the context that the policeman is looking in the doll's direction.
The child is also aware that the policeman sees in a straight line,
and he has at least the primitive ability to construct this line, for
he can place an object so as to intercept it. Indeed most children
showed a fairly clear sense of the extension of this line by placing
the wall roughly midway between the policeman and the doll. Only one
or two placed the wall close to the policeman, while a few more placed
it close to the doll; in all these cases the wall still intercepted
the policeman's line of sight. Finally, the child who passes the
line of sight test seems to be aware that placing the wall between
the policeman and the doll means that the policeman is no longer able
19
to see the doll but instead only sees the wall. In other words, he
seems to be aware that the other person sees the first object along
his line of sight.
This first experiment, then, directly contradicts Piaget and
Inhelder's claim that preschool children cannot have simple projective
abilities. Instead it shows that children as young as 3 years have
considerable competence in this area.
This experiment could be followed up in several ways. For
example, we have suggested various factors which may be responsible
for the child's poor performance on the projective line test, and
these factors could be investigated further. Alternatively, more
demanding tests could be made of the young child's projective abilities.
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We could investigate what cues he actually uses in determining
the other person's direction of gaze, and how accurately he uses
them; or we could see how accurately he can construct a straight
line of 3ight; or if he can construct the intersection of two
straight lines of sight. This last suggestion will in fact "be
taken up in experiment 7-
However, we will concentrate instead on the question of
whether or not young children have perspective abilities comparable





The main aim of this experiment was to see whether preschool
children have simple perspective abilities comparable to the projective
abilities unearthed in Experiment 1. This was done by comparing each
child's performances on a simple projective test and a simple perspective
test in the same situation. The materials used here were a toy dog and
a cup, which could be turned to any position. The child's projective
ability was tested by verbal questioning, i.e. the child was asked,
for various positions of the cup and the dog, whether the dog could
see the handle of the cup. In another session, the child's perspective
ability was tested by the standard method of picture selection, i.e.
the child was asked, for various positions of the cup and the dog, to
select the picture showing his own view and the picture showing the
dog's view. Thus the main aim of the experiment was to compare verbal
questioning with picture selection.
Two subsidiary aims were introduced by using picture selection.
First, it was not clear from previous work whether preschool children
could even select their own view correctly. It was noted in Chapter 3
that this was one of the discrepancies between Piaget and Inhelder's
findings on the mountain task and their report of the perspectives
task. In the former they found that children between 1+ and 6 years
were able to select their own view correctly (and of course they also
selected their own view when asked to give the doll's view). In the
perspectives task, on the other hand, Piaget and Inhelder claimed that
children of the same age were unable to select their own view of the
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single objects used in that task although, as we pointed out in
Chapter 3, their own protocols cast doubt on this claim. Similarly,
Aebli (1967) claimed that children younger than 6 years cannot
reliably select their own view, although he gave no data to support
this. Thus the second aim of this experiment was to see whether
preschool children could even select their own view correctly.
The final aim was occasioned by the finding of Aebli (1967)
that the proportion of egocentric errors to non-egocentric errors
varies according to how the task is presented. If the child is
asked to select his own view before the other's view, his errors
are more likely to be egocentric than if the reverse order is used.
Garner and Plant (1972) found a similar effect of order of presentation
on the actual number of egocentric responses given. This is relevant
both for interpreting what the egocentric response means, and for
general methodology. The third aim of this experiment, then, was to
investigate the effect on egocentric responses of varying the order
of presentation of own view and other view questions.
Subjects
32 nursery school children (17 boys and 15 girls) were subjects.
Their ages ranged from 1* years 11 months to U years 2 months (mean
age 4 years 7 months). They all attended a preschool playgroup and
were of mixed social class.
Materials
The materials used were a large yellow cup, four pictures of the
cup, and a toy dog called Ringo.
The cup was 10 cm high, with a handle. It was placed on a
table in front of the child with the handle in one of four positions:
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(i) at the left, (ii) at the right, (iii) at the front, pointing
towards the child and (iv) at the back, hidden from the child.
The pictures used were each 15 cm x 8 cm and were fixed on
a board 1+5 cm x 17 cm. The pictures showed the four views
corresponding to the four positions of the cup.
The dog, Ringo, was about 30 cm high, and sat on one of two
chairs around the table. One chair was directly opposite the
child. The other was 90° to the child's right. The experimenter
sat behind and to the left of the child.
Figure 8 shows a plan view of the experimental situation,






Figure 8; Plan view of the experimental situation
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Figure 9: Four pictures showing; different views of the cup.
Procedure
Each child was tested twice, with a week between each session.
In one session he was given verbal questions; in the other he was
given picture selection. Half the children were given own view
questions before other view questions throughout ("own view first"),
and the other half were given the reverse order ("other view first").
Whether the children were given verbal questions before picture
selection, and whether they were given Ringo opposite before Ringo
to the side, were also counterbalanced.
At the start of the first session each child was introduced to




Ringo is out of sight behind the table. E says
100.
"Look at the cup.
Can you see the handle?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He turns the cup to another
position and says
"Can you see the handle now?"
This is repeated for the other two positions of the cup.
(ii) Other view
E puts Ringo on one of the two chairs. E says
"This time Ringo is looking at the cup.
Can Ringo see the handle?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He turns the cup to another
position and says
"Can Ringo see the handle now?"
This is repeated for the other two positions of the cup.
E then moves Ringo to the other chair and repeats for all four
positions of the cup.
(B) Picture selection
(i) Own view
Ringo is out of sight beneath the table. E takes out the pictures
and shows them to the child. E says
"These are four pictures of the cup.
Look at the cup. Now look at the pictures.
Which picture shows what you see?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He turns the cup to another
position and says
"Which picture shows what you see now?"
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This is repeated for the other two positions of the cup.
(ii) Other view
E puts Ringo on one of the two chairs, E says
"This time Ringo is looking at the cup.
Which picture shows what Ringo sees?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He turns the cup to
another position and says
"Which picture shows what Ringo sees now?"
This is repeated for the other two positions of the cup.
E then moves Ringo to the other chair and repeats for all four
positions of the cup.
Results
Wo significant order effects were found for either
(a) verbal questions first / picture selection first, or
(b) Ringo opposite first / Ringo to the side first.
Table 3 compares own view first with other view first.
The figures given are the percentage of correct responses,
except for the last column which is the percentage of egocentric
errors out of the total number of errors.
Table 3 - Comparison of percentage correct scores for own

















first 91% 88% 6h% 19% 11%
Other vie*
first 981 82% 90% 13% 66%
These results show that performance is generally slightly better
in the own view first condition, with the exception of verbal questions
(own view) where performance is virtually errorless in both conditions.
However, none of these differences is statistically significant at
the 0.05 level (Mann-Whitney U test). In particular, the proportion
of egocentric errors in the total number of errors is slightly higher
in the own view first condition, although there is virtually no
difference in the total number of egocentric responses in each
condition (7^ compared with 73).
These scores are combined for Table U.
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All these differences are highly significant. Thus performance
is better for own view than for other view both with verbal questions
(N=17, x=2, p=0.002, sign test, two-tailed) and with picture selection
(n=28, 3=3.2, p=0.00lU, sign test, two-tailed). More interestingly,
performance is much better with verbal questions than with Picture
selection, both for own view (N=25, x=l, p 0.002, sign test, two-tailed)
and for other view (n=32, z=5.5» p\0.0001, sign test, two-laiied).
The kinds of errors made were different in each condition.
(i) verbal questions, own view: only 3 errors occurred out of 128
responses. All 3 were "false positives", i.e. the child said he
could see the handle when he could not.
(ii) verbal questions, other view: 38 errors occurred out of 256
responses. Of these, 3 were "false positives", i.e. the child said
Ringo could see the handle when he could not. The remaining 35
were "false negatives", i.e. the child said Ringo could not see the
handle when in fact he could. All 35 of these false negatives
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occurred when Ringo saw the handle either on the right side of the
cup; there were no errors at all when the handle pointed directly
at Ringo. Moreover these false negatives occurred totally independently
of whether the child himself saw the handle.
(iii) picture selection, own view: 55 errors occurred out of a total of
128 responses. Of these, the biggest single category was of left/right
reversals, i.e. when the child saw the handle on the left he picked
the picture showing the handle on the right, and vice versa. Left/
right reversals constituted 20 out of the 55 errors, while random
responding would have produced only 9 errors in this category.
(iv) picture selection, other view: 215 errors occurred out of a
total of 256 responses. The vast majority of these were egocentric
responses, i.e. the child selected his own view instead of Ringo's
view. These made up li+7 out of the 215 errors (68$). The proportion
of egocentric responses out of all the responses (correct and incorrect)
in this condition is 1U7/256, or 57$- This is identical to the
proportion of correct responses in the picture selection, own view-
condition, which was 73/128, again 57$. Thus in both picture selection
conditions, 57$ of the responses consisted of the child simply
selecting his own view, irrespective of the instructions.
Discussion
There were three aims of this experiment. The most important
one was to compare verbal questioning and picture selection. The
two subsidiary aims were to see if preschool children could correctly
select their oT,m view, and to investigate the effect of varying the
order of own view and other view conditions. These three aims will
now be considered in reverse order.
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Performance is slightly better in the own view first, condition,
and the proportion of egocentric responses in the total number of
errors is also slightly higher in this condition. However, no
differences reached significance. Moreover the total number of
egocentric responses was the same in each condition. Thus we can
give tentative support to Aebli (1967) w^o also found that the
proportion of egocentric errors was higher in the own view first
condition, while disagreeing with Garner and Plant (1972) who
found a difference in the total number of egocentric responses.
Although the suggestion that egocentric responding may be
subject to order effects is interesting in itself, we are more
concerned here with its methodological implications. In all
subsequent experiments own view conditions were always given
20
before other view conditions.
(2) Picture selection, own view
The results showed that the k-year olds in the present
experiment could select their own view of a simple object with
a fair degree of success (57$), contrary to the doubts of Aebli,
and of Piaget and Inhelder.
The largest single category of errors was left/right reversals,
i.e. if the handle was on the left the child selected the picture
showing the handle on the right, and vice versa. This is in
agreement with a well known series of experiments which suggests
that preschool children have difficulty in discriminating between
figures differing only in their left/right orientation, (e.g. Gibson
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et al 1962, Rudel and Teuber 1963). These results were originally-
taken as showing that young children were unable to discriminate
between such figures, but more recent work has shown that if the
task requirements are simplified and the perceptual context in
which the figures are presented is varied then young children can
perform such discriminations (e.g. Over and Over 1967; Huttenlocher
1967 a, b; Bryant 1969; Taylor and Wales 1970). It seems that
unless certain conditions are satisfied preschool children will
tend to ignore the left/right dimension.
It was hoped that such problems would be avoided in the present
study because the handle of the cup would act as a distinctive
feature and draw the child's attention to differences in orientation
on the left/right dimension. This strategy seems to have been only
partially successful, and a number of left/righlt reversals did occur.
Again, the implication here is mainly methodological; with the
present materials, merely changing the position of the cup without
otherwise drawing attention to relevant features or dimensions is
insufficient for completely successful own view picture selection.
(3) Verbal questions/picture selection
The main aim of this experiment was to compare children's
performances on two different procedures, verbal questioning and
picture selection. The results show a striking difference between
the two procedures. The children performed much better with verbal
questioning than with picture selection, both on their own view
(98% compared with 57$) and on the other view (85$ compared with
16$). Both these differences are highly significant. Although
the direction of the differences was predictable the magnitude,
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especially for the other view condition, was quite unexpected.
There are no real precedents for this finding in the
experimental literature. Only one previous study, that of
Aebli (1967), has compared two different procedures in this
way, and although Aebli suggested that his subjects performed
better with verbal questioning than with picture selection, he
did not give any precise data.
At first sight this finding seems to suggest that i|-year
old children are able to calculate wnat Ringo is looking at, and
in particular whether or not he can see the handle, but that they
cannot calculate how it looks to him. This result confirms the
finding of Experiment 1 that children of this age have simple
projective abilities, but suggests that they do not have simple
perspective abilities. Moreover, the fact that the majority of
errors in the other view picture selection were egocentric errors
suggests that most of these children do not even have the simple
perspective awareness that Ringo's view of the cup is different
from their own.
Although this seems to be the direct implication of this
result, it is not easy to accept conceptually. For example, it
seems very strange (though not impossible) that a child should know
that Ringo will not see the handle of the cup when it is turned
away from him, and yet still select as a picture of Ringo's view
one in which the handle is clearly visible. Before accepting this
result at face value we must first investigate the possibility that
picture selection is not an adequate test of perspective ability.




The aim of this experiment was to compare the method of picture
selection with an alternative method for testing perspective abilities,
using the same materials as in Experiment 2. This alternative method
was developed from a spontaneous comment made by one of the subjects
in Experiment 2. When the cup was turned so that the handle was not
visible to her, this subject spontaneously remarked "it's a bowl",
thus suggesting that different views of the cup could be distinguished
by different names. This idea was developed into an alternative
method for testing perspective abilities, in which the child is shown
a cup with the handle visible and told that he sees a "cup". Then
he is shown the cup with the handle turned away from him and told
that he sees a "bowl". He is then asked to turn the cup so that
"Ringo sees a 'bowl'". The child is judged to have responded
correctly if he turns the cup so that the handle is away from Ringo,
thus showing that he is considering how it looks to Ringo. This
method is known as "cup rotation".
The two methods were compared by first giving all the subjects
the picture selection condition, and then giving the cup rotation
condition only to those subjects who failed to reach criterion on
the picture selection. After the cup rotation condition a further
picture selection question was asked to see if there had been any
facilitation of picture selection due to the cup rotation.
Subjects
W preschool children (23 boys and 21 girls) were subjects.
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Their ages ranged from 5 years 2 months to 3 years 10 months (mean
age U years 6 months). They were of mixed social class, and all
were attending nursery school or preschool playgroups in the
Edinburgh area.
Materials
The materials were the same as in Experiment 2.
Procedure
There were two parts to the procedure. In part I all children
were given picture selection (own view followed by other view) exactly
as described in Experiment 2. Any children who reached the criterion
of 3 correct responses out of k in selecting Ringo's view were not
tested further. All the other children were divided into two equal
groups according to age and, after a short interlude during which
the experimenter and child played with other toys, they were all
given part II.
In part II the experimenter (e) starts with just the cup on the
table. He turns the cup so that the child can see the handle and
says
"When it's like this you see a cup."
E then turns the cup so that the child cannot see the handle and
says
"When it's like this you see a bowl."
E repeats this if the child appears not to understand. E then puts
Ringo on the chair at 90° to the child's right, and turns the cup
so that the handle is visible to both the child and Ringo. He then
says
"Wow can you make it so that Ringo sees a bowl?"
lie.
After this cup rotation procedure, E gets out the pictures again and
asks one picture selection (other view) question:
"Which picture shows what Ringo sees?"
Results
The overall scores were 52$ for picture selection, own view, and
11$ for picture selection, other view. These scores were slightly
below those found in Experiment 2.
1* out of the UU subjects reached the criterion of 3 or U correct
responses out of This left UO children for part II. They were
divided into two groups of 20 according to age. The mean age of the
older group was k years 11 months, and that of the younger group was
!+ years 2 months.
Part II
Table 5 shows the number of children, out of 20 in each group, who
(1) responded correctly to cup rotation;
(2) responded correctly to subsequent picture selection, other view.






Older group (k years 11 months) 13 f r\
Younger group (k years 2 months) 5 b
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13 out of 20 children in the older group and 5 out of 20 in
the younger group succeeded on cup rotation, while all of them
had previously failed on unfacilitated picture selection. These
differences are significant (N=13» x=0, p^O.OOl for the older
group, and N=5» x=0, p(o.05 for the younger group; both sign test,
one-tailed).
9 out of 20 children in the older group and U out of 20
in the younger group were facilitated on picture selection by
the cup rotation procedure. This improvement is significant for
the older group (N=9» x=0, p\0.005, sign test, one-tailed) but
not significant at the 0.05 level for the younger group.
It seems that facilitation was due to successful performance
on cup rotation. In the older group, 9 out of 13 children who
succeeded on cup rotation were also facilitated on picture
selection, while none of those who failed on cup rotation were
facilitated. For the younger group, 3 out of 5 children who
succeeded on cup rotation were facilitated, while only 1 out of
15 who failed on cup rotation was facilitated (for both these,
p 0.01, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed).
The older children performed better than the younger children
p /
on cup rotation (13/20 compared with 5/20, "X .97, df=l, p\0.025,
test, one-tailed). The difference between the groups on
picture selection facilitation is not significant at the 0.05 level.
Errors
(i) Picture selection
As in Experiment 2, the largest category of errors on picture
selection (other view) was egocentric errors. In part I this category
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constituted 6l% of the total errors. In part II it constituted
6h% of the total errors for the older group, and QQ% of the total
errors for the younger group.
(ii) Cup rotation
For cup rotation every single error was identical. Every
child (22 out of Ho) who did not correctly turn the cup so that
the handle was away from Ringo. instead turned the cup so that
the handle was away from himself. This can also be considered
an egocentric error, for the child turned the cup so that h£ saw
the "bowl", not Ringo.
Discussion
The main findings of this experiment are:
(1) that l+-year old children perform much better on cup rotation
than on picture selection;
(2) that successful performance on cup rotation facilitates
subsequent picture selection;
(3) that performance on cup rotation improves with age.
The most important implication of these findings is that the
method of picture selection in the form used here, and in Experiment 2,
is not an adequate test of the young child's perspective abilities.
The alternative method of cup rotation shows that many children do
have a certain degree of perspective ability, yet these children
still fail on picture selection. The question of why they do this
will be taken up again later.
The rest of this discussion will focus on the question of
precisely what this experiment, and the method of cup rotation,
tells us about the perspective abilities of preschool children.
For a start, we must point out certain defects in this specific
experimental design. First, the cup rotation procedure was severely-
limited by using only one position of Ringo for each child, whereas
more reliable data could easily have been produced by using at
least three different positions. This is also true for the subsequent
picture selection trial. Secondly, it would have been better to
compare the two methods of picture selection and cup rotation either
by having parts I and II in separate experimental sessions or by
having two independently matched groups, one performing picture
selection and the other cup rotation. Either of these alternative
designs would have avoided the possibility that an initial failure
on picture selection in some way affected later performance. Thirdly,
there was no proper control for the possibility of spontaneous
facilitation on picture selection performance due simply to its
being repeated in the same session. In fact this possibility seems
remote in view of the lack of facilitation with the subjects who
failed on cup rotation.
There are also some deficiencies in the specific method of
cup rotation used here. First, more effort could have been made
to ensure that the children understood the distinction between the
"cup" and the "bowl". The distinction is not an easy one to make,
anyway, as the cup is a "cup" in almost all positions, and a "bowl"
in only a few positions. The procedure could have been extended to
include a longer period in which the children learned the distinction,
followed by a short test of whether learning had occurred, perhaps
using a set of pictures of "cups" and "bowls".
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A much more important deficiency in the method of cup rotation
used here is that incorrect responses do not necessarily indicate a
lack of perspective ability. This is because the instructions are
ambiguous and allow two different legitimate interpretations. One
of these, the view interpretation, will tend to produce the "correct"
response, while the other, the object interpretation, will tend to
produce the "incorrect" or egocentric response. This distinction is
explained in the following analysis.
If a person is looking at an object and is asked "What do you
see?", then their reply will probably fall into one of two main
categories. Either they may simply name the object, e.g. "I see a
cup" or "I see a house", or they may actually specify the particular
view they have of the object, e.g. "I see a cup with its handle on
the right" or "I see the front of a house". The choice they make will
depend on how they interpret the question in the context in which it
is asked. The object interpretation will be generally much more
likely to occur than the view interpretation, because people are
generally much more concerned about objects than about particular
views of objects. This is true not only in perception, as is shown
by the early acquisition of shape constancy, but also in language,
as evidenced by the fact that it is objects, not views of objects,
which have names. This is no accident, of course, but is due to
the interpersonal (and therefore non-subjective) nature of language
learning and use. This point is well made by Quine:
".... The usual premium on objectivity
is well illustrated by 'square'. Each
of a party of observers glances at a
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tile from his own vantage point and
calls it square; and each of them has,
as his retinal projection of the tile,
a scalene quadrilateral which is
geometrically dissimilar to everyone
else's. The learner of 'square' has
to take his chances with the rest of
society, and he ends up using the word
to suit. Association of 'square' with
just the situations in which the retinal
projection is square would be simpler
to learn, but the more objective usage is,
by its very intersubjectivity, what we
tend to be exposed to and encouraged in."
(Quine i960, p.7)21
This analysis can now be applied to the cup rotation situation.
It will be recalled that in that procedure the experimenter turns
the cup so that the child sees the handle, and says
(1) "When it's like this you see a cup."
He then turns the cup so that the child cannot see the handle and says
(2) "When it's like this you see a bowl."
The experimenter then puts Ringo on the chair at 90° to the child's
right, turns the cup so that the handle is visible to both the child
and Ringo, and says
(3) "How can you make it so that Ringo sees a bowl?"
The assumption behind this procedure is that the child will give a
view interpretation to statements (l) and (2) and regard them as
referring to his own subjective view of the cup. He will then
differentiate "between one kind of view which is of a "cup" and
another kind which is of a "bowl". He will finally interpret
instruction (3) as requiring him to attend to Ringo's view, and
he will then turn the cup so that it looks like a bowl to Ringo.
And presumably these assumptions were justified for the 18 children
out of UO who responded "correctly".
However, a child may given an object interpretation to
statements (l) and (2), and, given the general prevalence of
object interpretations in ordinary language, this would be a very
reasonable interpretation. If he did this he would regard statements
(l) and (2) as referring to objective positions of the cup. He
would interpret these statements as saying that when the cup is
turned to one position it is called a cup, and when it is turned to
another position it is called a bowl, and that these labels applied
irrespective of the viewpoint from which the cup was seen. It would
then be quite consistent for this child to interpret instruction
(3) as a request to turn the cup back to the position in which he
knows it is called a bowl, and hence would produce the "incorrect"
or egocentric response of turning the cup so that the handle was
away from him.
It is not possible to tell how many of the 22 children who gave
the incorrect response did so because they interpreted the instructions
in this way, and how many did so because they Vera "egocentric" in
Piaget's sense - i.e. they interpreted the instructions as referring
to views but believed that Ringo's view was identical to theirs.
This could be discovered by means of a more systematic design in which
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children would be asked "Do you see a cup?", "Do you see a howl?",
" Does Ringo see a cup?", "Does Ringo see a howl?", for several
different positions of the child, Ringo, and the cup. For
example, the cup might he turned so that the handle was away
from the child, and the child told that he saw a howl. The child
could then be taken round to the other side of the table and asked
if he 3aw a howl. Presumably those children who gave a view
interpretation would say "Ho", while those who gave an object
interpretation would say "Yes".
We have argued here that "incorrect" responses on cup rotation
do not necessarily indicate a lack of perspective abilities, and this
is a fairly serious drawback to this method. Nevertheless there is
no doubt that "correct" responses do_ indicate the presence of
perspective abilities. In order to make a correct response the
child must not only interpret the instructions as referring to Ringo's
view, but he must also to some extent "construct" Ringo's view in
calculating where to turn the cup.
This involves much more than if he had been merely asked to
"make it so that Ringo does not see the handle", which only involves
the same projective abilities required in Experiments 1 and 2.
Correct responding here involves the perspective ability of knowing
how it looks to Ringo, and the results of this experiment show that
at least 18 out of the 1+0 children tested have this ability. If
this experiment was repeated with the various improvements suggested
here, it might well produce an even higher figure than this.
Thus, despite its deficiencies, the method of cup rotation still
provides us with firm evidence that preschool children have simple
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perspective abilities, and so directly contradicts Piaget and
Inhelder's claim that children of this age cannot have such
abilities. Taken together with Experiment 1. this experiment
shows that there are at least two areas, projective and perspective,
in which preschool children are able to calculate what another
person can see.
We will not, however, pursue the method of cup rotation any
further. Instead we will concentrate on the implications which
this result has for the method of picture selection. The fact that
many children fail on picture selection yet succeed on cup rotation
suggests that picture selection is not a valid test of the child's
underlying perspective competence, and the fact that many children
who initially fail on picture selection subsequently succeed later
in the session suggests that it is not a reliable test either.
Given that picture selection has been the standard method for testing
perspective ability since the mountain task was devised, the possibility
that it is an inadequate test has serious implications for this whole
area of investigation. The next experiment is an attempt to discover
exactly why picture selection, in the form used here, seems to be




This experiment looks at the effect of using different specific
instructions within the picture selection procedure. This was done
because it was realised that the instructions used in Experiments 2
and 3 were ambiguous in exactly the same way as were the instructions
used in the cup rotation procedure, i.e. they allowed both a view
interpretation and an object interpretation.
It will be recalled that in the picture selection (own view)
procedure the experimenter presents the child with four pictures
showing different views of the cup and asks him
(1) "Which picture shows what you see?"
The experimenter then turns the cup to each of the other three
positions, asking the child each time
(2) "Which picture shows what you see now?"
In the picture selection (other view) procedure, the experimenter
puts Ringo on a chair and asks the child
(3) "Which picture shows what Ringo see3?"
The experimenter then turns the cup to each of the other three
positions, asking the child each time
(^) "Which picture shows what Ringo sees now?"
The assumption behind these procedures is that the child will
interpret the questions (l) - (1) as requiring a view interpretation.
It is hoped that he will regard questions (l) and (2) as each time
asking him to focus on his own particular view of the cup, and to
select the picture which shows this view, and it is hoped that he
will regard questions (3) and (U) as referring to Ringo's particular
view of the cup, and asking him to select the picture showing Ringo's
view.
However, it would be perfectly reasonable if a child instead
gave an ob,ject interpretation to each of these questions. In this
case the child would interpret the phrase "what you see" in questions
(l) and (2) as referring each tine simply to the cup and not to his
own view of the cup. Similarly the child would interpret "what
Ringo sees" in questions (3) and (k) as also referring simply to the
cup and not to Ringo's own view of the cup. He would then be entirely
justified in choosing any of the pictures because, on his interpretation
of questions (l) - (h), any picture of the cup shows "what he sees"
and "what Ringo sees".
We pointed out earlier that in everyday situations the object
interpretation of "see" is what is generally required. It might seem
surprising, then, that the experimenter expects children to make the
view interpretation of questions (l) - (U) in the experimental
situation. However, it is hoped that several, features of the situation
will help to induce this interpretation. First, the experimenter shows
the child pictures of different views of the cup, rather than pictures
of different objects (one of them being a cup). Secondly, the
experimenter, after giving the child question : (l) ("Which picture
shows what you see?"), turns the cup to a different position and asks
question (2) ("Which picture shows what you see now?"). This
repetition of the question seems to expect a different answer or,
at least, a reconsideration of the previous answer and, given that
the only change has been in the orientation of the cup, this suggests
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that the repetition of the question and the change in orientation
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are connected. On an object interpretation of the question, no
meaningful connection is possible, while on a view interpretation
there is an immediate connection. If one assumes that the child
is trying to make as much sense as he can of the experimental
situation, then one hopes that this procedure will induce the view
interpretation. A similar argument holds for the interpretation of
questions (3) and (k).
However, although it is hoped that these aspects of the
procedures will induce the view interpretation, there is still the
possibility that a child may adopt the object interpretation. This
possibility means that if a child fails picture selection, either
of his own view or of the other view, then this does not necessarily
mean that he is unable to calculate the required view. It may
s|lttply mean that he has given the object interpretation to the question,
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rather than the view interpretation.
What we are proposing here, then, is that the instructions used
in picture selection allow two possible interpretations, and that the
children in Experiment 3 who seemed to have the necessary perspective
abilities and yet failed on picture selection (other view) did so
because they made the "incorrect" interpretation of the instructions.
It is not immediately apparent how this hypothesis can be tested
directly. However, it can be tested indirectly as follows. If we
alter some aspects of the experimental procedure so as to reduce the
likelihood of an "incorrect" interpretation and find that this leads
to an improved level of performance, then we have some tentative
support for our hypothesis.
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In this experiment we will concentrate on the wording of the
instructions, and attempt to reduce the ambiguity by adopting
alternative wordings. However, it is hard to find wordings for
these instructions which are unambiguous yet simple enough for
a preschool child to understand. Previous investigators in this
field have used a large variety of instructions, yet all of them
seem to have their drawbacks. We will briefly review the most
important of these previous efforts.
In their original account of the mountain task Piaget and
Inhelder (1956) do not give the precise wording they used, but
their procedure involved telling the child that the doll was
either painting a picture or taking a photograph of the mountains,
and then asking him to choose the picture which the doll would
paint, or the photograph which the doll would take. (A similar
procedure was used by Houssidas and Brown, 1959). The main
disadvantage of this method is that the child is required to
understand that, conventionally, taking photographs or painting
pictures from a single point gives a unique view of the objects
being photographed or painted. It is certainly possible that this
principle, which is superfluous to the formal requirements of the
task, may not have been fully understood by some of Piaget and
Inhelder's younger subjects.
Another method of presenting the task which may not have been
easily understood was that used by Flavell et al, 1968 (and subsequently
by Rubin, 1973). In one condition, Flavell used two identical blocks
with different pictures on each side and asked his subjects to
"....take your block and put it on the paper here so that it looks
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to you here just like that block looks to him there - so that you
see on your block just what he sees on his block." (emphasis in
original). The youngest children Flavell tested with this procedure
were 7 years old, but even they may well have had difficulty following
such instructions.
Other investigators used instructions similar to those of
Experiments 2 and 3. For instance Neale (1966) asked his subjects
to "...choose a picture showing what the man would see from his
position." Shantz and Watson (1971) asked their subjects for
"the picture that shows what the doll sees from there", while Dodwell
(1963) used the instructions "I will put this little doll at different
places and then I would like you to pick out the picture that shows
what the doll would see from those places." However, all these
instructions contain the same ambiguity as those used in Experiments
2 and 3; they allow both an obj ect interpretation and a view
interpretation. This ambiguity is not removed by the addition of
"from his position" or "from there" after "see".
Indeed, only one previous experiment seems to have used
unambiguous instructions, that of Garner and Plant (1972). They
asked their school-age subjects "If you stand where the doll is
standing which picture shows what it would look like?". Although
these instructions are unambiguous, they are not suitable for
preschool children, who would tend to respond by actually going
to stand where the doll was standing.
The fact that most of the experiments in this area, including
the mountain task, have used ambiguous or confusing instructions has
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very serious implications. It raises the strong possibility that
many children below 8 years failed on these tasks simply because
they could not understand what they were required to do. It also
shows the extent to which previous investigators have failed to
consider how their instructions might be interpreted by a young
child.
The present experiment compared the standard instructions
using "see", which were simple but ambiguous, with instructions
using "how it looks", which were less ambiguous but more complex.
The precise wordings were:
(1) "Which picture shows what you see? / what I see?"
(2) "Which picture shows how it looks to you? / to me?"
Pilot studies for this experiment also tried the instructions "Which
picture shows my view? / your view?" but preschool children found
these were too difficult.
A third wording was also used, which was specific to the actual
materials used in this experiment. These materials were three dolls
of different colours, each mounted near a corner of a triangular
base and facing outwards. They were introduced for two reasons.
First, being three objects in a triangle, the dolls resembled
Piaget and Inhelder's mountains much more closely than did the cup
used in Experiments 2 and 3. Secondly, the different views of the
dolls could be easily identified, since for each view a different
coloured doll's face was visible. Consequently the third wording
used was:
(3) "Which picture shows the doll's face that you see? / that I see?"
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This set of instructions is similar to instructions (2) in that
they are "both more complex but less ambiguous than instructions (l).
Because these dolls were already being used in this experiment,
it was thought that it might be confusing if another toy animal
(such as Ringo) or doll was used for the other view condition. More¬
over it was thought that it might also be confusing for the child to
be asked what a toy animal or doll could "see" when these inanimate
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objects did not really see at all. Instead, for the other view condition
the experimenter himself sat looking at the dolls from different
positions around the table. This explains why the instructions
contain "you" and "i".
Subjects
1*5 preschool children (2l* boys, 21 girls) were subjects. Their
ages ranged from 1* years 1 month to 5 years 2 months (mean age 1* years
9 months) and all were attending full time nursery school. They were
split into three groups of 15 children, matched as far as possible
for age and sex.
Materials
The materials used were three coloured dolls (red, blue, yellow)
and three pictures of the dolls.
The dolls were 15 cm high, with prominent faces. They were
each mounted near a corner of a triangular base 5 cm high and side
length 30 cm. Each doll faced outwards from its corner of the base.
The dolls were placed on a table in front of the child. The
base was always in one of three positions, i.e. with either the red
doll, the blue doll, or the yellow doll facing the child.
The experimenter (E) also sat at the table, 120° to the right
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of the child.
Thus for each position of the base, the child saw the face
of the doll nearest him, and side views of the other two dolls.
Similarly, E saw the face of the doll nearest him, and side
views of the other two dolls.
The pictures were each 15 cm x 10 cm, and fixed on a board
36 cm x 15 cm. The pictures showed the three views corresponding
to the three positions of the base. Thus for each position of
the base one picture showed the child's view and another picture
showed E's view.
Figure 10 shows the experimental set-up, and figure 11 is
a black and white representation of one of the pictures of the
dolls.




Figure 11: Representation of one of the pictures used.
Procedure
Each group of children received one set of picture instructions.
The wording of each set of instructions was as follows:
Condition (l) ("see")
own view: "Which -picture shows what you see?"
other view: "Which picture shows what I see?"
Condition (2) ("looks")
own view: "Which picture shows how it looks to you?"
other view: "Which picture shows how it looks to ne?"
Condition (3) ("doll's face")
128.
own view: "Which -picture shows the doll's face that you see?"
other view: "Which -picture shows the doll's face that I see?"
The procedure for each condition wa3 identical, apart from the




E shows the pictures to the child and says
"These are three pictures of the dolls.
Look at the dolls. Now look at the pictures.
Which -picture shows what you see?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He turns the base and repeats
"Which picture shows what you see?"
This is repeated for the third position of the base.
(ii) other view
E says
"I am looking at the dolls.
Which picture shows what I see?"
This is repeated, as above, for the other two positions of the base.
Results
Because there are only three pictures to choose from, the
probability of guessing the correct picture purely by chance is
quite high (33 1/3^). Accordingly, a criterion of two or three
correct responses out of three was set. The following table shows
the number of children (out of 15 in each group) who reached
criterion.
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Table 6 - Comparison of different instructions
own other
view view
Condition (l): "see" 9 5
Condition (2): "look" 1+ 2
Condition (3): "doll's face" 6 3
None of these differences is significant at the 0.05 level, using
the Fisher exact probability test, two-tailed.
Errors
Most of the errors for the other view conditions were egocentric
i.e. the child selected the picture showing his own view rather than
the emperimenter's view. Egocentric errors amounted to 69 out of 111
errors, or 62%. This figure is very similar to the proportion of
egocentric errors in Experiments 2 and 3.
There were no significant differences (at the 0.05 level) in
the proportion of egocentric errors between the various instruction
conditions.
Discussion
These results show that varying the wording of the instructions
used produces no improvement in performance on picture selection,
other view. If anything performance was lower with the alternative
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instructions (2) and (3) than with the standard instructions (l).
If this experiment had found that performance on selecting the
experimenter's view was improved dramatically by using the less
ambiguous instructions of conditions (2) and (3), then this would
have been strong support for our hypothesis that the children were
failing on picture selection because the instructions allowed more
than one interpretation. However, the actual results found do not
enable us to either confirm or reject this hypothesis. For instance,
it is possible that the children in condition (l) failed because of
the ambiguity of the instructions, while those in condition (2) and
(3) failed because of the complexity of the instructions.
It is of course possible that other wordings would have produced
dramatic improvements in performance. For instance, we could have
tried
(1) "Which picture shows what you see from there? / what I see from
here?" or
(5) "Which picture best shows what you see? / what I see?"
However, it seems from this experiment that changing the wording of
the instructions alone is unlikely to produce major improvements in





The previous experiment tried to raise the level of performance
on picture selection simply by altering the wording of the instructions,
but failed to find any improvement. In looking for other ways of
improving performance, several different lines of argument lead to the
same conclusion: that performance might be improved by prefacing the
picture selection with a series of verbal questions on the child's
own view, on the other view, and on the pictures.
The main argument for doing this arises directly out of the
previous experiment. The hypothesis put forward there was that some
children failed on picture selection because they gave the object
interpretation to the instructions rather than the view interpretation.
It was argued that various features of the experimental situation
(such as the fact that the pictures were different views of the same
object or set of objects, rather than being pictures of different
objects, and the fact that the instructions were repeated after moving
the object to different positions) were designed to induce the view
interpretation, but that it was still possible for a child to ignore
or misinterpret these features and so make the undesired interpretation.
This possibility, that the child might ignore or misinterpret
these features, seems all the more likely since his attention is not
explicitly drawn to them by the experimenter. This suggests that
if the experimenter explicitly disambiguates the situation before
asking the picture selection questions, then the child will be more
likely to succeed on picture selection. This can be done, using the
same materials as Experiment U, by asking the following series
of verbal questions before going on to the picture selection procedure
(1) verbal questions (own view): "Which doll's face do you see?"
(2) verbal questions (other view): "Which doll's face do I see?"
(3) verbal questions (pictures): "Which doll's face do you see in
this -picture?"
A second argument for adopting this procedure arises out of
the findings of Experiment 3. It was found in that experiment that
performance on picture selection was facilitated by successful
performance on cup rotation. This suggests that when the facilitation
effect occurred it was because the cup rotation procedure had focused
the child's attention on the differences between various views of the
cup, perhaps coupled with the fact that the child had been given
different verbal labels for these different views. This in turn
suggests that performance on picture selection will be improved by
prefacing it with a procedure which draws the child's attention to
different views of the dolls, and which also makes available to the
child different verbal labels for each view. These conditions are
satisfied by the three sets of verbal questions described above.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the verbal questions
(l) and (2) will be more straightforward for a U-year old child than
the standard picture selection questions. Thus the two main aims of
Experiment 5 are:
(i) to try to replicate the finding of Experiment 2 that performance
on verbal questions is higher than on picture selection alone;
and
(ii) to see whether performance on picture selection prefaced by
133.
these verbal questions is higher than on picture selection
alone.
Subjects
UO preschool children (22 boys and 18 girls) were subjects.
Their ages ranged from U years 10 months to b years 0 months (mean
age b years 5 months). They all attended either the morning session
of a nursery school, and they were of mixed social class.
Materials
The materials were the same as in Experiment U.
Procedure
The children were divided into two groups of 20 children, matched
as far as possible for age and sex. One group, condition A, received
picture selection only (PS only). The other group, condition B,
received verbal questioning followed by picture selection (VQ and PS).
Each child was tested once.
At the start of each session the child was introduced to the
dolls and shown all three positions of the base. He was then asked
to name the colour of each doll. Most children could do this (the
inability to do this, it turned out, did not affect the results, as
will be discussed later).
Condition A (PS only);
The children in this condition were given picture selection questions
exactly as in Experiment condition (l), i.e. the questions were
(i) own view; "Which picture shows what you see?"
(ii) other view: "Which picture shows what I see?"
Condition B (VQ and PS):
(i) VQ own view
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No pictures are shown. E says
"Look at the dolls.
Which doll's face do you see?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He turns the base to
another position and says
"Which doll's face do you see now?"
This is repeated, as above, for the third position of the base.
(ii) VQ other view
No pictures are shown. E says
"I am looking at the dolls.
Which doll's face do I see?"
This is repeated, as above, for the other two positions of the base.
(iii) VQ pictures
Only the pictures are shown. E says
"These are three pictures of the dolls."
E points to one picture and asks
"Which doll's face do you see in this picture?"
This is repeated for the other two pictures.
(iv) PS own view. PS other view
These were exactly as for condition A.
Order of instructions
All questions were given in blocks of three similar questions.
PS (own view) was always given before PS (other view). Similarly
VQ (own view) was always given before VQ (other view).
Ten children in condition B were given VQ (pictures) ^efo^e VQ
(views). Ten children were given the reverse order. All 20 children
in this condition were given VQ before PS.
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Results
No significant order effects were found.
A criterion was set of two or more questions correctly answered
out of a block of three questions. Table 7 shows the number of
children, out of 20 in each group, who reached this criterion for
each set of questions.
Table 7: Number of children reaching criterion in each condition.
VQ VQ VQ PS PS








20 19 16 13 13
Condition A (PS only)
The results for this condition were very similar to those found
with picture selection in Experiments 2, 3 and U. That is, 12 children
out of 20 succeeded on PS (own view) but only one child succeeded on
PS (other view). The majority of errors (6U$) on PS (other view)
were egocentric errors.
Condition B (VQ and PS)
There were two main findings here. First, all children performed
at nearly 100$ on VQ. All 20 children succeeded on VQ (own view),
which is significantly higher than the number succeeding on PS
2 P
(own view) in condition A =7.65, df=l, p^0.005, test, one-tailed).
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19 children out of 20 succeeded on VQ (other view), which is significantly-
higher than the number succeeding on PS (other view) in condition A
(%2=28.9, df=l, p<0.0005, if test, one-tailed).
Secondly, performance on PS (other view) was dramatically higher
than in condition A (13 children reached criterion compared with 1,
3(2=13.1, df=l, p(0.0005, test, one-tailed), while performance on
PS (own view) was not significantly higher (at the 0.05 level) than
in condition A.
Discussion
The main findings in this experiment are as follows:
(1) As expected, children perform much better with verbal questioning.
both on their own and on the other view, than with picture selection.
Indeed, their performance here on verbal questioning came close to
100/5. This finding confirms the main result of Experiment 2, where
a similar difference was found.
(2) However, the major finding of this experiment was that children's
performance on picture selection, other view, was dramatically improved
by giving verbal questions before picture selection. The magnitude of
this effect was unexpected and striking: only 1 child out of 20 succeeded
in condition A while 13 out of 20 succeeded in condition B.
This finding raises two related questions: first, what strategy
were successful performers using to select the correct picture? and
second, how did the presence of verbal questions help to encourage
this successful strategy?.
The verbal questions used in this experiment were:
VQ own view: Which doll's face do you see?
VQ other view: Which doll's face do I see?
VQ pictures: Which doll's face do you see in
this picture?
All these questions refer to the dolls' faces. This suggests that
those children who succeeded on picture selection, other view, in
condition B used a strategy involving the dolls' faces. That is,
they may well have used the following two-stage strategy:
(1) the child calculates which doll's face the experimenter sees:
(2) the child selects the picture showing this doll's face.
There is informal evidence for this from Experiment 5. Many
children in condition B, when correctly selecting a picture showing
the experimenter's view, made some kind of reference, either "by
pointing, or verbally, or both, to whichever doll's face the experimenter
saw. For example, if the dolls were positioned so that the experimenter
was looking at the blue doll's face, the child would point to the blue
doll saying "You see this one's face", and then select the correct
picture. Moreover, this kind of referring was still done by children
in condition B who failed picture selection. For example, a child
would correctly say "You see the blue doll's face" and then select
an incorrect picture. At the same time the child would point, in the
picture chosen, to the blue doll. Of course, as this is an incorrect
choice, only the side view of the blue doll would be visible. In
terms of the strategy outlined above, these children seemed to be
adopting only the first of the two stages. None of the children in
condition A made reference to the dolls ' faces in this way.
An important point to note here is that between 10% and 15$
of the children could not in fact name the different colours of each
doll when asked at the beginning of the experiment. However this did
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not seem to affect performance, for many of these children still
referred to the relevant doll's face, typically saying 'you see
that one's face', before selecting the correct picture. This
suggests that it is not necessary that the child actually possesses
a verbal label for each view, as long as he can adequately differentiate
between the different views.
If the children who succeeded on picture selection, other view,
were for the most part using the strategy outlined above, then the
effect of the verbal questions is essentially one of inducing this
strategy.
This effect may be brought about in several ways. One possibility
is that each set of verbal questions acts independently. That is,
VQ (views) may increase the probability of the second stage being
adopted. If this were so, then both VQ (views) and VQ (pictures)
would be needed to produce the effect. Alternatively, the effect
may be produced by either VQ (views) or VQ (pictures) alone.
The next experiment is an attempt to clarify and extend the




There were four aims to this experiment.
(1) The first aim was to try to replicate the main finding of
Experiment 5 using a slightly different experimental design. In
Experiment 6 all subjects were first given standard picture selection
questions, and only those who failed to reach the criterion were
subsequently retested on a second session. This ensured that all
subjects who started the second session were at a comparable level.
(2) The second aim was to see if a similar effect was possible
with 3-year old children as well as U-year olds.
(3) The third aim was to try to confirm that children who
succeeded on picture selection after being given verbal questions
were in fact using the two-stage strategy outlined in the discussion
of Experiment 5. This cannot be tested directly, but indirect evidence
can be obtained as follows. If children do succeed on picture selection
by using this two-stage strategy, then it is likely that they will also
perform well if each picture session is presented in two stages directly
parallel to the strategy. Thus in some conditions of Experiment 6 the
child is asked "Wkichdoll^ followed directly by
either
"So which picture shows what I see?"
or
"So which picture shows the doll's face
that I see?"
This presentation has individual picture selection questions following
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individual verbal questions, and thus it differs from the presentation
used in Experiment 5 and in other conditions of Experiment 6, which
has blocks of picture selection questions following blocks of verbal
questions.
(H) The final aim of Experiment 6 was to explore in more detail
precisely how the verbal questions were improving performance on
picture selection. This was done by comparing the effects of VQ (views)
along, VQ (pictures) alone, and VQ (views and pictures).
It was mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 5 that several
children who had received verbal questions as well as picture selection
made errors in which they pointed to the correct doll but in the
wrong picture. As errors of this kind are a useful indicator of the
strategy that the child is using, it was noted whenever they occurred
in this experiment.
Subjects
Two hundred and sixteen nursery school children (ll8 boys and
98 girls) were subjects. Their ages ranged from 5 years 3 months to
k years 0 months (mean age years 6 months) and they were of mixed
social class. None were subjects for Experiment 5.
Material
The same materials were used as in Experiment 5.
Procedure
There were two parts to this experiment. In part I all children
were given PS exactly as for condition A of Experiment 5, i.e., a
block of three PS (own view) questions followed by a block of three
PS (other view) questions. Children who spontaneously passed PS
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(other view) were not retested, The remaining children were given
part II.
In part II the children were divided into eight groups (A to II)
matched, as Tar as possible, for age, sex, and performance in part I.
These children were given part II between one and two weeks after
part I.
Instructions for part II
Condition A (control VQ, anc PS)
The control VQ were verbal questions about the dolls which did
not help to differentiate the child's view from the experimenter's.
For example, they were questions about the identical aprons which
all the dolls were wearing.
Condition B (VQ pictures and PS)
Condition C (VQ views and PS)
Condition D (VQ views. VQ pictures, and PS)
In all the above conditions, VQ and PS were always given in blocks
of three similar questions, exactly as in Experiment 5. PS (own view)
was always given before PS (other view) and VQ (own view) was always
given before VQ (other view).
In conditions E, F, G and H, each PS question was presented in
two stages. The wording used in conditions E and F will be indicated
by PS*; the wording used in conditions G and H will be indicated by
PS**.
Condition E
(i) PS* (own view)
At first E has the pictures turned face down, so the child cannot
see them. E says
Ik2.
"Look at the dolls.
Which doll's face do yon see?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He then shows the pictures
and says
"So which picture shows what you see?"
This is repeated for the other two positions of the base. Each time
E keeps the pictures overturned while asking "Which doll's face do
you see?"
(ii) PS* (other view)
With the pictures overturned E says
"I am looking at the dolls.
Which doll's face do I see?"
After the child responds, E says "O.K." He then shows the pictures
and says
"So which -picture shows what I see?"
This is repeated, as above, for the other two positions of the base.
Condition F
This was identical to condition E except that PS* was preceded by
VQ (pictures).
Condition G
This was identical to condition E except that "So which picture shows
what you see?" was replaced by
PS**: "So which picture shows the doll's face that you see?"
Similarly, "So which picture shows what I see?" was replaced by
PS**: "So which picture shows the doll's face that I see?"
Condition H





36 out of 216 children spontaneously reached the criterion
(at least two correct responses out of three) on PS (other view),
leaving 180 children who failed to reach criterion. Most of the
errors (59$) in PS (other view) were egocentric errors.
Of the 180 children eligible for Part II, 20 were unavailable
at the time of retesting. This left 160 children, 20 for each of
conditions A to H.
Part II
Table 8 shows the number of children, out of 20 who reached the
criterion in each condition.




























! A 8 2
B 20 ll* k
C 20 20 12 6
D 20 19 19 15 16
E 19 17
F 20 20 20
G 19 19
H 20 19 18
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Conditions A to D, and conditions E to H, will he considered
separately.
Conditions A to D
(i) verbal questions
As in Experiments 2 and 5, VQ presented little difficulty.
Almost all the children in conditions Bt C and D succeeded on their
respective VQ.
(ii) picture selection
Own view; 8 children reached criterion in condition A, which
is not significantly different from chance responding. l4 children
in condition B, 12 in condition C and 15 in condition D reached
2
criterion. While all these differ from chance (p(0.05,/^ test),
only condition D differs significantly from condition A. (^=3.7,
df=l, p(0.05, test, one-tailed).
Other view: 2 children in condition A, 4 in condition B and
6 in condition C reached criterion. None of these differ significantly
from chance responding. However 16 children reached criterion in
, 2
condition D. This differs significantly from condition A (.X"=±7.1,
p(b.0005), from condition B (^=12.1, p(0.0005)» and from condition
c (X2=10.1, p(0.005; all these df3!,^2 test, one-tailed).
The results from conditions A to D thus replicate the main
findings of Experiment 5. Further, they 3how that performance on
PS (other view) is significantly improved only after both ¥0 (views)
and VQ (pictures). Neither set of VQ alone hs.s this effect.
Conditions E to h
Virtually all the children in all the conditions E to H reached
criterion on all questions. There were no significant effects produced
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by 70 (pictures), and no significant differences between the wording
used for PS in condition E and F, and the wording used in conditions
G and H.
The results from conditions E to H show that when PS questions
are presented in two stages they present no difficulty to the children.
Errors
In all conditions the majority of errors on picture selection,
other view, were egocentric errors. Overall, these amounted to 101
out of 153 total errors, or 6h$.
A more detailed analysis of the error patterns suggests that
the verbal questions have a differential effect on the two stages of
the strategy. It was mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 5
that children will often select an incorrect picture while pointing,
in that picture, to the doll whose face the experimenter sees. It
was suggested that such errors might indicate that these children
had adopted only the first stage of this strategy. In other words,
these children correctly calculate which doll's face the experimenter
sees, but then select an incorrect picture.
Now if the verbal questions do have a differential effect,
then children in conditions A and B who do not receive verbal questions
(views) would make fewer of these errors than children in conditions
G and D, who do receive verbal questions (views).
This is in fact the case. The numbers of this kind of error
out of the total errors are:
condition A - 10 out of ^9 (20$)
condition B - 7 out of U3 (16$)
condition C - 17 out of 33 (52$)
condition D - 9 out of 16 (56$)
lU6.
This is strong support for the differential effect hypothesis.
Additional results from 3-year old children
After these results had been obtained from U-year old children,
a group of 3-year olds vere given some of the above conditions.
There were ^7 3-year old children (21 boys and 26 girls).
Their ages ranged from 3 years 11 months to 3 years 1 month (mean
age 3 years 8 months). They were of mixed social class.
The materials and procedure were exactly as described above.
3 children spontaneously reached criterion on PS (other view)
in part I. 8 children were unavailable for retesting. This left
3b children for part II, 12 each for conditions D, F and H.
Table 9 shows the number of children, out of 12, who reached
the criterion in each condition.




























D 12 10 12 10 9
F 12 10 10
H 10 11 11
These results are almost identical to those from the l+~year old
children in the same conditions. Table 10 directly compares the scores
of the 3- auu 1- year olds on picture selection, other view.
ivr.
Table 10: Comparison of 3- and U-vear olds.
Condition 3-year olds U-year olds
D (P3) 9/12 (7550 lb/20 (QC%)
F (P3») 10/12 (83/0 20/20(100%)
II (PS**) 11/12 (92/0 16/20 (90JO
The 3-year olds are clearly performing as well as the 4-year olds
in all conditions.
Summary of results
We will briefly summarise the results in terms of the main aims
of the experiment.
(1) Renlication of Experiment 5: The main finding of Experiment 5 was
replicated. Performance on PS (other view) was dramatically improved
when picture selection was prefaced by VQ (views) and VQ (pictures).
The effect was, if anything, slightly larger than that of Experiment
5, although the procedure was slightly different. Thus 16 out of
20 children who had all previously failed on picture selection alone
succeeded when picture selection was prefaced by verbal questions.
This compares with 13 out of 20 children who succeeded in Experiment 5.
(2) Three-year olds; An almost identical improvement on PS (other
view) was found with the 3-year olds. Thus 9 out of 12 3-year olds,
who had all previously failed on picture selection alone, succeeded
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when picture selection was prefaced, by verbal questions.
(3) Two-stape strategy: This experiment provided further indirect
evidence that successful performers on picture selection* other
view, were using a two-stage strategy. All children, 3-year olds
as well as l+-year olds, scored virtually 100$ when the picture
selection questions were presented in two stages in conditions E
to H. For the U-year olds, performance was .just as high whether or
not these two-stage questions were prefaced, by 70 (pictures), and
the two different wordings of the instructions produced equally
high per fox-mances.
(1*) Differential effect of VQ. (views) and VQ. (pictures): For the
H-year olds, the improvement in performance only occurred after
both VQ (views) and VQ (pictures). Neither set of verbal questions
alone produced this effect. This suggests that the verbal questions
have a differential effect: VQ (views) increase the probability of
a child's adopting the first stage of the strategy, and VQ (pictures)
have a similar effect on the second stage. Further evidence for
this differential effect hypothesis comes from the error patterns.
No comparable data is available for the 3-year olds.
Discussion
This experiment replicates and extends the main finding of
Experiment 5* and shows that most 3- and U-year old children can,
in certain conditions, select pictures showing another person's
view. They appear to do this by adopting a two-stage strategy.
Most children do not adopt this strategy spontaneously, but only
if picture selection is prefaced both by verbal questions about
the child's view and the other person's view, and by verbal questions
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about the pictures. It seems that these verbal questions have
a differential effect: verbal questions (views) increase the
probability of the child's adopting the first stage of the strategy,
ana verbal questions (pictures) have a similar effect on the
second stage.
The rest of this discussion focuses on the following questions:
(1) Why is it that children do not spontaneously adopt the
successful strategy?
(2) What do these findings imply about the child's perspective
and projective abilities?
We will then present a general discussion of Experiments 1-6.
(l) To ask why children do not spontaneously adopt the successful
strategy is the same as to ask why verbal questions are necessary at
all. The main reason for introducing verbal questions in the first
place was pat forward in the introduction to Experiment 5. There
it was argued that some children failed on picture selection because
they adopt the object interpretation of the instructions rather than
the view interpretation, and it was suggested that they would be
more likely to adopt the view interpretation if the experimenter
explicitly disambiguated the situation before asking the picture
selection questions. 3n this particular line of argument, then,
the verbal questions are necessary because they disambiguate the
situation, and so encourage the child to adopt the view interpretation.
This argument, as it stands, is unable to explain all the
findings of the present experiment. In particular it cannot explain
the occurrence of errors in which the child selects an incorrect
picture while pointing, on that picture, to the doll whose face the
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experimenter sees. We have argued that children who make this
kind of error have adopted only the first stage of the two-stage
strategy. That is, they have correctly calculated which doll's face
the experimenter sees, but have not chosen the correct picture.
In terms of the two possible interpretations of the instructions,
these children have clearly made the view of interpretation and not the
object interpretation. If they had made the latter, they would not
have focused on an aspect of the group of dolls which was specific
to the experimenter's view, but would just have considered the
grgup as a whole.
The occurrence of this kind of error shows that it is possible
for a child to make the view interpretation of the instructions but
still fail to make the correct response. Adopting the view interpretation
is a necessary condition for correctly responding, but is not a sufficient
condition. The child must also understand the conventions of the
pictures.
It is often implicitly assumed that the conventions used in a
certain picture or set of pictures will be immediately understood by
anyone looking at this picture or this set. Yet at the same time
pictures are often ambiguous, and the conventions have to be determined
from the particular context in which the picture appears. This point
has been made several times by Gombrich (i960, 1972), and also by
Marshall and Wales (197*0 who suggest that pictures are often more
ambiguous than language:
"...there appears to be no general set of interacting
pictorial conventions which specify the pragmatic
functions of an expression with the same degree of
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precision and clarity that attends, for example,
the communicative consequences of optional
transformations in linguistic structure."
(Marshall and Wales, 197*+, p.8)
Marshall and Wales point out that there has been no developmental
study of how children learn the conventions of pictures comparable
to the vast amount of research that has been done on the acquisition
of language. They also stress that we know little about how the
two representation systems interact with each other, both in adults
and in children.
In one of the few studies to have looked at preschool children's
understanding of pict\ires, Wheeler (1972) presented children with
pairs consisting of an object and a picture of the object. She
then asked the children to show her the object, the picture, and
the picture of the object, and found that the children's errors
consisted mostly of pointing to the picture when asked to point to
the object. She concluded from this, and similar findings, that
preschool children had not yet developed "the pictorial attitude",
i.e. the ability to distinguish between an object and its picture.
The conclusion, however, does not seem justified from her data, for
her subjects may simply have been confused because the picture and
the object had the same name.
In another part of the same study, Wheeler presented 5~ and
6-year olds with an array consisting of a red star, a green circle
and a blue square arranged vertically. She showed her subjects
various pictures which more or less resembled the array and asked each
time if the picture was a picture of the array. She concluded that
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■che most important feature children used in making their .judgments
was simply whether the three shapes were present or absent in the
picture. The order of the shapes was next important, and the
colour was least important. Thus some children would accept a
picture as being; a picture of the array even if it included yellow
25
shapes.
This finding is clearly relevant to the pictures used in
Experiments U, 5, and 6, where the different views of the dolls
were differentiated 3olely on the grounds of colour. If young
children do not spontaneously regard colour as important in matching
pictures to external objects then they are unlikely either to have
adequately differentiated between the pictures, or to have fully
understood that the pictures represented different views of the
same set of objects. Thus there are strong grounds for assuming that
children do not spontaneously understand the specific meaning of the
pictures used in these experiments. It is .just as important to
disambiguate the conventions of the -pictures as it is to disambiguate
the language of the instructions.
What we are proposing here, then, is that the dramatic effect
of verbal questions on picture selection, other view, occurs because
the verbal questions (views) disambiguate the language of the
instructions, while verbal questions (pictures) disambiguate the
conventions of the pictures. This raises the important question of
how this relates to our earlier proposal, that verbal questions (views)
increase the probability of the child's adopting the first stage of
the two-stage strategy, while verbal questions (pictures) have a
similar effect on the second stage.
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We will argue here that these two explanations are very closely
related and that, in this particular situation, they nay well amount
to the same thing. That is, the child's fully understanding the
language of the instructions raay he identical with his developing
the first stage of the strategy, and his fully understanding the
conventions of the pictures may he identical with his developing
the second stage of the strategy.
This seems, intuitively, to he the most likely explanation of
these results. The main objection to this argument, though, is
conceptual rather than empirical. The objection focuses on the
implicit assumption that "understanding instructions" can he equated
with "knowing what to do". This assumption, it might he argued,
denies the possibility that a child may understand the instructions
yet be unable to develop a successful strategy. This possibility,
after all, is what happens when adults "know what they have to do
but not quite how to do it".
This objection raises questions which are conceptually very
difficult, such as whether a child can understand instructions with¬
out translating them into real or hypothetical actions, or, indeed,
what it means to understand a sentence at all. It is not immediately
clear how, or even whether, such problems can be settled empirically.
For the time being, we will merely repeat that the most likely
interpretation of these findings is that the two explanations are
essentially the same, and leave the discussion at this point.
(2) We will now consider what these findings imply about the
young child's perspective and projective abilities. At first sight
it seems that picture selection is a relatively straight forward
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test of the child's perspective ability; i.e. the child is required
to select a picture showing how it looks to the other person. The
results of Experiments 5 and 6, then, show that children as young
as 3 years do have the simple perspective ability needed for this
task.
However the situation is more complicated than this. If a
child is using the two-stage strategy, then he will
(i) calculate which doll's face the experimenter sees,
and then
(ii) select the picture showing this doll's face.
The first stage, however, only requires the child to have the
projective ability of calculating what the experimenter sees, and
the second stage only requires him to use this knowledge to infer
which is the correct picture. In other words, it seems that the
child's apparent perspective ability is really a combination of
projective ability and inferential ability.
Although this seems at first sight surprising, it will quickly
be realised that many similar perspective abilities can be broken
down in this way. Consider for example a situation which might
have arisen in Experiments 2 or 3, where a child is asked to select
a picture showing Ringo's view of the cup when the handle is
turned away from Ringo. A child might succeed on this by first
calculating that Ringo eould not see the handle (projective ability)
and then inferring that the correct picture was the one in which
the handle could not be seen (inferential ability). Another more
complex example might arise in the mountain task, where a child
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has a brown mountain on his left at the front, a green mountain in
the middle at the back, and a grey mountain on his right at the
front, and he is asked to select a picture showing wrhat a doll,
sitting opposite, sees. He might well do this by first calculating
that the green mountain is nearest the doll, so reducing his choice
to those pictures with the green mountain at the front. He may then
calculate that the doll sees the brown mountain on the right, and
hence narrow his choice down to the correct picture.
What we are saying here is simply that children may well
succeed on quite complex picture selection tasks by developing
inferential strategies based on relatively simple projective or
perspective abilities. This seems quite a reasonable assumption to
make, particularly in view of our analysis of the three dolls task.
It is, however, generally assumed by other investigators in this
area that children in fact succeed on picture selection by a process
involving imagery. That is, it is assumed that a child will look
at his own view, and by systematically applying a number of mental
transformations or rotations to it he will construct an image of the
other person's view. He will then select a picture showing this
image.
Certainly Piaget and Inhelder believe that the mountain task
is a test of the child's ability to "imagine", or produce "visual
images" of, other views. For instance they said that a child who
fails on the mountain task "...cannot form a comprehensive mental
picture detailed enough to enable him to think out the transformations
in terms of virtual perspectives ...it is the egocentric illusion
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vhich prevents these children from reversing to the left-right,
before-behind relations and thereby rotating the perspectives
along with their changing viewpoints..." (p.2l8); and "... he
appears to be rooted to his own viewpoint in the narrowest and
most restricted fashion so that he cannot imagine any perspective
but his own." (p.2U2)
This position is held even more explicitly by Huttenlocher
and Presson (1973), who claim that 8- and 10-year old children
solve a problem similar to the mountain task by "mentally rotating"
the display. Huttenlocher and Presson also asked adults to solve
the problem and report on how they had done it. Most adults
reported forming an image, although a few said that they had used
an inferential process.
Clearly this kind of task can be solved either by inference
or by imagery, and it is important to discover which conditions
favour one method rather than another. For the time being, we will
merely claim that our 3- and l+-year old children solved the present
perspective problem by using inference, although they probably
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could not solve it by means of imagery.
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General Discussion of Experiments 1-6
Taken together the results of Experiments 1-6 show that
preschool children have considerable abilities in both the projective
and perspective areas. In the projective area the results of
Experiment 1 show that almost all 3-year olds have at least the
basic projective abilities outlined in Chapter 3, up to and including
knowing that other people will not see objects which are hidden by
nearer objects along their line of sight. The results of Experiment
6 show that 3-year old children can also perform simple perspective
calculations, when these involve merely the transformation of
orientation (i.e. knowing that another person's view of an object,
or group of objects, will be of the side of the object which is
nearest to them). The results of Experiment 3 suggest that only the
older U-year old children can perform perspective calculations
involving the front/back transformation (i.e. knowing that another
person's view will not contain objects which are occluded by
objects nearer to them on their line of sight). However this last
ability has not been tested for under the optimal conditions
discovered by Experiments 5 and 6.
Since the work reported here was started a handful of studies
have appeared which give considerable support to these findings.
Fishbein, Lewis and Keiffer (1972) report an unpublished study by
Lewis and Fishbein (1969) in which a single toy was used, and
children aged from 3l years to 9l years were asked to identify the
perspective of the experimenter by either pointing to a photograph
or turning the toy. Lewis and Fishbein found that all the children
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performed well on both the pointing and turning tasks, the latter
producing virtually errorless performance. Unfortunately no more
details are given of this earlier study.
Fishbein et al go on to describe a study in which they compared
children's performance on a 'turning' task, in which the child was
asked to turn toys so that the experimenter could see specified
views of the toys, with their performance on a 'pointing' task,
in which the child was asked to point to a photograph of the
experimenter's view. The toys all had distinguishable front, back
left and right side views. (e.g. a toy mouse with a candle in one
hand and the other hand at his side). In some conditions only one
toy was used, while in other conditions a group of 3 toys was used.
In the turning task E used instructions like 'show me the front of
the mouse', while in the pointing task E said "I want you to point
to the picture which looks like what I can see from where I am
sitting". Fishbein et al found that for a group of preschool
children aged from 3 years 5 months to 4 years 8 months (mean age
H years 0 months) performance on the turning task was very high
(over 90%). On the pointing task performance depended on the
number of toys used and the number of photographs to be selected
from. Thus with 1 toy and k photographs performance was 75%, with
3 toys and h photographs it was 66%, with 1 toy and 8 photographs
it was U8%, and with 3 toys and 8 photographs it was 3k%.
These results fit reasonably well with our own findings.
The turning task requires fairly straightforward projective abilities,
and so Fishbein's results confirm our findings that such tasks
present few problems to 3- and U-year old children. The pointing
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task, on the other hand, is a picture selection task similar to
those used in Experiments 2-6, and so it might at first sight
seem strange that Fishbein et al found high performance in
some conditions without any of the preliminary verbal questions
found necessary in Experiments 5 and 6. However a closer study
of the x>rocedure used by Fishbein et al shows that they had an
extensive 'familiarisation' procedure before giving the test
questions. In this 'familiarisation' procedure the experimenter
sat beside the child and described the distinctive features of
each view of the toys, using labels such as 'front','back' and
'side'. He then asked the child to select a picture showing his
own view of the toys, and corrected all the errors which the child
made. Moreover in the actual test session the experimenter gave
the child evaluative feedback, correcting him when he was wrong
and giving him sweets when he was right. It seems highly probable
that this procedure was equivalent to the preliminary verbal
questions used in Experiments 5 and 6, and this could in fact be
tested experimentally.
Another recent study by Masangkay et al (197*0 investigated
the projective abilities of children aged from 2 years 1 month to
3 years 7 months. In one task, the 'picture' task, the experimenter
held a piece of card with a picture on each side between himself
and the child and asked 'what do you see?' and "what do I see?'.
In some trials the pictures were the same on each side, and in
other trials they were different. In another task, the 'eye-position'
ta3k, U toys were positioned around the child (on the ceiling above
him, on the walls to his left and right, and on the floor at his feet).
The female experimenter sat facing the child and asked him which
toy she was looking at while she fixated each toy in turn. In
between fixations E closed her eyes and moved them to the next
fixation position when closed. Thus the only cue available to the
child was eye-position, not eye-movements. Masangkay et al found
that performance was similar on both tasks; the 2-year olds scored
around 50$ on each task while the 3-year olds performed at near
100$.
Again these results fit in well with our findings, confirming
that almost all 3-year olds have simple projective abilities and
3'oggesting that a considerable number of 2-year olds also have
such abilities. Indeed the performance of the 2-year olds is
remarkably high considering the problems involved in testing children
of this age. Moreover the eye-position task is clearly a useful
paradigm for investigating these projective abilities in more detail
(e.g. finding out which cues are used in calculating what another
person is looking at, or how accurately children can perform such
calculations).
Masangkay et al report two further experiments which are also
relevant here. In the first experiment they compared the performance
of children aged between 3 years and 5i years on a series of 5 tasks.
The first of these, the 'picture' task, was a slightly modified
version of the picture task described earlier. In the second of thes
tasks, the 'turtle' task, E sat opposite the child and held
horizontally between them a card with a picture of a turtle on it,
asking, for various positions of the card, 'do you/I see the turtle
right side up or upside down?'. In the third task, the 'fishes' task
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three differently coloured fishes were mounted at 120 to each
other (as in the 3 dolls task used in our Experiments U - 6), and
three comparison fishes, each identical to one of the other fishes,
were lined up facing the child to one side of the display. E sat
at 120° to the child so that he saw one fish nearest to him while
another fish was nearest to the child. E asked the child 'does the
one that you/I see best look like this one, this one, or this one?'
(pointing to each comparison fish in turn). In the fourth task,
the 'witches' task, E sat opposite the child with a toy witch
between them which faced either one or the other of them, and for
comparison there were three identical witches, in different orientat
ions, lined up close to the child. E asked the child to say which
of the comparison witches 'looks exactly like what you/I see?'.
The last task, the 'clown task', was similar to the turtle task
except that the picture showed a smiling clown's face when seen
from one orientation, but a frowning face when seen from 180° to
this orientation. E sat opposite the child and asked 'do you/I
see the smiling face or the frowning face?'.
The results were fairly straightforward and showed that
performance on the picture task and the fishes task was near 100#
for almost all the children from 3 years upwards. The turtle
task and the clown task elicited around chance responding for the
3-year olds but performance was near 100# for the H-year olds.
Performance on the witches task was low for all the children below
h\ years but improved steadily to over 80# for the 5-year olds.
As before, these results fit in very well with our own findings
In our terms, the picture task and the fishes task are both simple
projective tasks, and Masangkay's results confirm our findings that
almost all 3-year olds succeed on such tasks. The turtle task and
the clown task are both perspective tasks, in that they require the
child to calculate 'how it looks' to the experimenter, and are
essentially simpler versions of the 'cup rotation' procedure used in
Experiment 3. Thus Masangkay's findings that the tasks are difficult
for 3-year olds but easy for U-year olds confirm our finding that the
cup rotation procedure produces good performance only with the older
l+-year olds. Finally, the witches task is a perspective task closely
resembling a standard picture selection task, and without anything
like the verbal questions used in our Experiments 5 and 6 it is not
surprising that performance was low for all children below l+js years.
In the final experiment reported by Masangkay et al 12 children
aged between 3I and h years were given a series of U tasks in the
same order. In the first of these, the 'witch-spots' task, a blue
spot was painted on the nose of a toy witch and an orange spot was
painted on the back of her hat. The witch was then placed between
the child and the experimenter who asked 'do you/I see the nose with
the blue spot or the hat with the orange spot?*. In the second task,
'witch-split', a witch was split down the middle and the two halves
mounted on opposite sides of a board. This was placed between the
child and the experimenter who asked 'd0 you/I see the witch's nose
or the witch's hat?'. The third task was the standard 'witches'
task used in the previous experiment, while the fourth task, the
'black' task was a simple picture selection task in which the child
was asked to select from 2 photographs the one showing the
experimenter's view of a block mounted on a platform.
163.
Masangkay et al found that performance was near 100% on the
first two tasks (witch-spots and witch-split), hut was low for the
last two tasks (witches and block). There was no evidence of any
facilitation on the witches task due to successful performance on
the witch-spots or witch-split tasks.
In our terms the first two tasks were simple projective tasks
and the results show yet again that these present few problems
for 3-year old children. The last two tasks were simple perspective
tasks involving either picture selection or a similar comparison
procedure, and Masangkay's results confirm our findings that 3-year
old children usually fail such tasks if no form of preliminary
questioning is given. What is interesting here is that there was
no facilitation effect on the witches task due to successful
performance on the witch-spots or witch-split tasks. Clearly these
two earlier tasks did not function in the sane way as the verbal
questions did in our Experiments 5 and 6, and so Masangkay's
subjects were unable to develop a correct strategy for solving
the problem. One possible reason for this failure to obtain a
facilitation effect is that the questions used in the witch-spots
and witch-split tasks were concerned only with the distinctive
features of the test witch. The comparison witches were not even
present during these first two tasks. This situation resembles
condition C in Experiment 6, where the only verbal questions asked
were about the dolls, not about the pictures. In that condition
too, no facilitation effect was found. We would predict on the
basis of our findings in Experiment 6 that performance on the
witches task would be facilitated by preliminary verbal questions
about the test witch and about the comparison witches.
On the basis of these experiments Masangkay et al distinguish
between two levels of ability, which they call levels 1 and 2, and
conclude that while level 1 is present to some extent in at least
half of their 2-year olds, level 2 does not appear in the majority
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of children until U years. Thi3 level 1/level 2 distinction is
virtually identical to our projective/perspective distinction, and
we can in fact suggest from the results of Experiment 6 that some
degree of level 2 ability (our perspective ability) is present in
almost all 3-year olds. Apart from this important difference,
though, these experiments of Masangkay et al provide strong support
for many of our own findings.
The final study to have appeared on this topic since this thesis
was begun is an unpublished study by Light (197*0 of the role-taking
skills of U-year old children. Light followed up a sample of 31
Cambridge children who had been studied intensively in their first
year of life by Richards (e.g. Richards and Bernal, 1972), and gave
them a battery of role-taking tasks around their fourth birthdays.
The first task closely resembled Masangkay's turtle task but used a
small plywood figure of a man instead of a turtle. The child and
the experimenter sat at various positions around a table while E
asked the child to put the man 'up the right way' or 'upside down*
either for E or for the child. Light's second task was similar to
the first in that it required the child to place flat pictures the
right way round for the experimenter sitting opposite. This time,
however, this was not made explicit to the child. Instead the child
and the experimenter took it in turns to give each other 'presents'
(cards with pictures of objects on them), which involved them placing
the cards in rows in front of each other. Light found similar results
for the two tasks. About half of his subjects were predominantly
correct in orienting the man in the first task while a similar
proportion of the children in the second task turned most of the
pictures so that the experimenter saw them the right way up. This
is consistent with the findings of Masangkay et al that performance
on the turtle task was at the chance level for the 3-year olds but
near 100$ for the l+-year olds.
Two more tasks devised by Light, his 'pyramid' tasks, are also
relevant here. In these tasks he used a 3-sided pyramid which had
different pictures on each side. In the first task the pyramid was
placed between the experimenter and the child so that two faces of
the pyramid were visible only to the child while the other one was
visible only to the experimenter. The child had to work out which
picture the experimenter could see. In the second task a doll was
placed at various positions around the pyramid (including positions
where two pictures were visible to the doll) and the child was
asked to say what the doll could see. Light found that most of the
children were able to manage the first task without too much difficulty,
and that virtually all the children managed those trials of the second
task where the doll could only see a single picture. However only half
of these children were successful when the doll could see two pictures.
Again these results are fairly consistent with our findings, and show
that simple projective tasks are performed well at this age level.
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These three recent studies, then, give very strong support to
the findings of Experiments 1-6, and suggest that we are justified
in drawing the following conclusions.
(1) Virtually all tasks which require only projective abilities
(i.e. those in which the child has only to calculate what another
person can see) Eire performed well by almost all 3-year olds and by
a fair number of 2-yeEir olds. This includes the turning task of
Lewis and Fishbein, and of Fishbein et al; the eye-position, picture,
fishes, witch-spots and witch-split tasks of Masangkay et al; and
the pyramid tasks of Light, as well as our Experiment 1. The single
exception to this list is the paxt of Light's second pyramid task
in which two pictures were visible to the doll.
(2) Simple perspective tasks in which the child has to place
a figure in a given orientation to another person are performed
poorly by most 3-year olds but very well by most ii-year olds. This
includes Masangkay's turtle and clown tasks as well as Light's first
two tasks. A more complex version of this kind of task, our cup
rotation procedure, is performed well by older U-year old children.
(3) Slightly more complex perspective tasks in which the child
has to match the other person's view to some representation of this
view are generally performed poorly by most 3- and U-year old
children. This includes Masangkay's witches task as well as the
orthodox picture selection procedures used in Experiments 2, 3
and U, and in some conditions of Experiments 5 and 6.
(k) However, if these tasks are presented in a way that
effectively disambiguates the instructions and the representation
conventions being used, and allows the child to develop a successful
167.
strategy which relates features of the other person's view to
representations of this view, then a high proportion of 3- and k-year
old children will succeed on these tasks. These conditions were
certainly met in our Experiments 5 and 6, and were probably met in
Fishbein, Lewis and Keiffer's pointing task.
The final question to be considered in this general discussion
of Experiments 1 - 6 is: how should these findings be followed up in
future experiments?
It seems that little more can be discovered with the materials
of Experiments U, 5, and 6, although it would be interesting to know
whether both verbal questions (own view) and verbal, questions (other
view) were needed in condition D, or whether the same improvement
in performance would be produced with only one of these sets of
questions. Both the "disambiguation" hypothesis and the "strategy
formation" hypothesis would suggest that verbal questions (other view)
would be necessary at least, although neither hypothesis is sufficiently
precise to make a clear cut prediction. It would also be interesting
in view of the findings of Masangkay et al, to know how well 2-year
olds perform with these materials.
However it would be much more interesting to see whether the
main findings of Experiments 5 and 6 are replicable with different
materials and different task requirements. In particular we would
want to know whether preliminary verbal questions can dramatically
affect children's performance on perspective tasks which involve
transformations in either the front/back dimension or the left/
right dimension (as in the task used in Experiments 2 and 3), or
even in both dimensions simultaneously (as in the mountain task).
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Can preschool children succeed on these tasks if they are presented
in the right way?.
There are, however, problems in knowing what verbal questions
to use in such tasks. The most direct way of specifying each view
and each picture would be to use the words 'left', 'right', 'front',
and 'back': i.e. one would ask the child
'does the doll see the handle on the left?'
or
'which mountain do I see at the back?'
Unfortunately young children are known to have difficulties with
all these terms. Piaget (1928) found that children below 5 years
could not specify which was their left or right hand, while children
below 8 years could not say which was the left or right hand of a
person sitting opposite them. Similar results were found by Swanson
and Benton (1955) and Elkind (1961). Young children also have
difficulty with the terms "in front of", "behind", "at the front" and
"at the back" (Harris and Stronmen 1972; also unpublished work by
the author). One of the difficulties they have with these terms is
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that they confuse opposites, such as "front" with "back", although
they find it easier if the objects concerned themselves have "fronts"
and "backs" (e.g. houses, people, cars, etc.).
It does not seem that there is an easy way to avoid the problems
caused by young children's inadequate knowledge of these terras. In
an informal pilot study with mountains the present author tried
"Which mountain do you see in the middle?"
and
"Which mountain do you see nearest to you / furthest from you?"
but found that preschool children also have difficulty with these
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wordings. In any case these wordings alone are insufficient to
differentiate all views of the mountains. Another approach to this
problem would be to have preliminary training sessions in which
young children would be taught the correct use of "left" and "right",
but this could well be an arduous and unrewarding process for all
concerned. Alternatively, one could try slightly older children,
although one might expect, in view of the findings of Piaget and
others, that children of 5 or 6 years would be unable to tell which
was "right" and "left" for the person sitting opposite them.
There are, then, rather difficult problems to be solved before
this line of enquiry into preschool children's perspective abilities
can be continued in its logical direction. In comparison, the
further study of preschool children's projective abilities presents
far fewer problems. More positively, the results of virtually all
the studies of projective abilities so far suggest that the performance
of children of 3 years (and even younger) is remarkably high in this
area. Consequently the last two experiments to be reported here are
studies of young children's ability to perform more complex projective





Experiment 1, it will be recalled, compared two methods of
constructing a straight line between two dolls facing each other on
a table. In one condition, the "projective line task", the child
was given a number of dolls and asked to put them in a straight line
between the first two dolls. In the other condition, the "line of
sight task", the child was given a small "wall" and asked to put it
so that one doll could not see the other. The child could only do
this successfully by calculating the straight line of sight between
the two dolls.
It was found in that experiment that most of the 4-year olds
passed the projective line task, but few of the 3-year olds did so.
However, virtually all the children, 3-year olds as well as 4-year
olds, passed the line of sight task, thus showing that children as
young as 3 years have simple projective abilities. Moreover, the
line of sight task is both easy for the children to understand and
enjoyable for them to do, and so it seems to be a useful paradigm
for investigating more complex projective abilities.
The present experiment investigated whether preschool children
could perform calculations involving the interaction of two lines of
sight. This was done by using three dolls (two policemen and a
small boy) and a configuration of walls shaped in a cross. The
children were asked to hide the boy from both the policemen, and




30 preschool children (20 boys and 10 girls) were subjects.
Their ages ranged from U years 11 months to 3 years 6 months (mean
age U years 3 months). They were all attending the morning session
of a preschool playgroup and they were of mixed social class. They
were split into 3 groups of 10 subjects according to age. The mean
ages of the groups were U years 9 months, U years 3 months and 3 years
9 months.
Materials
The materials used were 2 small wooden policeman (identical to
the one used in Experiment l), one of the dolls from Experiment 1,
and a cross-shaped configuration of walls. The walls were 7 cm high
and I cm thick, ana each arm of the cross was 7 cm long. Figure 12
shows a typical arrangement of the policemen, boy and walls.




The preliminaries were designed to familiarize the children
with the materials and the experimental situation. The experimenter
brought out one policeman, the boy, and the walls, and placed them
on the table in front of the child. He said "The policeman is
looking for the boy. The boy wants to hide from the policeman."
He then placed the policeman and the walls, as shown in figure 13.
The policeman could see into sections B and C but not into sections
A and D. The experimenter then placed the boy in section A and asked
"Can the policeman see the boy?"
He then placed the boy successively in sections B, C, and D, each
time repeating this question.
He then placed the policeman as shown in figure lH, so that the









This time the experimenter handed the small boy doll to the child
and said
"Can you hide the boy so the policeman can't see him?"
If a child gave an incorrect response the experimenter pointed out
his error and repeated the question until the child had made a
correct response.
(2) Test
When it was clear that the child fully understood the situation,
the experimenter brought out the other policeman, and said
"Here's another policeman. He is also looking for the boy.
The boy must hide from both policemen."
The experimenter put one policeman between sections B and C, and





Thus policeman 1 saw into sections B and C, and policeman 2 saw
into sections C and D, This left section A as the only place where
the boy could hide. The experimenter then said
"Can you hide the boy so that BOTH the policemen can't see him?"
This was repeated three times, each time leaving a different
section as the only hiding place. This made a total of four test
trials with the two policemen.
Results
(1) Preliminaries
Performance was very high on all the preliminary questions.
Overall, the children responded correctly on 138 out of 150 trials
(i.e. 92# correct). There were no age effects.
(2) Test
Performance was also very high on all the test questions.
Overall, the children responded correctly on 108 out of 120 trials
(i.e. 90# correct). The scores for each of the three groups are






Group 1 (mean age U years 9 months) 38 /ho 95#
Group 2 (mean age U years 3 months) 35/kO 88#
Group 3 (mean age 3 years 9 months) 35/UO 88#
There were no significant differences between any of these groups.
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Discussion
These results show that there was a strikingly high level of
performance throughout the preliminaries and the test. Children
found very little difficulty in correctly identifying where the
hoy could hide from both policemen. As this task requires the
child to handle two lines of sight, these children were clearly
performing at quite a complex cognitive level.
Before ve analyse this finding any further, we will attempt




This experiment attempted to extend the findings of Experiment 7
in two ways; first, by using slightly younger subjects, and secondly,
by using more complex materials. The number of policemen was extended
to three, and the configurations of walls were extended to allow
five, and then six sections.
Subjects
20 U-year old children (ll boys, 9 girls) and 20 3-year old
children (10 boys, 10 girls) were subjects. The ages of the l+-year
old children ranged from U years 9 months to U years 0 months (mean
age ^ years 5 months), and the ages of the 3-year old children ranged
from 3 years 11 months to 3 years 1 month (mean age 3 years 6 months).
All children attended a full time nursery school and they were of
mixed social class.
Materials
The materials used were similar to those of Experiment 7.
There were three policemen and one small boy doll (identical to those




Figure 16; Configurations of walls used in Experiment 8
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All the walls were 7 cm high and \ cm thick. The two larger
sections in configuration (l) were 7 cm x 10l cm; all the other
sections, in configurations (l) and (2), were 7 cm x 7 cm.
Procedure
The children were split into two groups, matched as far as
possible for age and sex. One group, condition (l), performed
with two policemen and configuration (l). The other group,
condition (2), performed with three policemen and configuration (2).
All children received a set of preliminary questions exactly
as in Experiment 7» to familiarise them with the materials and the
situation.
Condition (l)
The test procedure was virtually identical to that used in
Experiment 7. The experimenter placed the two policemen between









This left section E as the only place where the boy could not be
seen. The experimenter asked the child
"Can vou hide the bov so that BOTH the
policemen can't see him?".
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This was repeated for three other positions of the policemen,
such that the only possible hiding places were, respectively,
sections C, D and B.
Condition (2)
The test procedure was virtually identical to that of condition
(l), except that three policemen were used with the different wall
configuration. The experimenter placed them between sections A and





This left section C as the only place where the boy could not be
seen. The experimenter asked the child
"Can you hide the boy so that NONE of the
policemen can see him?".
This was repeated for three other positions of the policemen,
such that the only possible hiding places were, respectively,
sections F, E and B.
Results
Table 12 gives the scores (out of Uo in each case) for each age
group in each condition.
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Table 12
Age group condition (l) condition (2)
4-year olds 39 (98$) 36 (90$)
3-year olds 25 (63$) 28 (70$)
For the 4-year olds, performance was near 100$ for both conditions.
For the 3-year olds, performance was fairly high, but not as high
as for the 4-year olds. In condition (l) the difference between
the 3- and 4-year olds was significant at the 0.025 level (U=23,
Mann-Whitney U test, one-tailed), but in condition (2) the difference
just failed to reach significance at the 0.05 level (U=31 Mann-Whitney
U test, one-tailed).
Discussion
These results are as striking as those of Experiment 7, and
confirm that children as young as 3 years can perform well on tasks
of this complexity. Although the difference between the 3- and 4-year
olds is not unexpected, it is surprising that there is no difference
between conditions (l) and (2). The latter seems to be a much harder
task than the former, for not only does the wall configuration have
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more sections, but the child has to hide the boy from three policemen.
It is important to point out at this stage that these tasks are
very enjoyable for the children, and they find it very easy to get
totally involved with the situation. The tasks are very similar to
the children's own games of hide and seek, and the children readily
identify with the boy and his need to hide from the policeman.
They are particularly excited if the policemen are introduced one
by one, and many of the subjects in condition (2) were eagerly
waiting for even more policemen to appear. This involvement must
inevitably improve their performance, although it is not easy to
express this in formal terms.
It is surprising, in view of the fact that preschool children
universally play at hide and seek, that this kind of paradigm has
not been used before now in testing young children. By an interesting
coincidence, however, at the same time that these experiments were
being carried out, a very similar paradigm was being used in a
totally independent study of U-year old children in Cambridge. This
unpublished study, by Light (197*0, has already been referred to in
Chapter U. Light gave a battery of role-taking tests to a small group
of children around their fourth birthdays, and two of the tasks
involved 'hide and seek' situations. In one task, one doll had to
be hidden from another amongst a group of objects (such as a house
and a car), while in the other task the doll had to be hidden from
two other dolls within a configuration of walls similar to those used
in Experiments 7 and 8. Light found that performance was generally
high; well over half of his subjects gave predominantly correct
responses on both tasks. Thus Light's findings substantially confirm
the results obtained here.
The rest of this discussion will focus on two main questions;
(1) What kinds of mental operations are required for success on these
tasks?.
(2) How should these experiments be followed up in future work?.
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(l) Let us start by considering a typical situation from condition (2).
With the policemen in these positions, the only section where the boy
can hide is C. How does the child work out that this is the correct
solution?.
One possibility which we must consider is that the child is
simply placing the boy as far away from the policemen as possible,
and that he is not even taking any account of where each individual
policeman is looking. We can discount this possibility, however,
for two reasons. First, children typically place the boy as close
as possible to the inside corner of each section, and this is in
fact the part of the section which is nearest to the policemen. On
the above hypothesis they would not do this, but would try to place
the boy as far away from the walls as possible. Secondly, and more
importantly, there is direct evidence that several children do actually
take account of where each policeman is looking. These are children
who characteristically move the boy to one section and, without letting
go of him, look around to see if he is visible to any of the policemen.
If he is, then they try another section.
This characteristic performance of moving the boy to a section
and holding on to him while checking if he can be seen closely resembles
a practice that often occurs when a person is learning to play chess.
(as Figure 19)
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Beginners frequently move a chess piece to a square and, without
letting go of the piece, look to see if it can be captured, or
if the move is otherwise unsafe. This practice soon disappears
as the player learns to internalise the whole process instead.
The comparison with chess is an important one in trying to
understand these tasks, and it may well be that there are similar
mental processes involved in both situations. If we pursue this
comparison a bit further, then we can hypothesize that those children
who do not actually move the boy from one section to another, checking
each time to see if he can be seen, have instead internalised the
process. That is the children are mentally considering a number of
sections in turn and working out, for each one, if the boy could be
seen if he were actually to move there.
To be more explicit, we are claiming that the child has
internalised the following sequence:
1. Move boy to a particular section.
2. Can any policeman now see him?
3. If yes, move boy to another section and
repeat 2.
It. If no. then this is correct response.
If we assume that children are mentally checking out each section
in turn, then the next question to consider is what overall strategy they
are using in doing this. It is possible that they may start at one
section, work out if that section is being covered by a policeman or
not, and then proceed to the next in a completely systematic manner.
Alternatively, they may make a rough estimate of a likely section,
perhaps based simply on distance from the policeman, and then work out
if the boy would be seen in that section or not. We cannot at this
stage speculate as to which strategy the subjects in these experiments
were using, but it might be possible to determine this in future work
by studying the child's eye movements. Although this would present
considerable problems, it might well produce valuable insights as to
how children succeed on these problems.
Whichever strategy the child is using, he must still be able to
work out from a given situation which of a number of possible altern¬
ative states are likely to meet the task requirements and provide the
boy with a safe hiding place. This process must almost certainly be
regarded as inference, for the child must infer the correct alternative
by applying certain rules to the given situation. It may also involve
imagery. in that the child may actually imagine the boy in each of
the alternative positions. This seems unlikely, although we have no
direct evidence either way. In any case it is not easy even to
specify what would count as evidence for such a claim.
(2) How, then, should this finding be followed up?. We have already
suggested that repeating Experiments 7 and 8 and recording the child¬
ren's eye movements might tell us a lot more about the kinds of
strategy they were using in performing the tasks. There are, however,
a large number of other ways we could continue. We could, for
instance, increase the complexity of the situation almost indefinitely,
adding more policemen and more sections to the configuration of walls.
Figure 19 shows a possible set-up with four policemen and nine
compartments.
181;.
Successful performance on this task, however, would only require a
more exhaustive application of the same basic 'checking out' process
needed in Experiments 7 and 8.
Alternatively we could use slightly different paradigms which
require a different kind of reasoning to be used. For example, in
the situation illustrated in figure 20 below
policeman © 1 p 1
(§) mother
Figure 20
the child's task is to place the boy so that
(1) the policeman cannot see him, but
(2) his mother can see him.
It would also be interesting to investigate in more detail the
children's understanding of the basic rules of the paradigms used in
Experiments 7 and 8. This could be done, for example, by using anomalous
situations (such as placing the policemen so that all the sections are
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covered, and there are no safe hiding places), or by making
ineffectual rearrangements of the policemen which do not affect
which section is safe. One could also investigate the extent to
which the children explicitly took into account which way the
policemen were looking on every trial, or whether they simply
assumed that if a policeman was 'near' to a section then the boy
could not hide in that section. This could be looked at by having
trials in which a policeman was near a section but in fact looking
away from it.
A rather different way to follow up these experiments would be
to use them to see how accurately children could perform simple
geometrical calculations, such as calculating the intersection of
two straight lines. In figure 21, for example, the child's task
would be to place an object such as a model tree so that both the
boys would be hidden at once.
boy 1q q boy 2
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policeman 1 ^ policeman 2
Figure 21
Clearly there are a variety of interesting ways in which these
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experiments could be followed up.
This concludes our account of Experiments 1 to 8. In the final
chapter we will summarise the main findings of these experiments and
present our conclusions.
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Chapter 5; Summary and Conclusions
We will first present a summary of the experiments described
in Chapter ht and then try to draw some general conclusions.
Experiment 1 looked at the extent to which preschool children
have simple projective abilities. This was done by comparing their
performance on Piaget and Inhelder's "projective line task" with
their performance on a "line of sight" task. In the former task the
child was given a number of dolls and asked to put them in a straight
line between two end dolls placed some distance apart on a table.
In the latter task the child was given an object and asked to place
it so that one end doll could not see the other. It was found that,
while most of the U-year old children succeeded on the projective
line task, few of the 3-year old children could manage this. On the
other hand, virtually all the children, 3-year olds as well as U-year
olds, succeeded on the line of sight task. These results were taken
as showing that, contrary to Piaget and Inhelder's claims, preschool
children can succeed on the projective line task, and that the
projective line task is not as direct a test of the ability to
construct a straight line as the line of sight task. More importantly,
the results with the line of sight task show that 3-year old children
do have considerable projective abilities. Not only do they know that
what the dolls see is different from what they themselves see, but
also they are able to construct the line of sight from one doll to
the other, and they are aware that blocking this line of sight means
that one doll can no longer see the other.
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to see whether preschool children
have simple perspective abilities. This was done by comparing the
performance of 4-year old children on a projective test with their
performance on a perspective test in the same situation. The materials
used were a toy dog and a cup. The child's projective ability was
tested by verbal questioning, i.e. the child was asked, for various
positions of the cup and the dog, whether the dog could see the
handle of the cup. The child's perspective ability was tested in
another session by the method of picture selection, i.e. the child
was asked, for various positions of the cup and the dog, to select
the picture showing his own view and the picture showing the dog's
view. It was found that there was a considerable difference between
the two procedures. The children performed much better with verbal
questioning than with picture selection, both on their own view
(98% compared with 57/0 and on the other view (85% compared with 16%).
Although the results for the other view condition suggest that 4-year
old children do not have simple perspective abilities, it was argued
that this conclusion could not be accepted immediately without first
investigating whether picture selection was an adequate test of
perspective ability.
Experiment 3 investigated this possibility by comparing picture
selection with the alternative method of cup rotation. In this
method the child was shown the cup with the handle visible and told
that he saw a "cup". Then he was shown the cup with the handle turned
away from him and told that he saw a "bowl". He was then asked to
turn the cup so that the dog "saw a bowl". It was found that, for
4-year old children, cup rotation was much easier than picture
selection, and that successful performance on cup rotation facilitated
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performance on a subsequent picture selection trial. This result
3howed that U-year old children do have simple perspective abilities,
and that the method of picture selection as used in Experiments 2
and 3 was not an adequate test of these abilities.
The next three experiments looked for ways of modifying the
picture selection procedure so as to make it a more adequate test of
perspective ability. Experiment U looked at the effect of varying
the wording of the instructions used in picture selection. This was
done because it was realised that the instructions used in Experiments
2 and 3 were ambiguous. The materials used in this experiment were
three dolls of different colours, each mounted near a corner of a
triangular base and facing outwards. H-year old children were asked
to select pictures showing their own view, and the view of the
experimenter who sat at 120° to the child'3 right. The instructions
used were
(1) "Which picture shows what you see/I see?"
(2) "Which picture shows how it looks to you/to me?"
(3) "Which picture shows the doll's face that you
see/I see?"
It was found that there was very little difference between the
instructions, with the standard instructions (l) being slightly
easier than instructions (2) or (3). This result showed that changing
the wording of the instructions alone was unable to produce any improve¬
ments in performance.
Experiment 5 looked at whether performance on picture selection
could be improved by prefacing the picture selection questions with
a series of verbal questions about the child's own view, about the
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experimenter's view, and about the pictures. The same materials
were used as in Experiment 4. One group of 4-year old children
were asked the following series of verbal questions before picture
selection:
(1) verbal questions (own view) "Which doll's
face do you see?"
(2) verbal questions (other view) "Which doll's
face do I see?"
(3) verbal questions (pictures) "Which doll's face
do you see in this -picture?"
Performance on these verbal questions was near 100%. More importantly,
subsequent performance on picture selection, other view, was strikingly
higher for this group than for a group who received only picture
selection (13 out of 20 children reached criterion after these verbal
questions, while only 1 child out of 20 succeeded with picture
selection alone). It was argued that the children who succeeded on
picture selection did so by using the following two-stage strategy:
(1) the child calculates which doll's face the
experimenter sees:
(2) the child selects the picture showing this
doll's face.
Experiment 6 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment
5 in several ways. First, it was found that a similar effect could
be obtained despite a slight change in the experimental design, and
that this effect also occurred with children as young as 3 years.
Thus 16 out of 20 4-year olds, and 9 out of 12 3-year olds, all of
whom had previously failed on picture selection alone, succeeded when
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picture selection was prefaced by verbal questions. Secondly, in
some conditions the picture selection questions were presented in
two stages, directly parallel to the two-stage strategy outlined
earlier. Thus the children in these conditions were asked
"Which doll's face do I see?" followed directly by
either "so which picture shows what I see?"
or "so which -picture shows the doll's face that I see?"
All children in these conditions, 3-year olds as well as U-year olds,
scored virtually 100%. Finally this experiment looked at whether
both sets of verbal questions were needed to produce the improved
performance in picture selection, other view. It was found that
both sets were needed; neither set of verbal questions alone produced
the effect.
It was argued that this experiment provided further evidence
that the children who succeeded on picture selection were using the
two-stage strategy; that both sets of verbal questions were needed
for the adoption of this strategy; and that the verbal questions served
to disambiguate both the language of the instructions and the conventions
of the pictures. It was further argued that the children who succeeded
on picture selection were demonstrating perspective ability, and that
this perspective ability consisted of a projective component and an
inferential component.
The results of Experiments 1-6 were then considered in the
light of seme other recent studies of young children's projective and
perspective abilities. It was argued that these studies, by Fishbein
et al (1972), Masangkay et al (197*0, and Light (197*0» gave strong
support to the findings of Experiments 1-6.
The last two experiments followed up some possibilities
suggested by the results of Experiment 1. It was found in Experiment
1 that children as young as 3 years had little difficulty in construct¬
ing a line of sight between two dolls on a table. Experiment 7 looked
at whether preschool children could perform calculations involving the
interaction of two lines of sight. This was done by using three dolls
(two policemen and a small boy) and a configuration of walls shaped in
a cross. The children were asked to hide the boy from both the police¬
men, and thus had to keep in mind two lines of sight in choosing where
to hide him. It was found that children as young as 3 years performed
very well on this task and scored around 90$ correct.
Experiment 8 extended the findings of Experiment 7 by using more
complex materials. In one condition there were, as before, two police¬
men and a small boy, but the wall configuration had 5 sections rather
than In the other condition there were three policemen instead of
two, and the wall configuration had 6 sections. For the U-year olds,
performance was near 100$ for both conditions, while for the 3-year
olds performance was between 60 and 70$. It was argued that the child¬
ren who succeeded on these tasks were mentally calculating whether or
not certain sections were safe places for the boy to hide, and that
this showed that children as young as 3 years were capable of some
degree of inferential thinking.
Conclusions
In the previous chapter we discussed each of these experiments in
some detail and outlined some ways in which they could be followed up
in future work. We will now try to draw some more general conclusions,
First, we can claim with some confidence to have answered the
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questions we set out to investigate. We now know that preschool
children are able to calculate what another person can see, and
indeed have considerable abilities in this area. In the projective
area, we have shown that children as young as 3 years are able to
calculate what another person can see in a large number of situations.
More specifically, in terms of the analysis of these projective
abilities put forward in Chapter 3, we have shown that for the range
of situations used in our experiments 3-year old children:
(a) can use the relevant cues from the other person or doll in
order to calculate their direction of gaze;
(b) are aware that people see in straight lines;
(c) are able to construct a straight line along the other
person's direction of gaze in order to locate the object of their
gaze;
(d) know that other people see the nearest object along their
line of sight, and that objects further along their line of sight
will be occluded by the nearest object.
Moreover, we have shown in Experiments 7 and 8 that children as
young as 3 years perform well on tasks requiring them to co-ordinate
2 or 3 lines of sight. These abilities go a long way beyond those
originally outlined in the analysis of projective abilities given
in Chapter 3. However, it is not clear to what extent they can be
considered as high level projective abilities, or whether successful
performers in these tasks were in fact combining a relatively low
level projective ability into a more general non-projective strategy
(e.g. 'if a policeman is next to a section then that section is not
a good hiding place.1 ). As we have already mentioned in the discussion
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of these experiments in Chapter *t, this possibility could be
investigated in further experiments.
In the perspective area we have shown that children as young
as 3 years can calculate how an object or group of objects looks
to another person when this involves the transformation of orientation
(i.e. knowing that other people will see the part of the object or
group which is turned towards them). We have also shown that most
older lj-year old children and some younger U-year olds can calculate
how it looks to another person when this involves transformations in
the front/back dimension, (i.e. knowing that other people will see
objects that are nearer to them in front of objects that are further
away, and that the nearer objects may occlude the further objects).
However the ability to perform this particular transformation has not
yet been tested under the optimal conditions discovered by Experiments
5 and 6. Similarly, we have no knowledge yet as to whether preschool
children can, under optimal conditions, perform transformations in
the left/right dimension (i.e. working out which objects another
person sees on the left and which are seen on the right).
As we have already seen, these findings are for the most part
supported by some recent studies which have appeared since this
thesis was begun (Fishbein et al, 1972, Masangkay et al, 197^, and
Light, 197*0 • Thus we have strong grounds for concluding that preschool
children are able to calculate what another person can see, and that
this constitutes substantial evidence against Piaget and Inhelder's
claim that preschool children are unable to perform such calculations.
Clearly preschool children are not egocentric in this particular respect.
Indeed, there is a growing amount of evidence suggesting that, in
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other areas as well, preschool children are not as egocentric as
Piaget has claimed. For example Borke (1971) presented children
between 3 and 8 years with a series of stories, and asked them to
indicate how the child in each story felt by selecting a picture
of a 'happy', 'sad', 'afraid', or 'angry' face. Typical situations
involved eating a favourite snack, losing a toy, getting lost: in the
woods at night etc. Borke found that even the 3-year olds were able
to make appropriate responses, scoring above chance with all the
faces apart from the 'afraid' face. Performance was best with the
•happy' face; by 3g - U years almost all the children could respond
appropriately with this face. These results are very encouraging,
particularly in view of the fact that Borke's task required the child
both to discriminate between the different faces and to apply them
correctly to the situations.
Another recent study which concluded that preschool children were
less egocentric than Piaget maintains was that of Garvey and Hogan
(1973). In this study Garvey and Hogan videotaped dyads of children
aged between 3i and 5 years, and found that several different measures
revealed a 'high level of mutual responsiveness' in the children's
interactions. For about 2/3 of the time the children were judged
to be in 'mutual focus' (i.e. their actions, both verbal and non¬
verbal, were interdependent; see Goffman 1963), and well over half
of the children's speech was classed as 'social' (i.e. it was either
a relevant response to the other child's previous activity, or it evoked
a relevant response from the other child). Moreover there were frequent
occurrences of quite complex social routines between the children (see
the example quoted earlier on p.56 ).
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Garvey and Hogan conclude that preschool children are capable
of a 'surprising level of interpersonal understanding'.
This present study then, adds further support to the growing
belief that preschool children are not as egocentric as Piaget has
claimed, and shows that in this particular area at least, children
as young as 3 years are able to take another person's point of view.
Moreover, the findings that preschool children do have these
perspective and projective abilities strongly raises the possibility
that they are using these abilities in their ongoing social inter¬
actions. We discussed this possibility in some depth in Chapter 2,
and as we have no more direct evidence for this, we will not elaborate
on the argument here. Nevertheless, the present experiments must be
considered as strong informal evidence for this possibility; it
seems highly unlikely that young children would have such a well
developed and useful skill, yet fail to make use of it in their ongoing
interactions.
The experiments reported here, however, amount to somewhat more
than a demonstration that preschool children have the projective and
perspective abilities listed above. Accordingly, the rest of this
chapter will consider what further implications can be drawn from
these experiments.
First, we will consider the results of Experiments 5 and 6, which
showed that quite striking differences in performance can be produced
by what are superficially quite small differences in procedure.
Experiment 6, in particular, showed that if two sets of verbal questions
are given before picture selection then most children can develop the
correct strategy for succeeding on the task, while if only one set of
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questions, or no questions at all, are given, then very few children
can succeed on the task. Moreover, if the procedure is then structured
so that the questions asked are directly in line with the correct
strategy, then again it is found that most children can succeed on
the task.
Such dramatic effects are quite unusual in the experimental
literature, and apart from their immediate implication for the ability
being tested for, they have more general implications for the whole
area of testing young children's cognitive abilities. For a start
they suggest that we must pay very close attention to how tasks are
presented to the child. This means more than just considering the
language used in the instructions of the task (although this is
important in itself, as Donaldson and Wales (1970) amongst others
have pointed out, and as Grieve (l97l) has convincingly proved with
respect to class inclusion tasks). The results of Experiment U, as
well as those of Experiments 5 and 6, show that the language of the
instructions alone may not be the crucial factor.
Instead we must consider how the child will interpret the whole
test situation, where this includes not only the language of the
instructions but also the conventions of any pictures that may be used.
It also means considering how the child will interpret any changes
the experimenter makes in the array, or indeed how the child will
interpret any aspect of the experimenters behaviour which might be
30
considered relevant to the situation. In short, it is of vital
importance to consider the test situation as an interaction between
the child and the experimenter, in which both sides are actively
trying to give meaning to the whole situation and to interpret each
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other's behaviour accordingly.
A further implication of the dramatic results of Experiments 5
and 6 is that they demonstrate the importance of considering which
strategy a child may use in solving a task, and in particular they
show the value of shaping the task procedure so that the questions
asked are directly in line with the strategy. It might of course
be objected that this is making the task unnecessarily easy for the
child. Such an objection, however, confuses two aspects of such a
task; first whether the child can spontaneously work out which
strategy to use, and secondly whether he can in fact perform the
calculations. These two aspects are typically confused in most
tests of cogn5.tive ability. However it is clearly of vital importance
to separate the two whenever possible, so that one can say, for any
given task, whether the child's difficulties are in working out what
to do, or in actually doing it. The results of Experiments 5 and
6 show that in the 3 dolls task the child's difficulties are in the
former area.
This conclusion, that the children in Experiments 5 and 6 have
the correct strategy but do not spontaneously know when to use it,
is similar to the conclusion reached by Bryant (1971) with a kind of
conservation task. Bryant asked children to judge which of two
unequal rows of flat counters laid out in one-to-one correspondence
had more counters in it. Then he transferred the two rows to two
different glasses so that, because of the thinness of the counters,
the columns of counters in each glass were the same height, and again
asked which set of counters had more in it. Bryant found that despite
the similarity of the height of the columns, his V-year old subjects
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were able to correctly 'conserve' their judgements of which set had
more. He concludes that children of this age can form hypotheses
about quantity, but do not know when to apply them correctly. Taken
together with our findings, this suggests that we must grant young
children greater abilities than we have done previously, and concen¬
trate more on discovering the situations in which these abilities will
or will not emerge.
Another important aspect of these experiments to be considered
here is our claim that children as young as 3 years succeed on the
3 dolls task and the policeman/boy tasks by using inference. If this
claim is true, then this is a very important result, for it is generally
held (e.g. by Piagetian theory) that children of this age are tied
to the immediate situation and are unable to make inferences beyond
the present. How justified are we then, in making this claim?.
The main problem here lies in deciding what does or does not
count as inference. In its most general sense inferring means making
some deduction or calculation which goes beyond the given situation.
However such a definition includes, at one end of the scale, making
abstract logical deductions (such as going from the premisses that
'all men are mortal' and 'Socrates is a man' to the conclusion that
'Socrates i$ mortal'), while at the other end of the scale it includes
knowing that an object hidden behind a screen will still be there if
the screen is removed. Clearly the latter ability is possessed by
all 2 year olds, while preschool children are generally thought to
be incapable of making the former kind of deduction (although there
is informal evidence that this may not be so; see Donaldson 1971).
Thus with such a broad definition it is meaningless to make general
claims such as saying that preschool children either can or cannot
perform inferences.
A more fruitful approach to the question is to argue that if
inferences are deductions which go beyond the immediate situation,
then they must involve the operation of certain rules. These rules
may be universal (e.g. the Laws of Predicate Calculus) or they might
be quite local (e.g. the rules that allow me to infer from the state
of this room that children were crayoning in here earlier). Thus in
Experiments 5 and 6 the crucial rules are those which connect each
of the experimenter's views of the dolls, via a particular dolls face,
to the appropriate picture. Similarly the crucial rules in
Experiments 7 and 8 are those which determine, for any given arrange¬
ment of walls and policemen, which of the sections will effectively
hide the boy. On this analysis the ability to perform inferences is
seen as the ability to perform logically within a rule-governed system
so that given one feature of the system one can systematically relate
it to other features or states of the system.
As before this approach allows a large number of phenomena to
be regarded as 'inferences'; its advantage is that it focuses on
the rules of the system with which the child is dealing, and suggests
that the important questions to ask are concerned with the complexity
and generality of these rules. It also suggests that if a child's
inferential capacities are being examined in a given situation it is
crucial to consider the extent to which the child must work out the
rules for himself, as well as considering both the complexity of
the rules the child must operate with, and the complexity of the
calculations involved in specific amplications of these rules.
If we apply this kind of analysis to Experiments 5-8 important
differences between the two kinds of task are revealed. For example
it is clear that the main difficulties the child has with the 3 dolls
task is in working out which rules are appropriate; the rules them¬
selves and their applications in specific situations are relatively
straightforward. On the other hand in the policeman/boy tasks the
rules are explained to the child in the preliminaries and the rules
themselves are quite simple; the most complex part of the task is
applying the rules on specific occasions. Thus this analysis shows
that the importance of the results of these experiments lies not so
much in showing that 3-year olds can perform 'inferences', but rather
in showing, in the 3 dolls task, the conditions under which they can
extract the relevant rules of the situation, and in the policemen/boy
tasks, in showing the extent of their abilities to perform the cal¬
cinations. We have already discussed the 3 dolls task from this point
of view earlier in this chapter; we will make two further points about
the policemen/boy tasks here.
First, we have already argued in Chapter k that to succeed on
these tasks the child must perform a sequence of internalised actions
which is incorporated into some kind of overall strategy. In view
of Piaget's definition of operations as 'internalised actions' (see
Chapter l), it seems reasonable to ask if this sequence can be
considered as concrete operational thought. However there is no simple
answer to this question, mainly because it is not easy to understand
precisely what Piaget means by concrete operations. For example,
they are frequently defined as internalised actions, which are reversible,
and co-ordinated into an overall system (e.g. Piaget and Inhelder,
1969). On one interpretation of these terms our sequence must qualify,
for it satisfies each of these criteria. The child has internalised
the action of moving the "boy to the particular section, and this
action is reversible, for the child has also internalised the reverse
action of moving him off the particular section. Moreover, these
actions are co-ordinated into an overall system, namely that of
checking if the boy can be seen in each position and continuing
appropriately whether the answer is yes or no.
Thus on one interpretation of Piaget, it seems that the children
who succeed on our tasks are manifesting concrete operational thought.
On the other hand, the kind of sequence we have here bears little
resemblance to such typical Piagetian operations as the "union of two
classes", although it does seem quite close to seeing the action of
pouring water from one container to another as "reversible" (Piaget
and Inhelder, 1969, p.98)« For the time being, we will merely suggest
that this sequence may be concrete operational thought. In any case,
even if it does not meet the precise Piagetian definition, it certainly
constitutes quite complex organised thinking. As such, the fact that
it occurs in children as young as 3 years is quite remarkable by any
account.
The second point we want to make about the policemen/boy tasks
is that the child is making calculations about a situation which is
primarily social. That is, the actions which the child must internal¬
ise in order to solve the task are the actions of people in social
situations (e.g. moving the boy to a given section etc.) and the basic
rules of the situation are primarily interpersonal (can the policemen
see the hoy? etc.). This argument retains its force even though the
actual situation is a model involving dolls. The importance of this
observation lies in the fact that to date, cognition has been regarded
as being almost exclusively concerned with the analysis of the physical,
non-social world. For example, virtually all the standard Piagetian
tests for concrete operational thought, (such as conservation, class-
inclusion, transitivity etc.) are concerned with the relationships
between and within inanimate, physical objects.
This bias is particularly surprising in view of the obvious
importance to young children of people and social situations generally.
Indeed it could well be argued that for the preschool child the social
world is more important than the physical world, and thus it would not
be surprising if it were found that the cognitive abilities of pre¬
school children were more advanced when the calculations required were
concerned with social rules and situations, rather than with non-social
situations. At present we are not in a position to make such a claim.
However the results obtained here suggest that a closer study of young
children's ability to perform calculations in primarily social situations
would be highly profitable.
This raises the question of what social situations should be
investigated in this way. We will not give a direct answer here but
instead point to the value of the present study as a heuristic for
future work. The approach taken here was to start from existing claims
made about young children's cognitive abilities, and to consider these
in the light of a close examination of some of the abilities young
children need to function in social situations. The success of this
approach, both in answering the question it set out to answer, and in
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providing further knowledge about young children's cognitive abilities,
suggests that it is an approach worth adopting in future work.
i
Appendix A: Footnotes
1. It is not easy to determine the exact nature of this relation¬
ship between egocentrism and the other features of the young child's
thought. In some places it seems as though Piaget believes that
egocentrism is the fundamental feature of the young child's thought
and all the other features are simply manifestations of egocentrism
(see especially his discussion of the relationship between egocentrism
and syncretism - Piaget 1926, pp.127, 157 and l6l, and 1928, p.228).
In other places he specifically denies the importance of egocentrism
and claims that all these features form a coherent group of inter¬
related features each of equal importance (Piaget 1928, pp.201 and
256).
2. Again we cannot determine the exact nature of this relationship,
for instance whether the connection is logically necessary or merely
empirical. This seems to be a common problem in interpreting Piaget
(see for example Flavell, 1963, p.37).
3. Piaget however denies that epistemological egocentrism is the
same as mere ignorance (Piaget, 1959» p.270). The difference seems
to be that knowledge can be acquired without the fundamental shifts
in perspective which characterise decentration. A more serious object¬
ion to Piaget'3 epistemological position lies in the fact that many
of the fundamental shifts in perspective which have occurred in the
history of science have been caused by purely non-scientific factors
(such as changes in fashion, political climate, etc.) rather than by
the pull of "objective truth" (see especially Kuhn 1962).
* •
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!».. Dewey's theory of meaning, incidentally, not only anticipated
Grice by some 30 years by emphasising intention, but also argued
that a "naturalist" approach to intention and meaning was possible.
"Primarily meaning is intent and intent is not personal in a private
and exclusive sense meaning is not indeed a psychic existence;
it is primarily a property of behaviour and secondarily a property
of objects", (ibid, pp.179 and 180)
5. The following is a graphic account by the mother of such a
child:
"It is perfectly logical, when one considers it. Elly
thinks her name is 'you' because everyone calls her
that. No one ever calls her 'I'. People call them¬
selves 'I', and as a further refinement Elly began to
call them 'I' herself. The reversal of meaning seems
nearly impervious to teaching; now, at eight, when
Elly says 'I like that* it means not that she herself
likes it but that her interlocuter does. What can I
do?. I can tell her to say 'kiss me' and reinforce
it by kissing her; I can refuse to give her a shove
in the swing until she says 'push me*. But these rare
ways of dramatizing the correct usage cannot hold their
own against the hundreds of incorrect reinforcements
that every day provides. 'You made a mistake,' I say
and Elly replies 'You made a mistake!' 'No, I_ didn't
make a mistake, you made a mistake.' 'You made a
mistake.' Everything one says makes it worse. Twice
on occasions a year apart - Elly has used 'me' correctly,
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•Becky gave me a book', she said recently, the
book in her hands. Hurrying to encourage her,
I caught myself saying 'Yes, she did give you
a book', thus destroying the effect I had meant
to reinforce. I have come to wonder how it is
that ordinary two year olds can grasp anything
so subtle."
(Park, 1972, pp.199-200)
6. Alternatively it may simply be that these children are at the
same overall level of language development as the normal 2-year olds
described by Sully. We cannot determine this until we know more about
the language development of both normal and autistic children.
7. There are a few experimental studies using adult subjects, which
have looked at how accurately they can judge another person's direction
of gaze in artificially controlled situations (e.g. Gibson and Pick
1963, Cline 1967, Ellgring 1971 and von Cranach 1971). In the basic
paradigm the subject sits opposite another person ("the looker") who
fixates various targets in a random order while the subject judges
whether the looker is looking at him or at some other location. So
far these studies have produced little agreement. Gibson and Pick
(1963) claimed that their subjects' accuracy in determing whether
or not they were being looked at approached the limits of human visual
acuity. Cline (1967) also found accurate performance when subjects
were judging if the looker was looking at their eyes or not, but
found poor performance for other kinds of judgements. On the other
hand, several studies by von Cranach and his associates at Munich
(von Cranach 1971, Ellgring 1971, von Cranach and Ellgring 1971) have
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found that performance was much poorer both for judgements of eye-
contact and for other kinds of judgement. Vine (1971) reviews these
studies and attempts to reconcile them to some extent on the grounds
of differing methodology. It seems that the important methodological
factors are the kinds of decision required, the distance between
the looker and the subject, the length of time the looker fixates
the targets, and the amount of discrepancy between the looker's head
orientation and gaze direction. On the whole, though, it is still
very unclear how accurately adults can in fact make such judgements
in these artificial situations. More importantly, it is not clear
if these studies are at all relevant to the abilities needed in
natural interactions. First, it seems that they require finer
discriminations than are actually needed in practice (see Vine 1971).
Secondly, as we have already pointed out, it is unlikely that judge¬
ments of other people's gaze direction in natural, interactions is
based solely on a single static cue such as eye position.
8. An analysis of the words "here" and "there" which particularly
emphasises their attention-drawing properties is given by Atkinson
and Griffiths (1973). Some developmental data on how these terms are
understood by young children is given by Wales (197^).
9. The importance of the concept of "faces" in describing social
interactions was first pointed out by Goffman (1967) who showed the
extent to which interactions are specifically organised so as to
prevent embarrassment due to loss of face.
10. It is hard to say exactly what constitutes "recognising" some¬
one in this way, although Eibl-Eibesfeldt (l97l) has suggested that
it may be the universally found "eye-flash", a very short movement
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(lasting about 1/3 of a second) consisting of looking, smiling,
raising the eyebrows and giving a short head nod.
11. For instance, does one actually focus on the other person or at
a point beyond the other person, as the name of the phenomenon implies?.
What difference does it make if one "looks through" someone because
one is actually preoccupied with other thoughts, or because one is
pretending to be so occupied?.
12. I am grateful to Sally Walker for pointing this out to me.
13. This syndrome has also been reported in psychotics by Riemer
(19^9, 1955).
lU. Percentage scores are very misleading in considering replications
of standard tests. Each investigator tends to use different scoring
methods and the final percentage score can be one of many things,
e.g. the group mean of raw scores, or the number of subjects below
a certain age who have reached a certain (usually arbitrary) criterion
of success. If we also note that most replications vary in small
but significant ways in such matters as materials, instructions,
procedure, social class and I.Q., of subjects, then it becomes clear
that a direct comparison across studies is of little use. At best,
these kinds of studies will reveal only general trends in performance.
15. The term visual line comes from Hering (l86l) who defined it as
"the locus of all points fixed relative to the eye which stimulate
a given point on the retina". The issue is complicated, however,
by binocular vision. This means that for one object fixed relative
to the eyes there are in fact two visual lines, one corresponding to
each eye, although these are usually experienced as one. Hering
referred to this as "the Law of Identical Visual Directions", which
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says that "for any given two corresponding lines of direction or
visual lines, there is in visual space a single visual direction
line along which appears everything which actually lies on the pair
of visual lines". (Hering, 19^2, p.^l). Duane (1931) calls this
the "cyclopian eye" while Howard and Templeton (1966) refer to it
as the "egocentre".
16. The argument is typical of much Piagetian reasoning in that
its conceptual status is hard to define. It is not clear if it is
meant to be a logically necessary deduction, in which case it can
be countered by purely logical arguments, or an empirical claim,
in which case it can only be disproved by actual empirical evidence.
In discussing thi3 argument of Piaget and Inhelder's, and the two
following arguments, we shall consider both the logical validity
of each argument and the empirical evidence for or against it.
IT. Two more experimental, studies of particular relevance (Fishbein
et al 1972, Masangkay et al 197*0 and a review (Flavell 197*0 have
been published since this thesis was started. These three publications
will be discussed in more detail later.
18. No specific social class or I.Q. data was collected in any of
the experiments reported here as these variables were not of primary
interest. However no child was tested who was considered by the
staff to be in any sense backward or disturbed.
19. It would have been pertinent to have asked the child at this
point "Does the policeman now see the doll, or the wall?", or "What
does the policeman now see?". Unfortunately this was not done.
20. We feel this is justified because our main concern here is to
find the most accurate methods for testing the child's competence.
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rather than merely to enumerate performance variables.
21. A similar point about the primacy of objects in ordinary
language has been made by philosophers interested in the theory
of sense-data. For example Austin, in discussing Warnock, says
"His statements of 'immediate perception' so far
from being that from which we advance to more
ordinary statements, are actually arrived at, and are
so arrived at in his own account, by retreating from
more ordinary statements by progressive hedging.
(There's a tiger - it seems to me that there's a
tiger - it seems to me now that there's a tiger -
it seems to me now as if there were a tiger)."
(Austin, 1962b, p.l^l)
Mackie also makes the same point:
"If there are (genuine sense-data reports) they may
turn out to be of some such form as 'It looks to me
as if there is a book on the table' and hence would
be parasitic upon the language of material objects."
(Mackie, 1970, p.ll6)
22. James McGarrigle has suggested that a similar analysis holds
for conservation tasks. The experimenter makes a change in one
aspect of an array and then repeats a question asked before the
change, thus suggesting that the repetition and the change are
connected (see McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1975).
23. It might be objected that the occurrence of a large proportion
of correct responses to the own view questions, and of a similar
proportion of egocentric responses to the other view questions,
counts against this possibility. Both these kinds of response
consist of the child simply selecting the picture of his own view
of the cup, and so it might seem that the child must be making the
view interpretation of both sets of questions. Unfortunately this
objection does not hold, as a child may make the view interpretation
when asked what he sees, but the object interpretation when asked
what Ringo sees. This kind of mixed interpretation would produce
the responses typically found.
2^. It is an interesting reflection on our assumptions about child¬
ren's knowledge of other people's inner states that we do not normally
question the use of dolls in such experiments.
25. This is not altogether surprising in view of the fact that
colour is often irrelevant in pictorial representation, particularly
in the picture books young children are usually exposed to.
26. It might be objected that we cannot then be certain in Experiments
5 and 6 that the selected picture shows 'how it looks' to the other
person. This kind of objection is very easy to make in this sort of
research (it might, for example, be made by a Piagetian who insisted
that the child should be able to justify his response) and is often
very hard either to refute or to substantiate. We will reply here
that we are taking the selection of the correct picture as sufficient
evidence for the presence of this ability while recognising that these
children may fail to meet stricter criteria, such as being able to
justify their response, or recognising the uniqueness of the other
person's view. However we doubt very much whether such criteria
are strictly necessary.
ix
27. This distinction is elaborated by Flavell (197*0 who was also
one of the co-authors of the Masangkay article.
28. This confusion of opposites is a common feature of semantic
development in preschool children (see for example Donaldson and
Wales 1970).
29. It may be that the greater symmetry of the configuration used
in condition (2) counteracted these other features.
30. This last point is well illustrated by an unpublished study
by McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975). Young children were given
conservation tasks in which the change in the array was caused by
•accident' rather than by the experimenter explicitly changing the
array in front of the child. McGarrigle and Donaldson found that




AEBLI, H. (1967). Egocentrism (Piaget) not a phase of mental develop¬
ment but a substitute solution for an insoluble task. Pedagogica
Europaea. _3, 97-103.
ANDERSON, J.W. (1972). Attachment behaviour of doors. In Blurton
Jones, N.G. (ed.), Ethological studies of child behaviour. London:
Cambridge University Press.
ARGYLE, M. (1969). Social Interaction. London: Methuen.
ARGYLE, M. and DEAN, J. (1965). Eye-contact, distance and affiliation.
Sociometry. 28. 289-302.
ATKINSON, M. (197*0. Prerequisites for reference. Paper presented
at B.A.A.L. seminar, Newcastle.
ATKINSON, M. and GRIFFITHS, P.D. (1973). Here's here's, there's,
here and there. Edinburgh Working Papers in Linguistics. 3., 29~73.
AUSTIN, J.L. (1962a). How to do things with words. London: Oxford
University Press.
AUSTIN, J.L. (l962\&). Sense and sensibilia. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
BLOOM, L. (1970). Language development. Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T.
Press.
BORKE, H. (1971). Interpersonal perception of young children:
egocentrism or empathy?. Developmental Psychology. 263-269.
BOSCH, G. (1970). Infantile autism. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
BROWN, R. (1965). Social psychology. New York: Free Press.
BRUNER, J.S. (1973). The ontogenesis of speech acts. Paper
presented at Symposium honouring Professor Niko Tinbergen, Amsterdam.
2.
BRUNER, J.S. (197*0. Continuities and. discontinuities in the
transition from pre-linguistic to linguistic communication.
Unpublished research proposal.
BRYANT, P.E. (1969). Perception and Memory of the orientation of
visually presented stimuli by young children. Nature. 22*+. 1132-1133.
BRYANT, P.E. (l97l). Cognitive development. British Medical Bulletin.
27, 200-205.
BUHLER, C. (l93l). Kindheit und JuRend. Leipzig: Hirzel.
CAMPBELL, R.N. and WALES, R.J. (1970). The study of language acquis¬
ition. In Lyons, J. (ed.), New horizons in linguistics. London:
Allen Lane.
CASTELL, R. (1970). Physical distance and visual attention as
measures of social interaction between child and adult. In Hutt, C.
and Hutt, S.J. (eds.), Behaviour studies in psychiatry. Oxford:
Pergamon Press.
CHILD, M.M. (197*0. The initiation of children's interactions.
Unpublished paper, Edinburgh.
CHOMSKY, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton.
CHOMSKY, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
CLINE, M.G. (1967). The perception of where a person is looking.
Amer. J. Psychol.. 80. 1+1-50.
CRANACH, M. VON. (1971). The role of orienting behaviour in human
interaction. In Esser A.H. (ed.), Environmental Space and Behaviour.
New York: Plenum Press.
CRANACH, M. VON, and ELLGRING, J.H. (1971). The perception of looking
behaviour. In Cranach, M. von, and Vine, I. (eds.). Expressive movement
3.
and non-verbal communication. London: Academic Press.
DEWEY, J. (1925). Experience and Nature. Chicago: Open Court.
DODWELL, P.C. (1963). Children's understanding of spatial concepts.
Canadian J. Psychol.. 17. lHl-l6l.
DONALDSON, M. (1971). Preconditions of inference. In Cole, J.K.
(ed.), Nebraska Symposia on Motivation. 1971. Lincoln, U.S.A.:
University of Nebraska Press.
DONALDSON, M. and WALES, R.J. (197°). On the acquisition of some
relational terms. In Hayes, J.R. (ed.), Cognition and the development
of language. New York: Wiley.
DUANE, M. (1931). Binocular vision and projection. Arch. Opthal.
H.Y.. 2, 73U-753.
EIBL—EIBESFELDT, I. (1971)• Love and hate. London: Methuen.
ELKIND, D. (1961). Children's conceptions of right and left: Piaget
replication study IV. J, Genet. Psychol., 99. 269-276.
ELLGRING, J.H. (1971). Lie Beurteilung des Blickes auf Punkte
innerhalb des Gesichts. Z. exp. angew. Psychol.
FISHBEIN, H.D., LEWIS, S. and KEIFFER, K. (1972). Children's
understanding of spatial relations: Co-ordination of perspectives.
Developmental Psychol.. 7. 21-33.
FISHER, M.S. (193*0. Language patterns of preschool children.
Child Dev. Monog. No.15.
FLAVELL, J.H. (1963). The developmental psychology of Jean Piaget.
New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
FLAVELL, J.H. (197*0 • The development of inferences about others.
In Mischel, T. (ed.) Understanding other persons. Oxford: Blackwell.
FLAVELL, J.H., BOTKIN, P.T., FRY, C.L., WRIGHT, J.W., and JARVIS, P.E.
(1968). The development of role-taking and communication skills in
children. New York: Wiley.
FRY, C.L. (1966). Training children to communicate to listeners.
Child Dev.. 37. 675-685.
FRY, C.L. (1969). Training children to communicate to listeners who
have varying listener requirements. J. Genet. Psychol.. llU. 153-166.
GARNET, J. and PLANT, E. (1972). On the measurement of egocentrism:
a replication and extension of Aebli's findings. Br, J. Educat. Psychol.
b2, 79-83.
GARVEY, C. and HOGAN, R. (1973). Social speech and social interaction:
egocentrism revisited. Child Dev.. UU, 562-568.
GEACH, P.T. (1962). Reference and generality. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press.
GIBSON, E.J., GIBSON, J.J., PICK, A.D., and OSSER, H. (1962). A
developmental study of the discrimination of letter-like forms.
J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol.. 55. 897-906.
GIBSON, J.J., and PICK, A.D. (1963). Perception of another person's
looking behaviour. Amer. J. Psychol.. 76, 386-395.
GLUCKSBERG, G.S. and KRAUSS, R.M. (1967). What do people say after
they have learned how to talk?. Studies of the development of
referential communications. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly. 13, 309-316.
GOFFMAN, E. (1961). Encounters. Chicago: Bobbs-Merill.
GOFFMAN, E. (1963). Behaviour in public places. Illinois: Free
Press.
GOFFMAN, E. (1967). Interaction Ritual. London: Allen Lane The
Penguin Press.
GOMBRICH, E.H. (i960). Art and Illusion: a study in the psychology
of pictorial representation. London: Phaidon Press.
5.
GOMBRICH, E.H. (1972). The visual image. Scientific American.
227. 82-97.
GRICE, H.P. (1957). Meaning. Phil. Rev.. 63. 377-388.
GRICE, H.P. (i960). Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and
word-meaning. Found, of Lang.. 1-18.
GRIEVE, R. (1971). Some studies of language use and class inclusion.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Edinburgh.
GRUBER, J.A. (1967). Topicalization in child language. Found, of
Lang.. _3, 37-65.
HABERMAS, J. (1970). Introductory remarks to a theory of communicative
competence. In Dreitzel, H.P. (ed.) Recent Sociology No.2. London:
Macmillan.
HARRIS, L.J. and STROMMEN, E. (1972). The role of front-back features
in children's 'front', 'back', and 'beside' placements of objects.
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly. 18. 259-271.
HERING, E. (l86l). Spatial sense and movements of the eye. (Trans. I9I+2
A.Radde). Baltimore: Amer. Acad. Optom.
HERMELIN, B. and O'CONNOR, N. (1970). Psychological experiments with
autistic children. Oxford: Pergamon, Press.
ROUSSIDAS, L. (1965). Co-ordination of perspectives in children.
Archiv. Fuer Die Gesamte Psychologie. 117. 319-326.
HOUSSIDAS, L. and BROWN, L. (1967). The co-ordination of perspectives
by mentally defective children. J. Genetic Psychol.. 110. 211-215.
HOWARD, I.P. and TEMPLETON, W.B. (1966). Human spatial orientation.
London: Wiley.
HUTT, C. and OUNSTED, C. (1966). The biological significance of
6.
gaze aversion with particular reference to the syndrome of infantile
autism. Behav. Science. 11, 3*^6-356.
HUTTENLOCHER, J. (1967a). Discrimination of figure orientation:
effects of relative position. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol., 63.
359-361.
HUTTENLOCHER, J. (1967b). Children's ability to order and orient
objects Child Dev.. 38, 1169-1176.
HUTTENLOCHER, J. and PRESSON, C.C. (1973). Mental rotation and
the perspective problem. Cognitive Psychol.. _U, 277-299.
HUXLEY, R. (1970). The development of the correct use of subject
personal pronouns in two children. In Flores D'Arcais, G.B. and
Levelt, W.J.M. (eds.), Advances in psycholinguistics. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
INHELDER, B. and PIAGET, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking
from childhood to adolescence. London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.
INHELDER, B. and PIAGET, J. (196*0. The early growth of logic in
the child: classification and seriation. London:Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
ISAACS, S. (1933). Social development in young children. New York:
Hareourt, Brace.
JAK0BS0N, R. (1972). Collected papers. The Hague: Mounton.
KANNER, L. (l9*+3). Autistic disturbances of affective contact.
Nervous Child. 217-250.
ICATZ, D. and KATZ, R. (1928). Conversations with children. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
KENDON, A. and FERBER, A. (197*0 . A description of some human
greetings. In Michael, R.P. and Crook, J.H. (eds.), Comparative ecology
7.
and behaviour of primates. London: Academic Press.
KOHLBERG, L., YAEGER, J. and HJERTHOLM, E. (1968). The development
of private speech: four studies and a review of the theories. Child
Dev.. 39, 691-736.
KUHN, T.S., (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions.
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. _2, No.2.
LAURENDAEU, M. and PINARD, A. (1970)• The development of the concept
of space in the child. New York: International Universities Press.
LEACH, G.M. (1972). A comparison of the social behaviour of some
normal and problem children. In Blurton Jones, N.G. (ed.). Ethological
studies of child behaviour. London: Cambridge University Press.
LEOPOLD, W. (19^9). Speech development of a bilingual child, vol. 3.
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
LEWIS, M.M. (1937). The beginnings of reference to past and present
in a child's speech. Brit. J. Educ. Psychol. lt 39~56.
LEWIS, S. and FISHBEIN, H.D. (1969). Space perception in children:
A disconfirmation of Piaget's developmental hypothesis. Paper presented
at the meeting of the Psychonomic Society, St. Louis.
LIGHT, P. (197^). The role-taking skills of four year old children.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge.
LOVELL, K. (1959). A follow up study of some aspects of the work
of Piaget and Inhelder on the child's conception of space. Br. J.
Educ. Pschol.. 2£, 10U-117.
LYONS, J. (1973). Deixis as the source of reference. Work in
Progress. Department of Linguistics, Edinburgh University, _6, 92-115.
MCCARTHY, D. (195^). Language development in children. In Carmichael,
L. (ed.). Manual of Child Psychology. 2nd. Edition. New York: Wiley.
8.
McGARRIGLE, J. and DONALDSON, M. (1975). Conservation accidents.
Unpublished paper, University of Edinburgh.
MACKIE, J. (1970). What's really wrong with phenomenalism? Annual
Philosophical Lecture, British Academy.
McNEILL, D. (1966). Developmental psycholinguistics. In Smith, F.
and Miller, G.A. (eds.), The genesis of language. Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press.
McNEILL, D. (1970). The acquisition of language. New York: Harper
and Row.
MARSHALL, J.C. (1971). Can humans talk? In Morton, J. (ed.).
Biological and sociological factors in psycholinguistics. London:
Logos Press.
MARSHALL, J.C. and WALES, R.J. (197*0. Pragmatics as biology or
culture. In Charry, C. (ed.), Pragmatic Aspects of Human Communication.
Dordrecht Holland: Reidel.
MASANGKAY, Z.S., McCLUSKEY, K.A., McINTYRE, C.W., SIMS-KNIGHT, J.,
VAUGHN, B.E., and FLAVELL, J.H. (197*0. The early development of infer¬
ences about the visual percepts of others. Child Dev.. Ug, 357-366.
MEAD, G.H. (193*0 . Mind. Self and Society. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
MEAD, G.H. (.19^7). Language and the development of the self. In Newcomb,
T.M. and Hartley, E.L. (eds.) Readings in Social Psychology. New York
Henry Holt.
NEALE, J.M. (1966). Egocentrism in institutionalized and non-institution¬
alized children. Child Dev.. 37. 97-101.
OVER, R. and OVER, J. (1967). Detection and recognition of mirror-image
obliques by young children. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol.. 6k, k6'J-kr(Q.
PARK, C.C. (1972) The Siege. London: Penguin Press.
9.
PETERSON, C.L., DANNER, F.W. and FLAVELL, J.H. (1972). Developmental
changes in children's responses to three indications of communicative
failure. Child Dev.. 43. 1463-1468.
PIAGET, J. (1926). The language and thought of the child. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
PIAGET, J. (1928). Judgement and reasoning in the child. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
PIAGET, J. (1932). The moral .judgement of the child. London: Kegan Paul.
PIAGET, J. (1950)• The psychology of intelligence. New York: Harcourt,
Brace.
PIAGET, J. (1951). Play, dreams and imitation in childhood. New York:
Norton.
PIAGET, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. New York:
International Universities Press.
PIAGET, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York:
Basic Books.
PIAGET, J. (1959). The measurement of egocentric language in verbal
communication between the adult and the child and in verbal exchanges
between children. Chapter added to the 3rd. edition of The language
and thought of the child.
PIAGET, J. (1962). Comments on Vygotsky's critical remarks concerning
'The language and thought of the child' and 'Judgement and reasoning
in the child'. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
PIAGET, J. and INHELDER, B. (1956). The child's conception of space.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paxil.
PIAGET, J. and INHELDER, B. (1969). The psychology of the child.
London; Routledge and Kegan Paxil.
10.
QUINE, W.O. (i960). Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.: M.T.I.
Press.
QUINE, W.O. (1968). Ontological relativity. J. Phil.. **5«
185-212.
RICHARDS, M.P.M. (197*0. First steps in becoming social. In
Richards, M.P.M. (ed.). The integration of a child into a social
world. London: Cambridge University Press.
RICHARDS, M.P.M. and BERNAL, J.F. (1972). An observational study
of mother-infant interaction. In Blurton Jones, N.G. (ed.).
Ethological studies of child behaviour. London: Cambridge University
Press.
RIEMER, M.D. (19**9). The averted gaze. Psychiat. Quart.. 23,
108-115.
RIEMER, M.D. (1955). Abnormalities of the gaze-a classification.
Psychiat. Quart.. 29, 659-672.
RUBIN, K. (1973). Egocentrism in childhood: a unitary construct?
Child Dev., 102-110.
RUDEL, R.G. and TEUBER, H.L. (1963). Discrimination of direction
of line in children J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol.. 56, 892-898.
RYAN, J. (197*0. Early language development: towards a communications!
analysis. In Richards, M.P.M. (ed.). The integration of a child into
a social world. London: Cambridge University Press.
SCAIFE, M. (197*0 • The capacity for joint attention in the infant.
Unpublished paper, Oxford University.
SEARLE, J.R. (1969). Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of
language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
SHAFFER, H.R. (197*0 . Behavioural synchrony in infancy. New Scientist.
11.
62, No.892.
SIIMTZ, C.U., and WATSON, J.S. (1971). Spatial abilities and
spatial egocentrism in the young child. Child Dev., U2, 171-181.
SPITZ, R. and WOLF, K.M. (19U6). The smiling response: a
contribution to the ontogenesis of social relations. Genetic
Psychol. Monographs. N0.3I+, 57-125.
STRAWSON, P.F. (1950). On referring. Mind. J+£, 320-31*1*.
STRAWSON, P.F. (1959). Individuals. London: Methuen.
STRAWSON, P.F. (196U). Intention and convention in speech acts.
Phil. Rev.. h-60.
SULLIVAN, E.V. and HUNT, D.E. (1967). Interpersonal and objective
decentering as a function of age and social class. J, Genet. Psychol.
110. 199-210.
SULLY, J. (1895). Studies of childhood. London: Longmans.
SWANSON, R. and BENTON, A.L. (1955). Some aspects of the genetic
development of right/left discrimination. Child Dev.. 26, 123-131*.
TAYLOR, J.A. and WALES, R.J. (1970). A developmental study of form
discrimination in preschool children. Quart. J. Exper. Psychol..
22, 720-731*.
TREVARTHEN, C.B. (197M. Conversations with a two year old.
New Scientist. 62, No.896.
TREVARTHEN, C.B., HUBLEY, P. and SHEERAN, L. (in press). Psychological
actions in early infancy. La Recherche.
VINE, I. (1971). Judgement of direction of gaze: an interpretation
of discrepant results. Br. J. Soc. Clin. Psychol. 10, 320-331.
VYGOTSKY, L. (1962). Thought and language. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.
Press.
12.
WALES, R.J. (197*0. The child's sentences make sense of the world.
In Bresson, F., (ed.). Current problems in Psycholinguisties.
Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
WHEELER, R. (1972). Children's understanding of pictures as
representations of objects. Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Edinburgh.
Y0UNI33, J. and ROBERTSON, A. (1970). Projective visual imagery
as a function of age and deafness. Child. Dev.. Ul, 215-22U.
